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OFFICE OF CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR WAR CRIMES

EVIDENCE DIVISION

Date : 22 July 1948

I certify that Document Number 2994-PS was introduced into evidence as Exhibit Number USA-472 in the Trial by the International Military Tribunal of Hermann GOERING, et al, which commenced on 20 November 1945, and that the attached photostat is a true and correct copy of the original.

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Nuremberg, 1 July 1948

Paul Joosten

PAUL A. JOOSTEN

General Secretary
International Military
Tribunal

State Dept. files

2997-B5

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SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT

of the

SUPREME HEADQUARTERS ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE COURT OF INQUIRY

re

SHOOTING OF ALLIED PRISONERS OF WAR

by

12 .SS PANZER DIVISION (HITLER-JUGEND)

in

NORMANDY, FRANCE

7-21 June, 1944

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SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT of the SUPREME HEADQUARTERS ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE COURT OF INQUIRY re SHOOTING OF ALLIED PRISONERS OF WAR by 12 SS Panzer Division (Hitler-Jugend) NORMANDY, FRANCE 7 - 21 June 1944

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL
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All original exhibits are on file with Adjutant General (Records) Supreme Headquarters, A.E.F.

*These exhibits have not been proved by evidence but were originally captured with Exhibit C-1 attached to them. The authenticity of Exhibit C-1 has been established in evidence.

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PART I

SUMMARY OF REPORT

1. As a result of the investigations made by the Special Inquiries Section G-1 Division, SHAEF, covering the period following the Allied landings in NORMANDY, it was found that the conduct of the 12 SS Panzer Division (Hitler-Jugend) presented a consistent pattern of brutality and ruthlessness. This characteristic was so marked as to make it appear desirable to assemble in a single document the results of those investigations which involved the Hitler-Jugend Division, with a view to facilitating subsequent action and to making the shameful character of this unit a matter of record.

2. To this end there is presented herewith in condensed form, as an introduction to the formal report of the standing Court of Inquiry which investigated the matter,

(a) The history of the Division, and
(b) A summary of the atrocities committed by members of the Division, and personalities implicated.

This is followed by a detailed record of the Court's proceedings, findings, recommendations and the additional documentary evidence on which the report is based.

A - HISTORY OF DIVISION

3. The 12 SS Panzer Division (Hitler-Jugend) was reorganised for action on the Western Front in 1943, and commenced its training at HEVERLOO and later at DIEST in BELGIUM. There appeared to be no essential enlistment qualification or selection, but as the majority of those composing the Division were 17 or 18 years of age, they came largely from the ranks of the Hitler Youth movement. An effort was made to get the most promising, enthusiastic and fit to enlist voluntarily for service with the Division. Later, recruits were drafted to it irrespective of their own wishes. It is safe to say, however, that, certainly at the outset, the Division was made up of ardent young Nazis who, prior to enlistment in the Division, had been well indoctrinated and trained in the Hitler Youth, to which semi-military organisation at the time all young men were required to belong. The officers and non-commissioned officers were selected from among the best battle experienced men available, the majority having formerly served in the Adolph Hitler Division. All the officers were not of the SS; but most, after attachment to the Division, in time applied for transfer from the Wehrmacht.

4. The members of this Division, as in other SS Divisions, came with respect to appointments, promotions and general administrative policy under the orders of their immediately superior SS formation commander. In operations they conformed to the tactical decisions and orders received through normal channels from superior formation commanders, whether Wehrmacht or SS. Also, like other Waffen SS

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formations, they had distinctive uniforms, ranks and insignia and not only felt themselves to be better soldiers than those of the Wehrmacht, but made that feeling very evident to all.

5. The original Corps Commander was Gruppenfuhrer (Lieut. General) SEPP DIETRICH, and the Divisional Commander was Brigadefuhrer (Major General) FRITZ WITT. The latter commanded the Division in the first days of the fighting in NORMANDY, and, it is believed, was killed on or about 10 June. He was succeeded by Standartenfuhrer (Col) now Brigadefuhrer Kurt MEYER, who from August 1943 had commanded the 25 Panzer Grenadier Regiment in the Division. Kurt MEYER was taken prisoner on 7 September 1944 and has been examined by the Court (Exhibit No. 9).

6. Early in April 1944 the Division moved from BELGIUM to FRANCE and established itself in the vicinity of L'AIGLE. With the commencement of the invasion it moved to assume an operational role North and West of CAEN. The position there was occupied on 7-8 June.

7. Eventually the Division occupied the general area from EPRON on the right to FONTENAY-LA-PESNEL on the left, with the 21 Panzer Division on its right and Panzer Lehr Division on the left. This was the line generally held until the Canadian advance on 26 June which drove the Germans back and started a general withdrawal, culminating in the Battle of Carpiquet and CAEN and the eventual capture of the latter city.

8. Following the loss of CAEN the Division was employed southeast of that city, until forced to flee in the closing of the CAEN-FALAISE pocket. In this they suffered heavy casualties, and were withdrawn across the SEINE and finally taken to AACHEN for reorganisation and reinforcement. It was not until the ARDENNES counter-offensive on 17 December that they were again employed.

B - SUMMARY OF ATROCITIES

9. Of the atrocities reported affecting the Hitler-Jugend Division most have been fully established, and the proof is given in published reports of the Court. Others are related only in the form of sworn allegations of Allied or German prisoners. The Index found at para 28, Part III of this report distinguishes between these two types.

10. The first atrocities occurred at AUTHIE and BURON on 7 June in the course of the attack made on those villages by a combat group or team commanded by Obersturmbannfuhrer MILIUS. This team was composed of the III Battalion of 25 SS Panzer Grenadier Regiment supported by the "Prinz" (Name of C.O.) Battalion of the 12 SS Panzer or Tank Regiment.

11. In the course of this first battle and immediately following it, at least 27 prisoners of war, mostly from the North Nova Scotia Highlanders of the 3 Canadian Infantry Division, were murdered by officers and men of this attacking force. These murders occurred in 12 different proved incidents, and it is believed that the actual total killed was 33. The details of each incident are set forth in Part IV of this Report.

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12. On 8 June, the 12 SS Reconnaissance Battalion which had been attached to the Panzer Lehr Division on the left established a Battle Headquarters at CHATEAU d'AUDRIEU, near PAVIE. On that day, near PUTOT-EN-BESSIN, they overran forward companies of the Royal Winnipeg Rifles and captured prisoners. It has been established that 19 of these prisoners were taken to the Battle Headquarters at the Chateau in 3 separate parties, and there, on the order apparently of an officer, murdered in cold blood by organized firing squads. It is believed that on another occasion that day 7 more suffered the same fate, while an eyewitness and two escaped Canadian prisoners are reported to have seen 18 or 20 more of their fellow prisoners likewise killed in one group. Thus a total of approximately 75 prisoners were murdered by these two units on the first two days of fighting.

13. Thereafter for the next two weeks other murders followed, until a total of 107 victims had been reached in 12 more separate shootings. While most of these latter involved only one or two victims at a time, in two cases more were killed. At LE MESNIL PATRY six bodies were found of men from different units, most bearing signs of previous wounds, and all unmistakably killed while prisoners. At MOUEN seven prisoners, six of whom were from the Queen's Own Rifles of Canada, were taken to a rear headquarters of the 12 SS Engineering Battalion and there interrogated by an officer. Four hours later they were marched under heavy guard to a point outside the village, where they were shot.

14. In another case 3 prisoners, after an unsatisfactory interrogation by a Regimental Commander, were stripped of all identifying marks, taken a short distance away and in the view of this officer shot dead.

15. Another Regimental Commander himself ordered the shooting of prisoners, following interrogations. Other officers either told their troops that the British and Canadians did not take prisoners, by implication leaving it to their men to take appropriate retaliatory action, or definitely told them not to take prisoners or to shoot them if taken. One officer ordered or permitted a non-commissioned officer to shoot down in cold blood a wounded American aviator who had been taken prisoner.

16. This cowardly murder of prisoners, who undoubtedly died in many cases because they would not betray their comrades or their cause, demands that especially those ordering the killings or encouraging them, as well as the actual perpetrators be brought to justice and made to suffer the full punishment for their criminal conduct.

17. The Commander of this Division from 10 June on, who had previously commanded the Regiment responsible for the murders at AUTHIE, is a prisoner in Allied hands. He has been questioned at length by the Court, but denies all knowledge of these murders. It may be for a Court composed of military officers with experience in command and combat, to determine finally the weight to be given to such denials, and the responsibility which he must bear for the actions

of his senior and junior officers and those acting under their orders and example.

18. That this Division gained for itself in the NORMANDY Campaign a most unsavory reputation, even among the rest of the German Armed Forces, is evident from the fact that German prisoners taken, admit that it was called the "Murder Division". How apt the title was, is amply shown from an examination of its infamous record. How many more prisoners became victims to the brutality of its members will probably never be known. That it remained true to its reputation, however, was demonstrated when as a reorganized Division it was next committed to action in the counter-offensive of December 1944 in the ARDENNES. In this counter-offensive American prisoners in even larger number were massacred in circumstances of the greatest brutality near MALMEDY and elsewhere by the members of this Division and another SS Division, the Liebstandarte Adolph Hitler.

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NOTE: For the purpose of this report arbitrary abbreviations have been adopted for reference to SS ranks, as shown below with corresponding British Army rank.

	Gruppenfuhrer	- Lieut. General
	Brigadefuhrer	- Major General
	Oberfuhrer	- Senior Colonel) Brigadier
	Standartenfuhrer	- Colonel)
OSBF	Obersturmbannfuhrer	- Lt. Col.
SBF	Sturmbannfuhrer	- Major
HSF	Hauptsturmfuhrer	- Capt.
OSF	Obersturmfuhrer	- Lieut.
USF	Untersturmfuhrer	- 2/Lt.
S SchF	Sturmscharfuhrer	- Staff Sjt.
H SchF	Hauptscharfuhrer	- WO I.
Ö SchF	Oberscharfuhrer	- C.S.M.
SchF	Scharfuhrer	- Sjt.
U SchF	Unterscharfuhrer	- Cpl.
O'Faehnr (Faehnr)	Oberfaehnrich	- Officer Candidate
RF	Rottenfuhrer	- Sr. L/Cpl.
SM	Sturmmann	- Jr. L/Cpl.
Mann	Mann	- Private
Soldat	Soldat	- Private
Schtz	Schutze	- Rifleman
Gren	Grenadier	- Grenadier

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Proceedings of a Court of Inquiry

assembled in the field

pursuant to orders of the

SUPREME COMMANDER

ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE

dated 20 August 1944

and pursuant to

letters of Supreme Headquarters

Allied Expeditionary Force

GAP 900/10/3 dated 18 August 1944
GAP 900/10 dated 21 August 1944

and pursuant also to the

order dated 11 February 1945 and

GAP 000.5-2(25) dated 8 March 1945

referring all cases affecting the

12 SS PANZER DIVISION (HITLER-JUGEND)

to the

consideration of the Court for a

SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT

PART II

1. The Court having had referred to it, in the course of its inquiry into le MESNIL-PARTY, les SAULLETS and AUTHIE Cases, information tending to show the commission of additional atrocities in the area held in Normandy by the 12 SS Panzer Division (Hitler-Jugend) during June 1944, decided to perpetuate such information as sworn testimony for later use. It was also decided to bring out, if it should later be found of value, a Supplementary Report to contain this additional evidence, and also any other information which might become available to substantiate or supplement the Reports already made by the Special and Standing Courts. The sittings of the Court hereinafter recorded to have taken place prior to 10 March 1945, were held accordingly, to perpetuate such information.

28 November 1944

2. The Court assembled for the hearing of such further evidence at Canadian Military Headquarters, Cockspur Street, London, at 1400 hours, on the 27 November 1944.

Present were:

ACTING PRESIDENT

Lt. Col. J.H. BORASTON, CB, OBE.,
T.A.R.O. Spec. List (British)
Supreme Headquarters, A.E.F.

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MEMBERS

Lt. Col. B.J.S. MACDONALD, E.D.,
Essex Scottish Regiment (Canadian)
Supreme Headquarters, A.E.F.

Lt. Col. CHARLES S. CUTTING,
Infantry, United States Army,
Supreme Headquarters, A.E.F.

IN ATTENDANCE

SSM G.J. NORWOOD,
R.A.S.C.
(Court Reporter)

3. The Members of the Court and the Court Reporter were reminded of their former oaths. The following witnesses were then examined on oath:

(a) Lieut. Donald Arthur JAMES, Royal Winnipeg Rifles, Canadian Army, whose recorded evidence is attached to this report, marked as Exhibit No. 10.

(b) H62861 Rfn. LEBAR, W.R., Royal Winnipeg Rifles, Canadian Army, whose recorded evidence is attached to this Report, marked as Exhibit No. 11.

(c) H102670 Rfn. LEE, L.W., Regina Rifles, Canadian Army, whose recorded evidence is attached to this Report, marked as Exhibit No. 12.

The Court adjourned at 1730 hours.

6 January 1945

4. The Court, constituted as last mentioned, assembled for the hearing of further evidence, at Headquarters Central Continental Enclosure Number 14, United States Prisoner of War Overhead Detachment 2021, APO 517, Chartes, France, at 1120 hours, 6 January 1945.

IN ATTENDANCE

2nd Lt. Walter C. Furst,
Military Intelligence Service,
United States Army.
(Interpreter)

T/4 Paul Maiorana,
(Court Reporter)

5. The Interpreter was duly sworn by the Acting President. The following named witness was examined on oath:-

Gren. Friedrich Torbanisch, Prisoner of War, late of 15 Company, 25 Panzer Grenadier Regiment, 12 SS Panzer Division (Hitler-Jugend), whose recorded evidence is attached to this Report marked as Exhibit No. 5.

The Court adjourned at 1245 hours.

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6. The evidence obtained at the sittings of the Court above recorded, and other supplementary information which had become available, decided the Court that a Supplementary Report had become desirable. The rendering of such Supplementary Report was by Supreme Headquarters letter GAP 000.5-2 (25) dated 8 March 1945 (Exhibit No. 4) referred to the Court presided over by Lt. Col. B.J.S. MACDONALD. The Court assembled for the hearing of further evidence at London District Prisoners of War Cage, 7 Kensington Palace Gardens, London at 1105 hours on Saturday, 10 March 1945.

Present were:

PRESIDENT

Lt. Col. B.J.S. MACDONALD, ED.,
Essex Scottish Regiment (Canadian Army)
Supreme Headquarters, A.E.F.

MEMBERS

Lt. Col. J.H. BORASTON, CB, OBE.,
T.A.R.O. Spec. List (British)
Supreme Headquarters, A.E.F.

Lt.Col. CHARLES S. CUTTING,
Infantry, United States Army,
Supreme Headquarters, A.E.F.

IN ATTENDANCE

Lt. R. W. ROOME,
Intelligence Corps,
British Army (Interpreter)

B128528 S/Sgt. J. C. LONGWORTH,
J.A.G. Branch C.M.H.Q.,
Canadian Army, England.
(Court Reporter)

7. The Members of the Court were reminded of their former oaths, and the Interpreter and Court Reporter were then duly sworn by the President. The following witnesses were then called and examined upon oath:

(a) Gren. Georg MERTENS, P.O.W. No.31G1/ 112.666 late of III Battalion, 25 Panzer Grenadier Regiment, 12 SS Panzer Division (Hitler-Jugend), whose recorded evidence is attached to this Report marked as Exhibit No. 6.

(b) Gren. BERNARD HERHOLZ, P.O.W. No.31G1/ 111.766 late of same unit, the relevant portions of whose evidence is attached to this Report, as Exhibit No. 7. The remainder of this witness's evidence concerned an operation of 17 December 1944 and is on file with the Adjutant General, Supreme Headquarters, A.E.F.

The Court adjourned at 1615 hours.

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26 March 1945 SECRET

8. The Court, specially composed, assembled for the hearing of further evidence at London District Prisoner of War Cage, 7 Kensington Palace Gardens, London, at 1030 hours on 26 March 1945.

Present were:

PRESIDENT

Major General R. W. BARKER,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1 Division,
Supreme Headquarters, A.E.F.

MEMBERS

Lt. Col. B.J.S. MACDONALD, ED.,
Essex Scottish Regiment (Canadian Army)
Supreme Headquarters, A.E.F.

Lt. Col. J.H. BORASTON, CB, OBE,
T.A.R.O. Spec. List (British)
Supreme Headquarters, A.E.F.

Lt. Col. John P. Page, ED,
Toronto Scottish Regiment (Canadian Army)
Supreme Headquarters, A.E.F.

IN ATTENDANCE

Lt. Col. A.P. SCOTLAND, OBE,
O.C. London District Prisoner of War Cage

and

Lt. R. W. ROOME,
Intelligence Corps (British)

(Interpreter)

SSM G.J. NORWOOD, R.A.S.C.

(Court Reporter)

9. The following named German Officer was then examined, not on oath:

Brigadefuhrer (Major General) Kurt MEYER, late G.O.C., 12 SS Panzer Division (Hitler-Jugend), whose recorded voluntary answers to questions put to him by the Court are attached to this Report marked as Exhibit No. 8.

The Court adjourned at 1905 hours.

27 March 1945

10. The Court resumed at London District Prisoner of War Cage, at 1000 hours on 27 March 1945.

Present were:

PRESIDENT

Lt. Col. B.J.S. MACDONALD, ED.,
Essex Scottish Regiment (Canadian Army),
Supreme Headquarters, A.E.F.

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MEMBERS

Lt. Col. J.H. BORASTON, CB, OBE,
T.A.R.O. Spec. List (British)
Supreme Headquarters, A.E.F.

Lt. Col. JOHN P. PAGE, ED,
Toronto Scottish Regiment (Canadian Army)
Supreme Headquarters, A.E.F.

IN ATTENDANCE

Lt. R. W. ROOME (Interpreter)

SSM G.J. NORWOOD (Court Reporter)

11. The examination, not on oath, of

Brigadefuhrer Kurt MEYER was continued. His further voluntary answers to questions asked by the Court are attached hereto marked Exhibit No. 9.

The Court adjourned at 1645 hours.

12. The Court then considered all the evidence above recorded or referred to respecting the shooting of Allied Prisoners of War at:

(a) Authie
(b) Chateau d'Audrieu
(c) St. Sulpice-sur-Risle Rille
(d) les Saullets
(e) le Mesnil-Patry
(f) les Mains
(g) Mouen
(gg) Argentan

together with all relevant reported statements of German prisoners of war, so far not examined on oath. Pursuant to instructions contained in the said letter dated 8 March 1945, referring the matter, the Court then proceeded to draft its findings, its reasons therefor and its recommendations for future action.

13. In addition the Court has included in Parts V and VI of this Report all other information which has come to it respecting the conduct of the 12 SS Panzer Division (Hitler-Jugend) in the Normandy Campaign and elsewhere and has recorded its findings and recommendations thereon.

092159

Signed in the Field this 19th day of April 1945.

SECRET

B.J.S. MACDONALD,
Lieutenant-Colonel,
Essex Scottish Regiment (Canadian),
Supreme Headquarters, A.E.F.
PRESIDENT.

J. H. BORASTON,
Lieutenant-Colonel,
T.A.R.O. Spec. List (British),
Supreme Headquarters, A.E.F.
MEMBER

CHARLES S. CUTTING,
Lieutenant-Colonel,
Infantry, United States Army,
Supreme Headquarters, A.E.F.
MEMBER.

JOHN P. PAGE,
Lieutenant-Colonel,
Toronto Scottish Regiment (Canadian)
Supreme Headquarters, A.E.F.
MEMBER.

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PART III

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SECTION I - FINDINGS OF THE COURT

1. (a) That seven cases of violations of the laws and usages of warfare and the terms of the Geneva Conventions, 1929, by members of the German Armed Forces have been established.

(b) That these cases occurred between the 7 and 17 June 1944, in NORMANDY, FRANCE.

(c) That the victims of such violations were all unarmed Allied prisoners of war in uniform, many of whom had ~~been previously wounded, and none of~~ whom had been previously wounded, and none of whom had resisted, endeavoured to escape or otherwise committed any act to justify their captors in killing them.

(d) That the cases represented 20 separate incidents and 64 prisoner of war victims, 62 Canadian, 1 British and 1 American, of whom 2 only of the 64 survived, all others being killed.

(e) That the perpetrators were members of the 12 SS Panzer Division (Hitler-Jugend) and of the following units:

12 SS Reconnaissance Battalion
12 SS Engineering (Pionier) Battalion
"Prinz" Battalion of 12 SS Panzer Regiment
III Battalion 25 Panzer Grenadier Regiment, and
II Battalion 26 Panzer Grenadier Regiment.

(f) That the Commanding Officers of the said units respectively at the relevant times were:

Sturmbannfuhrer GERHARDT BREMER
Sturmbannfuhrer MUELLER (or MULLER)
Obersturmbannfuhrer KARL HEINZ MILIUS
Sturmbannfuhrer PRINZ (believed killed), and
Sturmbannfuhrer BERNARD SIEBKEN

(g) That the Regimental Commanders at the relevant times were:

Brigadefuhrer KURT MEYER, succeeded in command of the 25 Panzer Grenadier Regiment about 10 June 1944 by Obersturmfuhrer KARL HEINZ MILIUS.

Standartenfuhrer WILHELM MOHNKE, of the 26 Panzer Grenadier Regiment.

(h) That the Divisional Commander, until he was killed about 10 June 1944, was Brigadefuhrer FRITZ WITT, succeeded immediately by Brigadefuhrer KURT MEYER.

(i) That the 12 SS Panzer Division (Hitler-Jugend) was a part of the 1 SS Panzer Corps, commanded by Obergruppenfuhrer SEPP DIETRICH and that the 1 Corps in turn was part of Panzer Group West, commanded by General der Panzertruppen GEYR von SCHWEPPENBURG, which formation was part of the Seventh Army commanded by Generaloberst DOLLMAN.

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2. That there is no sufficient evidence upon which responsibility for the said atrocities can be placed upon the Commander of any formation higher than the Division under examination.

3. That subject to paragraphs 7 and 8 below,

(a) There is at present no sufficient evidence directly implicating personally the two respective Divisional Commanders, FRITZ WITT and KURT MEYER.

(b) There is no corroborated evidence directly implicating personally the two Regimental Commanders, KARL HEINZ MILIUS and WILHELM MOHNKE.

(c) Except as set forth in paragraph 4 below, there is no evidence directly implicating personally any of the battalion commanders, officers or non-commissioned officers of the Division by name.

4. (a) That there is, however, circumstantial evidence directly implicating personally the following officers:

Sturmbannfuhrer GERHARDT BREMER, Hauptsturmfuhrer Von REITZENSTEIN and Obersturmfuhrers SCHENK and KIRCHNER, and the following non-commissioned officers: Stabscharfuhrer HAGETORN (said to have been killed) and Unterscharfuhrer HUGO WOLF.

(b) That there is also direct evidence implicating certain other officers and non-commissioned officers, unknown by name, who personally participated in the shootings at AUTHIE, AUDRIEU, les SAULLETS, les FAINS and MOUEN.

5. (a) That enlisted men/other ranks of 15 Company 25 Panzer Grenadier Regiment were given secret orders by Stabscharfuhrer HAGETORN at a formal parade of the Company to the effect that "SS troops shall take no prisoners; prisoners are to be executed after having been interrogated", and were also told that the officers had stated that the British did not take prisoners, so far as SS soldiers were concerned.

(b) That an Obersturmfuhrer of the III Battalion 26 SS Panzer Grenadier Regiment told his men that the British did not take prisoners, and that they were not to take prisoners either.

(c) That the men of the 12 SS Engineering (Pionier) and Reconnaissance Battalions were likewise told by their officers and non-commissioned officers that the British did not take prisoners.

(d) That no orders had been issued by Divisional Headquarters respecting observance of the terms of the Geneva Convention until after the protest made by the Canadian Government through the International Red Cross in July, 1944; although it was said by KURT MEYER under interrogation that provision was always made in Divisional Orders for the selection of points for the collection and evacuation of prisoners of war.

6. That in 5 of the total number of 20 established incidents or separate atrocities, shootings were carried out in an organised way by firing squads under

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command of non-commissioned officers (AUDRIEU 3, ST. SULPICE 1, MOUEN 1), while in two more cases officers or non-commissioned officers personally committed the reported atrocities (AUTHIE).

7. (a) That, by reason of the foregoing and the general prevalence of such cases throughout the Division, in which officers and non-commissioned officers participated, the conclusion is irresistible that it was understood throughout the Division, if not actually ordered, that a policy of denying quarter or executing prisoners after interrogation was impliedly if not openly approved by the Regimental and Divisional Commanders or at least would be treated by them with acquiescence.

(b) That, if such a policy was not so approved, or acquiesced in by the said Commander, then a lack of discipline and proper supervision prevailed throughout the Division in this particular matter, for which the respective Battalion, Regimental and Divisional Commanders are responsible.

8. (a) That, if the uncorroborated sworn statements of Allied soldiers and German prisoners not so far examined by the Court are accepted as true then the following officers are personally implicated as actual perpetrators of atrocities:

Standartenfuhrer WILHELM MOHNKE, now commanding 1 SS Panzer Division,
Obersturmbannfuhrer KARL HEINZ MILIUS, and
Sturmbannfuhrer SIEGFRIED MUELLER

the total numbers of incidents and victims being then increased respectively to totals of 31 and 107 (103 Canadians, 3 British and 1 American).

(b) That, if the evidence referred to in sub-paragraph 8 (a) above is eventually established, then one or other of two conclusions follows: either such conditions and conduct in the Division existed with the knowledge and approval of the Divisional Commanders WITT and MEYER, or the said Divisional Commanders failed in their duty to see that the provisions of the Geneva Conventions, 1929, were observed by all ranks under their command; in either of which cases they are responsible for the results of a condition of affairs in their Division which they in the one case sanctioned and encouraged and in the other criminally failed to prevent.

SECTION II - SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE

A - INTRODUCTION

9. Following the invasion of Europe in the summer of 1944, reports were received by Headquarters 21 Army Group of violations by the German Armed Forces of the well recognised laws and usages of war, and more particularly of the terms of the Geneva Conventions, 1929. The Commander in Chief in consequence appointed a Special Court of Inquiry to investigate and report upon the atrocity alleged to have occurred at Chateau d'Audrieu. This Court was headed by Major General R.W. BARKER, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1 Division, Supreme Headquarters, A.E.F. Soon thereafter a second atrocity was reported from MOUEN. The Supreme Commander

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then instructed the same Court to investigate this case as well and as further reports were received a standing Court was appointed on 20 August as a special inquiry branch of G-1 Division, Supreme Headquarters to make all necessary investigations and reports respecting new cases. The Members of the Courts were representative of the three main invading armies, British, American and Canadian. Each Court was to carry out its work in such a manner that evidence obtained and reports made could, where justified, be used as the basis for the prosecution and trial after the war of those found responsible for such violations, or "war crimes".

10. A large volume of reported cases occurred at the beginning of the Normandy campaign from 7 - 21 June, in the sector invaded by the 3 Canadian Infantry Division and defended by the 12 SS Panzer Division (Hitler-Jugend). The Courts have established that in seven of these cases, involving 20 separate incidents and 64 victims, such violations of the Geneva Conventions did occur. They have reports from escaped Allied prisoners of war and from German prisoners of war of seven more cases, involving an additional 42 victims and implicating personally four high ranking officers of the 12 SS Division.

11. This Report is intended primarily to be supplementary to those already brought out with respect to the said seven established cases. It contains such additional evidence as may have been obtained since the publication of those reports, and includes such further recommendations as appear necessary by reason thereof. The Report also includes a record of the other atrocities about which information has since been obtained, whether from stories related by escaped prisoners of war or by German prisoners or otherwise. It has been impossible as yet, (most of the German prisoners concerned are in the U.S. or Canada) to verify these reports and to obtain other confirmatory evidence. In the meantime, they must be accepted with some reserve. It is therefore recommended that all these witnesses, German or other, should be examined at length wherever they may be and as soon as conveniently possible; and likewise any other German prisoners who may now be or hereafter come into Allied hands and be able to confirm or add to the evidence so obtained. Following the end of the war, repatriated Canadian prisoners and others will, doubtless, be able to add still further evidence, and will have to be questioned for that purpose.

12. In the meantime, it has been decided, as a matter of policy, that the investigation of war crimes is to be carried out by national investigating bodies of the countries concerned, rather than by Supreme Headquarters. It is considered essential therefore that, even though still incomplete, a record of the work so far done by this Court beyond that recorded in Reports already rendered, and its findings thereon and recommendations for future action, should be perpetuated for the assistance and guidance of those whose task it may be to complete this inquiry and prepare the cases for trial.

13. The Court has first set forth its findings, reasons for findings and recommendations of a general character affecting the 12 SS Panzer Division (Hitler-Jugend) as a whole. It will then proceed to an

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examination of each case in turn, giving further facts, findings and recommendations respecting each; in accordance with its terms of reference and the said letter of 8 March 1945 calling for the submission of this Supplementary Report.

14. The history of the 12 SS Panzer Division down to its commencement of its campaign in Normandy is given in Part I hereof, as well as a summary of the atrocities chargeable to it thereafter. In the succeeding paragraphs of this section the movements of the Division, the boundaries of its various units, and the locations of the respective Headquarters are set forth as ascertained from various witnesses.

15. Early in April 1944 the Division moved from BELGIUM to FRANCE and established itself in the vicinity of L'AIGLE. With the commencement of the invasion it moved to assume an operational role North and West of CAEN. The position there was occupied on 7 - 8 June. The first operation a successful counter-attack was put in on the village of AUTHIE and BURON by the III Battalion of the 25 SS Panzer Grenadier Regiment, supported by the "Prinz" (name of C.O.) Battalion of the 12 SS Panzer Regiment. This action took place about the middle of the afternoon on 7 June. The combat group or team was commanded by OSBF MILIUS, C.O. of the III Battalion. In the course of this first battle and immediately following it, at least 27 Canadian prisoners of war in 12 different proved incidents were murdered by the officers and men of this attacking force.

16. The 25th Regiment, being the first of the Division to move into the combat zone, occupied a front Northwest of CAEN; but actually did not take it over until the 8th June. The line in the meantime was held by the 21st Panzer Division on the right and a mixture of G.A.F., Anti-aircraft and Coastal Defence troops on the left. The balance of the Division moved in, however, on the 8/9 June and the line was finally established, as shown on Exhibit "B", with the 25th Regiment holding the area from EPRON on the right to LA VILLONEUVE on the left. The I Battalion was on the right, II Battalion centre and III Battalion left, with an anti-aircraft unit holding a locality to the Northeast of AUTHIE and a company of engineers a position between the latter and LA VILLONEUVE. The area of the 26th Regiment extended from the latter village to FONTENAY-LE-PESNEL. The I Battalion, originally Northwest of NORREY-EN-BESSIN, was withdrawn to a position Northwest of ST. MAUVIEU. The Engineering (or "Pionier") Battalion was Northwest of CHEUX, with battle outposts between that position and LE MESNIL-PATRY. The other two battalions were on the left, as shown on the Exhibit. The Panzer Lehr Division was on the left again. This disposition appears to have remained more or less the same, until the Canadian advance on 26 June drove back the Germans and started a general withdrawal, culminating in the Battle of CAEN and the eventual capture of that city.

17. The location of the various Headquarters as given by Brigadefuhrer MEYER on his examination (Exhibit No. 8) is important and is as follows: Divisional Headquarters, marked on the exhibit with Roman numeral I from 8 to 10 or 11 June at 004671 just outside CAEN, II at VERSON, III at LOUVIGNY (2 days), IV at barracks in CAEN. MEYER says that No. I was occupied until he took over the Division. As

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to the precise date when the latter occurred he is determinedly evasive. He refused to say more than that he took over command the day on which his predecessor WITT was killed. This he thinks was the 10 June; but it may have been the 11th. MEYER was actually appointed G.O.C. on the 15th. But as soon as he assumed command on the earlier date, he moved the Headquarters to VERSON, where he says that it stayed less than 5 days, moving then to LOUVIGNY for 2 days and thence to CAEN.

18. 25th Regimental Headquarters was established at ST. GERMAIN LA-BLANCHE-HERBE, opposite the prison, with a Battle Headquarters at the fine observation point in the "Abbaye" at ARDENNE. The Abbaye was also frequently used for the same purpose by the Divisional Commander. 26th Regimental Headquarters was in an open field between AMURAY and GRANVILLE-SUR-ODON, at M.R. 897648, with its Battle Headquarters up near FONTENAY-LE-PESNEL at 883670, where the two left battalions of the Regiment also had their Headquarters.

MEYER was not able to say precisely where the Reconnaissance Battalion operated; because it had been attached to the Panzer Lehr Division on the left, during the early stages of the campaign.

19. Commencing on the 26 June the Division was forced back and took up defensive positions to the immediate West and Southwest of CAEN, as marked in green on Exhibit "P". From here under cover of G.A.F. and Security troops they took up early in July new positions in the area of SOUMONT, astride the CAEN-FALAISE road. As the squeeze on the FALAISE pocket started, they were moved astride the CAEN-LISIEUX Road near VILLONT. From there they were withdrawn across the Seine to BEAUVAIS and finally east of AACHEN for rest, reinforcement and reorganization. It was not until the ARDENNES counter-offensive on December 17th that they were again employed.

C - REASONS FOR FINDINGS

20. A list of the personalities serving with the Division in Normandy is given in Exhibit 27, together with physical descriptions where available. This was obtained from evidence given before the Court, and from other information made available to it. With respect to the senior officers it is confirmed by MEYER.

21. Since the submission of the earlier Reports herein referred to, there has come into the possession of the Court a top secret order (Exhibit C-1 - C-2) issued by Hitler's Headquarters on 18 October 1942, directing the denial of quarter to Commandos and Paratroopers, whether in uniform or not. The order was repeated under cover of letter dated 10 October 1944 (Exhibits C-3 - C-4). These were not involved directly in any of the cases immediately before the Court; but the order of 1942 is of importance in many other cases, and is also indicative of the attitude of OKH to the laws of warfare. MEYER admitted the authenticity of the order, and that he had seen it at the time of its circulation.

22. MEYER was also confronted with the secret order (Exhibits A-1 - 3) which German Prisoner of War Torbanisch, of the 15th Company attached to 25th Regimental

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Headquarters, said was given to his company. This order was given by the Company Speiss (1st Sgt/CSM) HAGETORN just prior to the Division being moved to France in April 1944. MEYER denied that any such order had been authorized by himself or anyone superior to him, or by the 15th Company Commander. He said that the Speiss must have made up the order himself without authority. He also denied that anything was ever said to the effect that the British or Canadians did not take prisoners, from which statements German troops might have implied permission to retaliate. On the contrary, he said that, except for one case which they had investigated, many Germans captured by the Canadians had escaped and all reported that they had been well treated as prisoners. He was not able to explain, however, how this same impression existed (that the Allies did not take prisoners) as the Chateau d'Audrieu, Mouen and les Fains Cases show it to have done. Nor was he able to explain why officers of his Regiment and Division had ordered and participated in the shooting of prisoners.

23. MEYER denied all knowledge of atrocities committed and had not previously heard of them, he said, except for an enquiry made from the Fuhrer's Headquarters during July. This enquiry followed a protest made through the Red Cross by the Canadian Government. According to MEYER, all divisions on the Western Front were circularized and instructed to report as to whether any prisoners had been shot in a farm yard; but without being given any other information as to probable time or place. Naturally, the return from all units was "nil". Included with this request for a report were orders that the terms of the Geneva Convention were to be strictly observed on the Western Front. The reply of the German Government to the protest is shown as Exhibit "D".

24. MEYER's position is that, having issued normal instructions for the evacuation of prisoners, having said nothing directly or indirectly from which it might be assumed that he favored a policy of avoiding the taking of prisoners, having himself seen a large number of prisoners especially on the first day (7 June) being evacuated in the usual manner, having on a couple of occasions manifested a humane attitude to individual prisoners, having severely punished one case of rape of a civilian by one of his men, and finally having no knowledge whatever of the incidents in question, he has a clear conscience and is not responsible. He does not seek to place the blame on any higher authority. The problem then, if his statements are to be believed, is one of responsibility for the acts of others under his command; acts performed without his proven knowledge or approval.

25. Did he fail in his duty of seeing that the provisions of the Geneva Conventions were observed? There is no direct proof that he did. It exists only in inference, from the fact that on seven occasions, in a total of some 20 proved incidents extending over a period of 11 days, prisoners were shot by troops of this Division. Some of these incidents (4) occurred before he took command of the Division, and a total of 3 occurred afterwards. While he was in command of his Regiment, however, the 12 incidents connected with the recapture of AUTHIE and BURON on the 7 June did occur. In 5 of the above mentioned 7 occasions German officers, one a battalion commander, appear to be implicated. It seems also that many

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German soldiers of this Division went into battle with the idea, given to them by their officers, that the British did not take prisoners. The natural implication therefore is, that they should not either. Nothing was done to correct that impression. It is thought to be a fair and reasonable assumption from these facts, that such a course of conduct as that actually taken by the personnel of the Division, was understood to be permitted and acquiesced in, indeed tacitly approved, by all commanders. If so, then the responsibility for what occurred under his command in Regiment and Division, is fully as much MEYER's as it is that of those of his officers and other ranks who actually participated in, authorized or approved the commission of the atrocities.

26. Undoubtedly, after the Normandy campaign this Division bore an unsavory and obviously well deserved reputation, even among other German troops. Two recruits taken into the Division in September 1944 speak of this (Exhibits 6 and 7). One of these (MERTENS) admits that the Division was frequently referred to as "H.J. Division - Murder Division". He said that he assumed, on the question being put to him, that the name came from stories that the Division had killed prisoners in Normandy. The section leaders of the Division and those above them, many of whom had served in Normandy, definitely conveyed the idea to these two recruits that they would prefer their men to take no prisoners, or to kill them if taken. HERHOLZ (another P.W. examined by the Court) confirms this and says that some of the N.C.O.'s who had been in the Normandy campaign told him and his companions about what had occurred there, and particularly spoke with relish of food procured by looting, and of the raping of women. That the latter offence was not uncommon in the Division is evident from the testimony in the ROUEN Case, where several cases of rape were reported. MEYER himself tells of one case at VERSON which he had promptly punished by the execution of the culprit. No doubt, as a disciplinarian, he would be quick to enforce discipline in such cases of this kind as came to his knowledge.

27. What has been dealt with above leaves out of account the additional unverified cases implicating two regimental commanders personally (see paragraph 11 above). Nor does it include consideration of the statement of HANRICHS, MEYER's Anti-tank Battalion Commander, that MEYER in RUSSIA ordered the burning of a village and the murder of all its inhabitants. If these latter facts are eventually established beyond doubt, there will be even less difficulty in arriving at a conclusion as to MEYER's own personal responsibility for the actions of the members of his Division.

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ATROCITIES COMMITTED BY 12 SS PZ DIV (HJ)

AGAINST ALLIED PERSONNEL (By Date)

DATE	PLACE	UNIT RESP.	C.O. & IMPLICATED	VICTIMS		Living Dead Unknown	No of Incidents	
7 June	*AUTHIE	PGR 25 III PGR 25 "Prinz" Pz Bn	MEYER MILIUS	(*27)	33	D	(*12)	14
7 June	H/Capt Brown	PGR 25	MILIUS		1	D		1
8 June	*CHATEAU d'AUDRIEU	Recce Bn	BREMER V RITZEN-STEIN SCHENK	(*19)	26	D	(* 3)	4
8 June	PUTOT-EN-BESSIN	Recce Bn	BREMER V RITZEN-STEIN		2 18	L Uk		1 1
9 June	BRETTE-VILLE l'ORG	26 PGR	MOHNKE MUELLER		1 1	L D		1
10 June	*ST SULPICE	Recce Bn	BREMER KIRCHNER WOLF	(* 1)	1	D	(* 1)	1
10 June	ROTS	25 PGR	MEYER WERNER		1	D		1
11 June	*LES SAULLETS	26 PGR	MOHNKE MUELLER	(* 3)	2 1	L D	(* 1)	1
10 - 12 June	ST GERMAINE LA BLANCHE HERBE	25 PGR	MILIUS		1	D		1
7 - 16 June	*LE MESNIL-PATRY	26 PGR Eng Bn	MOHNKE MUELLER	(* 6)	6	D	(* 1)	1
12 June	*LES FAINS	26 PGR or Recce Bn	MOHNKE BREMER	(* 1)	1	D	(* 1)	1
14 June	26 PGR Hq	26 PGR	MOHNKE		3	D		1
17 June	*MOUEN	Eng Bn	MUELLER	(* 7)	7	D	(* 1)	1
17 June	BURON II	25 PGR	MILIUS III/Comd		1	D		1
20 - 21 June	ARDENNE	25 PGR	MILIUS		1	D		1
				(*64)	107	5 L 102 D	(*20)	31

N.B. *Verified by finding of SHAEF Court of Inquiry
Others reported by surviving victims or Prisoners of War
102 victims - Canadian, 3 British (AUDRIEU, LES FAINS),
1 U.S.A.A.F. (ST. SULPICE).

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29. SECRET REPORTED BUT UNVERIFIED

AGAINST CIVILIANS

DATE	PLACE	UNIT RESP.	C.O. & IMPLICATED	VICTIMS	L D	No. OF Incidents
	ARCQUES (ACRO)	12 SS	WITT (Dead)	90-110	D	1
	ST MARTIN (on SEINE)	I/26 PGR	BREMER WINICKI	Village razed All men shot		1

30. BY MEYER AGAINST CIVILIANS

1939	MODLIN	1A/L.H	MEYER	50 Polish Jews	1
1943	JEFREMOVKA (?) (near SHARKOV)	Recce Bn L H	MEYER	Village razed Entire pop. killed	1

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31. That all specific recommendations made herein with respect to the examination or re-examination of German prisoners of war be carried out by this Court or a specially selected one at the earliest possible opportunity, to obtain the maximum amount of corroborative testimony available, and to ensure that where evidence warrants it, a conviction may be obtained at the trial of any suspected perpetrators named in this report, or of others afterwards found.

32. That no prisoners of war now in Allied hands or falling into them in the future, if former members of the 12 SS Panzer Division (Hitler-Jugend) serving during the Normandy campaign (June and July 1944) be released until all such members have been thoroughly interrogated by specially briefed and directed interrogators, as to the knowledge of such prisoners of and possible participation in any of the atrocities here reported upon or any others which may at that time have come to light.

33. That following such action a second supplementary report be rendered with findings and recommendations based upon such additional evidence.

34. That if the action recommended above be not taken, then in any event, on due time and occasion the following be brought to trial on charges of the following character:

(a) Of wilfully approving or acquiescing in a policy of denying quarter to prisoners of war, and of denying to them when captured the protection and treatment to which they were entitled as such, contrary to the laws and usages of war and in particular to the terms of the Geneva Conventions, 1929, or

(b) Of neglect of duty in that they as unit and formation commanders failed to issue such orders as would ensure a compliance on the part of the troops serving under their command, with the laws and usages of war and the terms of the Geneva Conventions, 1929, and with failing to exercise such supervision and disciplinary restraint upon the conduct of those serving under their command as to prevent such violations from occurring, and by failing further to ensure by orders, vigilence and by the exercise by themselves and those immediately responsible to them of the necessary restraint to prevent a reoccurrence of such conduct:

Brigadefuhrer Kurt MEYER, Obersturmbannfuhrers Karl Heinz (Hans Georg) MILIUS, Wilhelm MOHNKE, Sturmbannfuhrers Gerhardt (Gert) BREMER, Siegfried MUELLER, and PRINZ (if living).

35. That in addition the following be charged with murder as the direct perpetrators of the crime or as accessories before, or after the fact:

Sturmbannfuhrers Gerhardt (Gert) BREMER, Siegfried MUELLER, Hauptsturmfuhrer Von REITZENSTEIN, Obersturmfuhrers KIRCHNER and SCHENK, Stabscharfuhrer HAGETORN (if living), Oberscharfuhrer Leopold STUN, and Unterscharfuhrer Hugo WOLF.

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36. (a) That appropriate action be taken through the United Nations War Crimes Commission to ensure the apprehension and detention for trial after the termination of hostilities of the persons named in paragraphs 34 and 35.

(b) That a notation be made on the prisoner of war record of Brigadefuhrer MEYER to ensure his continued detention after the war and availability for trial when required.

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PART IV

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CASES REPORTED PREVIOUSLY BY COURT

(a) AUTHIE AND BURON (7 June 1944)

37. Facts - The facts as originally found by the Court are for convenience summarized hereunder:

38. On 7 June 1944 personnel of the 12 SS Division, at and near the villages of AUTHIE and BURON in NORMANDY, murdered 17 Canadian prisoners of war, injured another and, in all probability, murdered a further 10 Canadian prisoners of war. The incidents, which were sworn to in all cases by eye witnesses, totalled 13, of which 12 were established cases and were as follows:

39. A prisoner, while lying unarmed and helpless owing to a serious wound, was bayonetted and shot to death by a number of soldiers of this unit, one of whom is believed to have been an officer.

40. A prisoner, while unarmed and with hands up in token of surrender, was denied quarter and shot to death.

41. A prisoner, while being searched and otherwise unarmed, was found to have on his person a grenade which he had evidently had no opportunity to discard. He was thereupon shot by one of his guards. While lying on the road dying, he was kicked and some 15 minutes later dispatched by shots fired into the head.

42. A prisoner, while being marched behind the enemy lines, was wounded in the legs by shell fire. Being unable to keep up to the other prisoners, he fell to the ground. A guard then shot him through the head.

43. A soldier, was wounded, when his position was overrun by the enemy, and endeavoured to hide; so as to make his way back to his unit. He was caught and ordered to get up. While endeavouring to do so, one of the Germans placed his boot on the injured man's neck, trampling his face into the ground. The German then drew the soldier's own knife and killed him by stabbing him eight times in the body. It is to be noted in this case the Standing Court, while satisfied that this was a bloodthirsty and cruel denial of quarter, was not satisfied on the evidence that the soldier was actually a prisoner of war at the time, and so recorded no finding of murder.

44. A prisoner, while standing in line with other prisoners some distance behind the battlefront, unarmed and with hands above the head, was shot in the stomach for turning his head and died two days later at CAEN.

45. A prisoner was wounded in the foot by a shall which at the same time killed his two companions. While a civilian was dressing his wound, a German officer and private soldier came to the prostrate Canadian. Showing evident pleasure in his act, the officer drew his pistol and shot the prisoner twice in the head, killing him.

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46. Eight prisoners after capture were marched behind the lines and were sitting under guard at the side of a street in the village of AUTHIE. They were told to remove their helmets, and the guards then stepped into the street and with automatic weapons shot all the prisoners dead. ~~The bodies were told to remove their helmets, and the guards then stepped into the street and with automatic weapons shot all the prisoners dead.~~ The bodies were then pulled out into the street and left there to be run over by passing vehicles.

47. Nine prisoners, with three others who escaped to tell the story, were being marched in single file under German escort to the rear. When well behind the line and with their arms raised, they were suddenly fired upon by an approaching German soldier and by their own guard. All nine fell to the ground wounded and it is believed that they were killed.

48. Two prisoners who were being moved to the rear with others were wounded, probably fatally, by indiscriminate fire directed at them and their companions by their guards who were behaving in a completely undisciplined and frenzied manner.

49. A large number of Allied Prisoners of War were being marched in column along a road in the vicinity of CAEN, when a passing German truck was intentionally and at high speed driven into the column. Two of the prisoners were killed and another seriously injured. This happened near 25 Regimental and 12 SS Divisional Headquarters and the Germans went to some pains to cover up the incident. The killings were recorded as "died of wounds" and a funeral was held and filmed, evidently for record purposes, after the other prisoners had been warned of the consequence to themselves if they covered their faces during the taking of the picture.

50. Maltreatment of Corpses. At AUTHIE, troops of this Regiment and Division mocked and intentionally mutilated the bodies of dead Canadian soldiers. Some of the bodies were placed where they would be run over by passing vehicles. In one case a tank was deliberately driven over a body from head to foot and and this and another body were crushed to pulp. Other bodies were so mutilated as to be unrecognizable. The civilians were not permitted to bury the bodies for six days, and the attitude of the enemy troops was demonstrated in one instance by the pleasure they derived from putting an old hat on one of the corpses and a cigarette box in its mouth.

51. Robbery and Theft. These offences, almost trivial compared with the foregoing, were common, and prisoners were stripped of all personal belongings of any value whatever.

52. New Evidence. On the evidence of MEYER the attack on the above mentioned village was made by a combat team composed of the III Battalion of the 25th Panzer Grenadier Regiment and the "Prinz" Panzer Battalion. The team was commanded by OSBF MILIUS, the C.O. of III Battalion. The tank battalion was commanded by its C.O. SBF PRINZ, since, it is believed, killed in action. MILIUS, so far as known, is alive and is an instructor at a military school in Germany. HSF STEEGER, who succeeded MILIUS in command of III Battalion, is now a prisoner of war in the United States.

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It is probable that he took part in this attack and can (if willing) confirm much of what is already known, and also name all the officers who participated. Evidence of the names of the officers is of particular importance in these cases, inasmuch as there is evidence that officers personally shot prisoners.

53. Finding

(1) That Brigadefuhrer MEYER, OSBF MILIUS and SBF PRINZ (since killed) were the officers commanding at the material times and are responsible for the atrocities committed by their troops of the III/25 Panzer Grenadier Regiment and of the "PRINZ" Panzer Battalion at AUTHIE and BURON, on 7 June 1944.

54. Recommendations.

(1) That HSF STEEGER, successor to command of III Battalion, now a prisoner of war, be interrogated fully as to the names of officers participating in the attack, and the part taken by each, including himself, therein.

(2) That such further interrogations of prisoners, formerly of the III Battalion and "PRINZ" Battalion, be made as may be possible; with a view to arriving at the names of the actual perpetrators of the atrocities described.

(b) CHATEAU D'AUDRIEU (8 June 1944)

Facts - (as Reported)

55. On 8 June 1944 at Chateau D'AUDRIEU, near PAVIE, between the hours of 1400 and 1700, 19 Canadian prisoners of war were murdered by members of the 12 SS Reconnaissance Battalion. The prisoners were killed by firing parties at three different times and places, apparently on the order of the commanding officer of the unit. The bodies of an additional seven soldiers (including two British) were found later, bearing all the appearances of having been murdered in like fashion.

56. In command at the time was an officer referred to as the "commander" who wore about his neck the Knights Cross of the Iron Cross. Also present were a captain and a third officer. The last mentioned was identified as a lieutenant named SCHENK, the Signals officer. The commanding officer of the unit was SBF BREMER.

New Evidence

57. The evidence of MEYER serves to confirm the identification of the unit here involved and the names of its C.O. and many of its officers. This unit had been attached to the Panzer Lehr Division, which formation occupied the front to the left of the 12 SS Division. It was in the area at the boundary, as eventually established, of the two Divisions that these killings occurred. Further, MEYER states that this battalion (12 SS Reconnaissance Battalion) had as its objective the city of BAYEUX, and was known to have reached the line of the railway North of AUDRIEU. The statement of USF BECKER (Ex. 39-A), who reported for duty to the unit the day following the murders finally affirmatively determines the question.

58. BECKER also confirms, by hearsay evidence given him by a Headquarters officer named PALM and others, that the shootings occurred as alleged. He says that he was told that BREMER had been wounded by artillery fire, while at the Headquarters at the "Castle", and that HSF Von REITZENSTEIN who was acting as battalion commander ordered the executions in reprisal, the killing being done by BREMER's driver OSchF. STUN and the motorcycle dispatch riders attached to the Headquarters.

59. MEYER confirms that BREMER suffered a minor wound which necessitated him going to the rear for a few days and that the senior company commander took over. He is unable to state with certainty who that was, but thought that it was another officer named HSF MAIER. This officer's name does not appear on the list of officers given by BECKER and it is possible, therefore, that either MEYER or BECKER are trying to mislead the Court as to the officer really responsible. In favour of BECKER's evidence is the fact that, as he said, he served under Von REITZENSTEIN as Acting C.O. MEYER had not then assumed command of the Division and is himself only going by hearsay. It is well to note, however, for future reference that apparently there was, in fact, a captain named MAIER in the unit (See ST. SULPICE Report at Ex. 14 P2).

60. It is considered, however, by the Court that BREMER himself was actually at the Command Post at the time of the executions, and in all liklihood had not then been wounded. Mlle. DELAFON says definitely that the commander wore a decoration about his neck which she took to be the Knights Cross. BREMER was the only one in the Reconnaissance Battalion having this decoration. Moreover, the evidence of the civilians is to the effect that there was no artillery fire in the vicinity of the Chateau until 1830 hours, by which time all the executions had taken place.

61. A significant observation that BECKER himself made was that STUN was not permitted by Von REITZENSTEIN on one occasion to take prisoners away; because as REITZENSTEIN put it, "I know your method". Others explained that this meant that STUN had "several already on his conscience".

62. BECKER also says - "There was no desire on the part of the Germans to evacuate the prisoners to the rear. It was generally said that the enemy are taking no prisoners either". That this idea prevailed throughout the Division appears from other evidence as well.

63. Inquiry has been made to ascertain whether Mlles. DELAFON and LEVEL can give better physical descriptions of the officers seen at the Chateau, but the Court is informed that they are not able to do so.

64. Findings

(1) That SBF BREMER was present and approved, authorized or ordered the killing of the prisoners executed at Chateau d'Audrieu on 8 June 1944.

(2) That HSF Von REITZENSTEIN succeeded BREMER as acting commander of the 12 SS Reconnaissance Battalion, was present at the Battle Headquarters of

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the Battalion on the afternoon of 8 June 1944 and either himself ordered the killing of the said prisoners, or cooperated in the carrying out of such orders as an accessory at or before the fact.

(3) That OSF SCHENK was guilty as an accessory before the fact in the carrying out of such orders.

(4) That OSchF STUN was an active and willing participant in the killing of the said prisoners as the N.C.O. in charge of the firing squads.

65. Recommendations

(1) That the above named BREMER, VON REITZENSTEIN, SCHENK and STUN be respectively charged with the crime of murder.

(2) That HSF MAIER, if found, be held as a material witness.

(3) That the evidence of USF BECKER, the Adjutant OSF BURKHEIM and O/Leut PALM and the wounded soldier Ernst ABLENDER be obtained further to clarify the points of identification still in some doubt.

(c) ST. SULPICE-SUR-RISLE (10 June 1944)

67. Facts.

An American pilot crash-landed near RUGLES, EURE and was taken prisoner injured by members of a German artillery unit. He was handed over by them to some SS troops billeted in RUGLES. Here an USchF Hugo WOLF, with the permission of the German officer in command there, USF KIRCHNER, took the prisoner to a Chateau at ST. SULPICE a short distance North of L'AIGLE. There, after being shown the bodies of two German officers killed by air attack that day, he was murdered by WOLF.

68. The unit at RUGLES had the Fieldpost No. 58286G and was believed to be that of a detachment, probably Headquarters Company, SF of the 12 SS Panzer Division (H.J.). Another officer known to have been there was a HSF MEIER. (See as to him also in notes on AUDRIEU Case).

New Evidence

69. MEYER's evidence is consistent with the fact that the Reconnaissance Battalion actually had been located at RUGLES and ST. SULPICE; that BREMER was the C.O.; that MAIER and KIRCHNER were officers of that unit.

70. Exhibit 28 is a report given to the Court with respect, also to the troops occupying the Chateau at ST. SULPICE, where the aviator was killed. This report shows the same Fieldpost No. 58286B with, however, a different letter indicating a different company of the unit.

71. The findings being thereby confirmed, no amendment is indicated.

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Recommendations

72. That interrogations be conducted to determine:

(1) Which company was quartered at ST. SULPICE and what officers might have been present at the killing of the aviator and participated or acquiesced in what was done.

(2) The names of those if any, in addition to USchF WOLF, who fired the shots which killed the aviator.

(d) LES SAULLETS (11 June 1944)

73. Three Canadian soldiers of an armoured regiment, while attacking this village, were captured by personnel believed to be of the 26 Pz Gren Regt and were placed under escort. An officer or N.C.O. gave some order to the escort and the prisoners while being marched to the rear, were suddenly fired on by the escort from the rear. One prisoner was killed. The other two, one of whom was wounded, by feigning death, eventually managed to escape independently to their own lines.

New Evidence

74. From the evidence given by MEYER it is now evident that, while les SAULLETS and le MESNIL-PATRY were in the area held by the 26 Regiment, this particular portion of the front was held by the Engineering Battalion of the Division, operating under 26 Regimental command (See Exhibit "B"). This is in some degree confirmed, also, by evidence in the MOUEN Case (See Exhibit 14 P.3), namely that of Mme. Eugenie MARIE. She says that the unit there (identified as Engineering Battalion) "carried supplies up to CHEUX and le MESNIL-PATRY every night". Les SAULLETS and MESNIL-PATRY comprise virtually a single village. MEYER says that this Battalion had its Headquarters at CHEUX.

The C.O. of this unit has been identified as SBF MUELLER.

The II or III Battalion of 26th Regiment were also in close proximity to MESNIL-PATRY and les SAULLETS, and it may well be that they are also involved.

75. Finding

75. (1) That personnel from the Engineering, II and II Pz. Gren. Battalions, under command of 26 SS Pz. Gren. Regt., were in occupation of the area in question, and that the respective commanders should accordingly be required to take responsibility to the extent to which members of their units participated in the shooting.

Recommendation

76. (1) That when, as a consequence of interrogation, it is finally determined which battalion was in occupation of the area in question, appropriate charges be laid against the commander of such battalion and against OSBF MOHNKE, the Regimental Commander, and that they be brought to trial in due course.

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(e) LES FAINS (12 June 1944)

77. A British soldier, while being marched along the road near the village of Les FAINS and far from the battlefield, was killed by his escort. Two days later it is said four other British prisoners were shot under similar circumstances. Proof however is not available for the latter offense. There is evidence that on the 15 June the officer (an OSF) commanding a company of the unit billeted in the village on the farm of M. LELIEVRE ordered his men to deny quarter and kill prisoners if taken.

78. The Court believed, from the evidence afforded by the Fieldpost No. L56804 of the unit and obtained from the Intelligence information available, that the unit was the III Battalion of the 26th Regiment.

79. The Headquarters of the unit was said to be near TILLY-SUR-SEULLES and JUVIGNY.

New Evidence

80. MEYER denies that any unit of the Division could be in les FAINS on this date, as it was far West of the left boundary marked on Exhibit "B", which boundary he says is reliable, particularly in this respect. It is known, however, that the Headquarters of the II and III Battalions were near FONTENAY-LE-PESNEL at 882670. les FAINS lies along the main highway Southwest via JUVIGNY from this Headquarters. It is possible that the III Battalion on the left made use of this easy approach to their position. It is to be noted that OSF BECKER's route to this Battle Headquarters took him North on this road and through JUVIGNY. If the evidence as to the Fieldpost No. should prove unreliable, it is possible that these troops were a part of the Reconnaissance Battalion which had been operating North of this area. There is as yet, however, nothing more definite on which to base this conclusion.

Recommendation

81. That in all interrogations conducted an effort be made:

(a) To determine the Fieldpost Nos. of all units in the 12 SS Division at the material date.

(b) To obtain further evidence as to the unit at les FAINS on 12 June.

(c) To obtain the name of the OSF responsible for the order to kill prisoners, and further evidence of the order and whether it was authorized by Battalion and Regimental Commanders.

(f) LE MESNIL-PATRY (7-16 June 1944)

82. The bodies of seven Canadian soldiers were found at M.R. 899697 on the Southern outskirts of the village of le MESNIL-PATRY, near a building thought to have been used by the Germans as a Headquarters. Six of the bodies showed every indication of murder. The seventh is believed to be a battle casualty. Some had apparently received other wounds prior to those causing their deaths. One of these six soldiers believed murdered was reported missing

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on the 7 June. Two others were reported missing on 8 June, although probably due to action on the 7th. The other three were reported missing on the 11th. None of the six was at any time in action within a quarter to a half mile of the place where their bodies were found. Of the six, 3 were of Royal Winnipeg Rifles and Cameron Highlanders of Ottawa, which battalions were overrun on the 7 June in PUTOT-EN-BESSIN. The other three were from Queen's Own Rifles of Canada and 6 Canadian Armoured Regiment (1 Hussars) involved in the attack on 11 June against les SAULLETS from NORREY-EN-BESSIN.

New Evidence

83. USF Wilhelm STREMME of the Engineering Battalion and now a prisoner of war, joined No. 4 Company on 11 June S.E. of NORREY-EN-BESSIN. (His statement appears as Exhibit No. 15). His company came under command of OSF KURET (Exhibit No. 16). According to his story, on 12 June 4 or 5 Canadian prisoners, one a Corporal, were captured by his company and delivered by him to the Battalion Commander, MUELLER, at his Battle Headquarters East of MESNIL-PATRY M.R. 906699. If this map reference can be relied upon, the Headquarters would be 80 yards N.E. of the graves area. The statement also indicates that MUELLER was himself interrogating prisoners. KURET, however, places the Headquarters at M.R. 906668, which again is 1000 metres from where MEYER says it was at CHEUX. It is probable, in any event, that MUELLER used a more forward C.P. and it was at this place that directions were given as to the disposition of prisoners.

84. Mann MEMMERFROH says (Exhibit No. 18) that 3 Canadian prisoners were captured on 11 June and interrogated by MUELLER and an interpreter. The prisoners were brought back by USF from 4 Company. This information was obtained from No. 2 Company runner OPELKA. If STREMME is mistaken about the date, and also about the number and rank of his prisoners, they could be the same as the prisoners to whom MEMMERFROH refers. Otherwise, MEMMERFROH's three prisoners are additional to the ones described by STREMME.

85. Soldat RINKE (Exhibit No. 17) says that on 14/15 three prisoners were captured by No. 3 Company.

86. It is obviously desirable that these stories should be clarified by further interrogation, and an effort then made to link them up with the MESNIL-PATRY and les SAULLETS Cases.

Finding

87. That the balance of existing evidence, including that to be collected from the MOUEN Case, is that responsibility for the MESNIL-PATRY atrocity was that of the Engineer Battalion, and possibly also that of the battalion of the 26 Pz. Gren. Regt. to its left.

Recommendations

88. That further interrogations be made finally to determine the German unit or units holding the MESNIL-PATRY sector and to fix responsibility for the atrocity committed in the MESNIL-PATRY area during

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the time in question, and that action then be taken on the basis of such evidence to bring the culprit to trial.

(g) MOUEN (17 June 1944)

Facts

89. Personnel of the 3rd Company Tross (Train) 12th SS Engineering (Pionier) Battalion billeted at MOUEN, received 7 Canadian prisoners from the front on 17 June, at about 1800 hours. They were interrogated by an officer, and four hours later taken away under a heavy guard and shot.

90. Members of this unit were also said by civilian witnesses to have been responsible for the rape of several women in the village and vicinity. (With respect to these practices, see evidence of Gren. HERHOLZ, Exhibit No. 7).

New Evidence

91. The evidence of MEYER confirms that already given with respect to the command of the unit. He also speaks of the execution of one of his men at nearby VERSON for the rape of a local French girl.

92. KP5311 SS USF - Wilhelm STREMME - 4/55 Pi Bn 12 (See Exhibit No. 15) states that HSchF Terwort was in charge of 3 Company Tross. He gives the following description of TERWORT: Short (1:72m), thick-set, dark, round face - 29-30 years old, married. This description, however, does not correspond with the description of the Spoiss mentioned in the MOUEN Case, obtained from civilian witnesses.

93. STREMME also speaks of taking 3 prisoners to the C.O.'s Headquarters on 12 June, where they were interrogated by MUELLER. He does not know what happened to the prisoners thereafter. STREMME, although in No. 4 Company, was under the command of OSF KURET who on the 11 June took over command of both Nos. 2 and 4 Companies in the line.

94. KURET's statement is Exhibit No. 16. He says that on the 9 June, before the unit made contact with the Allies, he had been called to a Battalion conference attended by the Battalion Commander and all the company commanders.

Thos present were:

Battalion Comd.	- SEF MUELLER
OC Bn HQ Coy	- HSF PINKERNEL
OC No. 1 Coy	- C/Leut. TOLL
OC No. 2 Coy	- OSF KURET
OC No. 3 Coy	- HSF TIEDTKE
OC No. 4 Coy	- OSF EISCHOFF

95. According to KURET, the Battalion Commander at the conference said that the enemy would take, or was taking, no prisoners. He said this was given as an indication, not an order.

96. This information was passed on to the platoon commanders of KURET's company.

No. 1 Platoon	- USF BAUER
No. 2 Platoon	- HSchF KILIAN
No. 3 Platoon	- OSchF GERHARDS

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97. MANN RIEMERFROH (Exhibit No. 18) says KURET passed this on to the men at a company parade saying:

(a) The English and Americans are said to be taking no prisoners. Germans must therefore be careful not to be captured.

(b) They (the Germans) were to take Allied prisoners according to orders from above.

98. This naturally led to discussions among the men whether, if this were so, they should then take prisoners themselves. There was a difference of opinion. Some thought the Germans should not, and some that, if the Germans took prisoners, then probably the Allies would also. Some said they would shoot themselves rather than be captured (and killed).

99. KURET's statement to interrogating officers is said to have been given under circumstances suggesting a guilty conscience on his part. His statement is evasive on significant matters concerning which his memory should be better than it appears to be. He names his Spiess at HSchF DEMUTH who, he says, visited him every day in the line, but never mentioned the shooting. KURET says that he was taken to his position on the 10 June, and remained there until he was captured on the 26 June. This is hard to believe, when it is remembered that he had the responsibility of commanding No. 4 Company as well as his own and had all his transport, supplies and rear Headquarters at MOUEN. Moreover, when captured after 16 days in weapon slits, he was dressed in officers service dress in good condition, and not in camouflage battledress as were the others.

Finding

100. (1) That SBF MUELLER falsely stated to his company commanders, just prior to the battalion going into action, that the British did not take prisoners, whereby by implication he invited retaliation in the same manner by his own troops.

(2) That, if prisoners were killed, as it was established they were, here and elsewhere within this battalion area, then SBF MUELLER is the instigator of such crimes and should accordingly be tried for murder.

(3) That it is evident in this particular case, from the deliberate and organized manner in which the shooting was carried out after interrogation by a German officer, that the prisoners were murdered on the order of that officer, or of his superior, the Battalion Commander.

Recommendations

101. (1) That SBF MUELLER be placed on trial for the murder of the seven prisoners.

(2) That further interrogations be carried out, where possible, to obtain definite identification of the interrogating officer and of the Spiess and others taking part in the execution; with the object of placing them also on trial for murder.

(3) That OSF KURET be held as a material witness and re-examined both as one suspected of being

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the interrogating officer and also to clear up points in doubt referred to in his statement (Exhibit No. 16). To assist in such identification, it is further recommended that photographs be taken of him for submission to the witnesses in this case for recognition.

(4) That MILLERFROH be reinterrogated as to the second part of the orders given by KURET to the Company, inasmuch as this part of the order is not mentioned by the other witnesses.

(gg) ARGENTAN CASE (7 June 1944)

Facts

102. This case involves the shooting of three American aviators, on 7 June on the Falaise-Caen Road, just North of ARGENTAN. The aviators had been forced to bale out and had been taken prisoner, one being wounded. There is evidence that in the late afternoon they were taken in a truck or lorry to a medical aid post on this road. They were then taken a distance of 150-200 yards to the back of a barn owned by one SARREMJANES and were there killed. One of the perpetrators was described as wearing camouflage dress. From this latter fact, the Court concluded that some of the perpetrators were combat troops, rather than local permanently stationed troops. All that day convoys were moving up to the CAEN area. The convoys of the 12 SS Pz. Div. were among the largest of these on that day, as they moved past the SARREMJANES barn Northward.

103. While unable so to find as a fact on the evidence at present before it, the Court considers that definite grounds nonetheless exist for the conclusion that the troops responsible for the murders were of the 12 SS Panzer Division (H.J.). The case is, therefore, included here; so that it will not be overlooked when action is taken.

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PART V SECRET

ADDITIONAL NEW REPORTS AND EVIDENCE

A - FROM ESCAPED ALLIED PRISONERS OF WAR

(h) PUTOT-EN-BESSIN (8 June 1944)

104. Inasmuch as this case has not previously been reported upon by the Court, it will be necessary to consider it at greater length than would otherwise be essential here.

Facts

105. A Canadian soldier (H62861 Rfn. LEBAR, W.R., Royal Winnipeg Rifles, an escaped prisoner of war) has sworn to the Court (Exhibit No. 11) that he witnessed the shooting of what he judged to be 17-20 Canadian prisoners on 8 June in vicinity of PUTOT-EN-BESSIN. His Platoon, No. 8 of A Company, had taken up a position covering a bridge over a railway at M.R. 894721. (For confirmation of this and other tactical points, see evidence of Lt. Col. MELDRAM, C.O. and Lt. R.S. MOGLOVE, LEBAR's platoon commander, in AUFFEU Report, Exs. 28 and 29, and of Lt. JAMES, Exhibit No. 10 herein). At 1100 hours they were withdrawn to a road and track junction, M.R. 898724 (5), where LEBAR was captured later that morning, when the company position was overrun.

106. LEBAR was then taken over the railway bridge to the corner of an orchard, some 400 yards beyond. While resting there alone under guard, he saw what appeared to be 17-20 Canadian prisoners doubled across a field to the corner of a hedge and copse (see sketch Exhibit "E"). There they were gathered in a small group, while one of the German guards spoke to them. Two of the prisoners made a break and escaped through the field and copse. Simultaneously the four German guards opened fire on the prisoners. The witness was satisfied that all were killed or seriously wounded, because there were screams as they fell to the ground. This occurred about 1500 hours.

107. LEBAR was then taken away by his guard through the wood, to a building where he joined 50-60 other prisoners. From there they were marched to a Headquarters at BRETTEVILLE-SUR-ODON. Eventually the prisoners reached RENNES.

108. At RENNES, LEBAR met Rfn. FERRIS from his unit, who told him that he and a Corporal McLEAN had escaped from their original German captors when the guards had started shooting the prisoners. LEBAR had also talked to McLEAN who had been wounded while escaping and was in hospital. McLEAN told substantially the same story. The witness concluded that they had been the two soldiers whom he had seen escaping. McLEAN said that most of the prisoners shot had been walking wounded cases. FERRIS mentioned the name of a Rfn. RICHMAN who was in this group of prisoners.

109. This story is further confirmed by the evidence of Lt. D. A. JAMES, Royal Winnipeg Rifles, who was wounded and captured the same day (Exhibit No. 10). While in hospital at RENNES he met Corporal McLEAN who told him a story similar to that told to LEBAR, but

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in greater detail. McLEAN told Lt. JAMES that he and Lt. W. FERGUSON and other members of their platoon of C Company had been captured. About 3 hours later, they were stopped by their guards and told to keep close together. They believed they were going to be shot. So he and PARKS (the witness has probably mistaken FERRIS for PARKS) decided to try to escape, if any firing should start. When the guards opened fire and men started to drop, they made a run for it. Although McLEAN was wounded, they both managed to escape. Later they were caught again, but by a different group of Germans. McLEAN said there were about 20 prisoners in the original party which, in addition to Lt. FERGUSON, included a Sgt. REID. There were four guards. McLEAN was afraid something might happen, if the Germans learned that he had information as to this atrocity, and warned Lt. JAMES as to repeating the story. McLEAN, with others capable of being moved, was evacuated by the Germans from RENTS on 20 July.

110. Pte. PATTERSON, (Exhibit No. 13) also a prisoner, tells of a discussion he had with a fellow prisoner who would appear to be FERRIS. This fellow prisoner told him much the same story. He added, however, that one of the guards, just before the shooting started, said to them in English, "Now you die". At this two of them made a run to escape.

111. Efforts have been made to locate the bodies or graves of those said to have been killed in this incident, but without success.

Reasons for Findings

112. While there is eye-witness evidence from which one might reasonably conclude that all in the party save those who escaped had been murdered yet none saw their dead bodies.

113. The prisoners had been captured on 8 June and were from the same company and unit as those murdered in four groups that same afternoon at Chateau d'Audrieu by members of the 12.SS Reconnaissance Battalion. This suggests that if they were likewise killed that they were victims of the same enemy unit.

Findings

114. (1) That the Court is unable to say with finality that the facts as alleged are true, until bodies have been found.

(2) That the evidence before the Court is nonetheless sufficient to substantiate the fact that an atrocity has been committed, subject only to confirmation by the finding of the bodies of the victims.

Recommendations

115. (1) That search be made for Lieut. FERGUSON, Sjt. REID, Rfn. RICHMAN, Cpl. McLEAN and Rfn. FERRIS in German P/W Camps and that their evidence be taken and that they or such of them as may be found necessary for the purpose, be taken to the site of the shooting in an effort to locate the graves and bodies of the victims.

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(2) That in any event Rfn. LEBAR be taken there for that purpose.

(3) That following such further investigation and if found justified those responsible be brought to trial for murder.

(i) BRETTEVILLE L'ORGUEILLEUSE CASE (9 June 1944)

116. Unfortunately the evidence in this case was badly recorded and portions of the witness's testimony have not been fully transcribed.

117. M102670 Rfn. LEE, L.W. of B Company, the Regina Rifles, has sworn to the Court (Exhibit 12 and 12-A) that on 9 June at 1130 hours he was captured near BRETTEVILLE L'ORGUEILLEUSE along with Rfn. E. GILBERT, while acting as a standing patrol. Intelligence information is that on this day the Regina Rifles were holding BRETTEVILLE with one company in PUTOT-EN-BESSIN. LEE says that when captured he was 300 yards from the railway bridge, in an outpost position 1/2 mile distant from the rest of his company. This would seem to place him North of the railway track, in square 9171. After capture, they were taken back about 500 yards to the South side of the railway track. Here GILBERT was interrogated by an officer wearing several medals. In the course of the interrogation, the officer became angry and seizing an MP fired at and killed GILBERT. He then turned the gun on LEE who was hit in the thigh and fell to the ground, feigning death. Several more shots were fired, none of which hit his body; although one went through his water bottle. Artillery fire caused the enemy immediately after to withdraw, and LEE got back to his unit the next day. GILBERT's body was later seen by a Cpl. WOODS whom LEE saw but the Court has been unable to locate. WOODS, according to LEE, said that there were two shots found in GILBERT's head and several in the body. The attack and capture appears to have been carried out by tanks and their crews, supported by infantry. Though apparently seen by WOODS, GILBERT's body has not been found.

Finding

118. (1) That it is impossible from the uncorroborated nature of the evidence to be sure that an atrocity did in fact occur.

(2) That, if the story is correct, elements operating with the 26 Panzer Grenadier Regiment are responsible, and in all likelihood in view of other evidence (see Exhibits 14 and 17) OSTF MOHNKE is the officer who fired the shots.

Recommendation

119. (1) That efforts be continued to locate Cpl. WOODS, formerly of the Regina Rifles and last heard of at No. 1 Canadian Infantry Training Regiment, England, with the object of obtaining proof of the finding of GILBERT's body, the place where found and the condition of the body.

(2) That Rifleman LEE be taken over the ground in an effort to locate the spot where he was fired upon.

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(3) That interrogations be made of German prisoners to verify what troops were involved in fighting on that day in this particular area.

(4) That dependent on the success so achieved, action be taken to bring the officer responsible for the death of GILBERT to trial on a charge of murder.

(j) H/CAPT BROWN CASE (7 June 1944)

Facts

120. H/Capt V.L. BROWN, Chaplain 27 Canadian Armoured Regiment (S.F.R.) and Lt. W. C. GRAINGER were driving in a jeep toward ST. CONTEST, and missing the turn to les BRISSONS, went straight down the road into CUSSY where the enemy were in position. They were surrounded and got out of the jeep with hands up. GRAINGER was shot and left for dead while BROWN was seen walking toward the enemy with hands still raised. GRAINGER later recovered and drove away in the jeep. BROWN's fate was not known until some weeks later when CUSSY was captured. His body was then found with machine gun bullets across the chest. The body was discovered by Brig. J. F. BINGHAM of 2 C.A.B. Capt. H. R. STAPLEFORD, 503 Hq. 1 Canadian Army is believed also to be a witness to the finding of the body. Lt. GRAINGER is now believed to be at STRATFORD, ONT. Capt. BROWN's body is buried at BENY-SUR-MER, Normandy.

Finding

121. On the present state of the evidence it is not possible to say definitely that quarter was denied or that Capt. BROWN was shot after capture, although that would appear to be so.

Recommendation

122. That Lt. GRAINGER be examined on oath to determine all the details of their capture and that Brig. BINGHAM and Capt. STAPLEFORD also be examined as to the finding of the body. That the body be exhumed for pathological examination if then deemed advisable.

B - FROM GERMAN PRISONERS OF WAR
(Exhibits 14 A, B and C)

(k) 26 REGIMENT HEADQUARTERS CASE

123. SS Gren. WITHOLD STANGENBERG, a member of Headquarters Company, 26 Panzer Grenadier Regiment and a captured prisoner of war, relates the following incident.

124. On 14 June at approximately 1630 hours, he was in the neighbourhood of his Regimental Headquarters and saw three English or Canadian prisoners brought in for interrogation. This Headquarters was at Cross Roads 907710, where it had been since 11 June. The interrogation was carried out by OSEF MOHNKE, in the presence of His Adjutant HSF KAISER and several other officers. The prisoners were escorted by two members of the Feldgendarmerie attached to the Regiment.

125. The interrogation lasted 15-20 minutes with MOHNKE shouting and gesticulating the whole time. At

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its conclusion the prisoners were taken away about 30 yards, thoroughly searched and everything including identity discs taken away from them.

126. They were then taken away by the two guards a distance of 200-300 yards in the direction of the front line and shot with a machine pistol by one of the guards. The whole incident was watched by MOHNKE and the officers at the Headquarters. As soon as the shooting had been completed the guards ran back to the Headquarters.

127. The prisoners were unarmed, made no effort to resist or escape and there was no apparent reason for the killing. The incident was also witnessed by four other German soldiers who saw it from a concealed position some 100 yards away. They were Grens. STUTUFF, SHULZ, ROESNER and SCHITZICH. STANGENBERG was himself captured by the British on 28 June and is at present a prisoner in the U.S.

128. STANGENBERG's story is corroborated by hearsay evidence in a statement of P/W. Heinz SCHMIDT (See Exhibit No. 17), who also describes the two members of Gendarmerie who did the shooting.

129. Investigation has been carried out; but neither the bodies nor identity of the prisoners can be found. It is not known what became of the four other witnesses.

Finding

130. That in the absence of corroboration or the finding of bodies, it is not possible to find that the alleged atrocity did in fact occur.

Recommendation

131. (1) That every effort be made to locate the witnesses HSF KAISER, Grens. STUTUFF, SCHULZ, ROESNER and SCHITZICK, and if located that they be held as material witnesses.

(2) That Gren. STANGENBERG be taken to the site of the murders and asked to indicate precisely the place where the shooting occurred.

(3) That OSBF MOHNKE be apprehended when possible and held, until final effort is completed to obtain all possible further evidence, and, if such action be then justified, he be tried on a charge of murder.

(4) That the two members of the Feldgendarmerie, if ascertained, be likewise apprehended and tried on a charge of murder.

(i) ROTS (10 June 1944)

132. A German prisoner of war states that he was told by a dispatch rider of 16 Company of 25 Regiment that an Allied prisoner captured by his company had been shot on 10 June near ROTS. The company commander was OSF HEINER and the dispatch riders implicated were USchFs KUEBIER and BERNHARDT.

(K.P. 104752 RF WETZEL, EWARD
SS Feldgendarmerie KP. 12.)

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(m) ST. GERMAINE LA BLANCHE HERBE (10-12 June 1944)

133. German prisoner of war R. WETZEL (See ROTS Case) states that his section leader, OSchF GUECKLER, told him that on 10-12 June at ST. GERMAINE LA BLANCHE HERBE a British officer was shot on orders of OSBF MILIUS, C.O. - 25 Panzer Grenadier Regiment. (LDC 383)

(n) BURON (Second Case, 17 June 1944)

134. One Canadian P.W. was shot on or about 17 June near BURON by members of Headquarters Company III/25 SS Panzer Grenadier Regiment (MILIUS, Regt. Comd.) (LDC 344)

(o) ARDENNE (Ancienne Abbaye) (20-21 June 1944)

135. A Canadian P.W. was shot at above place in the village of ARDENNE by members of Headquarters of 25 Panzer Grenadier Regiment on 20-21 June 1944 (MILIUS Regt. Comd.).

Recommendations on (l),(m), (n) and (o) above.

136. Inasmuch as all these cases are hearsay reports and uncorroborated, it is impossible to make a finding. It is recommended, however, that all Prisoners of War referred to who have made the statements above set forth, be fully examined on oath with a view to finding what means, if any, exist for obtaining confirmation of their statements. That following this, the necessary action, if so indicated, be taken to bring perpetrators to trial.

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PART VI

REPORTS OF ATROCITIES RESPECTING CIVILIANS

(p) ARCQUES CASE

137. "Later the Hitler-Jugend Division moved to Area of ARCQUES. Soon after its arrival, a section of the railway line was blown up, presumably by French patriots. Immediately, some 90 men and women (railway employees and civilians) were shot by the SS. This time FALKENHAUSEN sent for Genlt BERTRAM (Oberfeldkommandant LILLE) and told him to deal with the matter. BERTRAM tackled Sepp DIETRICH (commander of the SS troops) whose attitude was that the shooting was perfectly justified.

FALKENHAUSEN then appealed to von RUNDSTEDT (OB WEST) and asked for a court martial. However, von RUNDSTEDT could (or would) not move in the matter." (Statement of P.W. CS/370 Oberst WACHSMUTH, Commandant of Military Hospital, Brussels, captured 3 Sep 44).

138. As this matter is not within the terms of reference of the Court, no finding can be made.

Recommendations

139. That enquiry be made of the Bureau de Recherche des Crimes de Guerre for any information in their possession respecting the truth of the story above told, and any responsibility for the alleged atrocity known to them. It is felt that such evidence will enable a more accurate appraisal at trial to be made of any evidence offered in defence to charges laid for offenses against the armed forces of the Allies.

(Q) ST. MARTIN CASE (Aug. 1944)

140. The following report is given by interrogating officers at Kempton Park Camp, 5 November 44.

"PREAMBLE PW, KP/169083, a Dutch national, volunteered for the Waffen-SS in May 41 but after having served in RUSSIA and having later witnessed SS behaviour in FRANCE, as well as experiencing some injustice himself, he deserted to the FFI on 9 Sep 44. He is somewhat confused with regard to dates and places and the following information should be treated with reserve.

In mid-Aug 44, two men of 3 Coy SS Pz. Gren. Regt. 26 were fired on and killed by partisans as the Coy was passing through the village of ST. MARTIN. Two days later the Battalion Commander, SBF BREMER ordered a punitive expedition against the village. This was carried out by No. 3 Coy under command of USF WINICKE. All the men in the village were shot and the women and children driven from their homes, which were then looted and burned down."

Recommendation

141. (1) That the prisoner be reinterrogated. Inasmuch as he has undoubtedly served with the 12 SS Division during the Normandy Campaign, he should prove

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a good witness and one possibly able to add further information respecting the other atrocities here reported.

(2) That inquiry be made as set forth in paragraph 139.

(r) RUSSIAN CASES (MEYER)

142. Obstlt Mueller RIENZBURG relates the following:

"I was on a 'Regiments' course at HULMSTER and some of those SS Sheiks were there, too, from the Leibstandarte and so on, a certain Standartenfuhrer MEYER who had the Oak Leaves..... At the end everyone had to give a lecture on experiences at the front, on some interesting subject..... gave very interesting lectures, and MEYER, for example, told how at KHARKOV for the second time he received orders to let himself be encircled somewhere, with the assurance that he would be extricated again. They set off - they had wonderful provisions, half a pig per head - and with colours flying they marched off to be encircled. Then they captured villages --- a people's car 'Kompanie' and so on....burst into the place first - two men were killed and two people's cars - the two drivers were killed - otherwise there were no casualties at all - they captured the village, killed everyone, children, women, old men, everyone. Then, after the third glass of wine, he said something like this: "If it were not for the Supreme Command, we should have won the war long ago. That is our cancer". He dared to say that to officers, who had the Knight's Cross and so on who had come there".

(See FWIS(H)/LDC/299 and 510 for possible confirmation)

143. The following related by SBF Jacob HANREICH, C.O. 12 SS Anti-Tank Battalion, now a prisoner, KP 49359, is possibly a confirmation of the last mentioned story.

"At the end of Feb 43, the Reconnaissance Battalion of Liebstandarte Adolph Hitler commanded by SBF MEYER, made an advance in an Easterly direction and reached the village of JEFREMOVKA (?), where they were surrounded by Russian forces. POL and ammunition had run out and they were supplied by air until they received the order to try and break through to the West. Before this attempt, the entire civilian population of the village was shot and the village itself burned to the ground". (Exhibit No. 27).

144. MEYER, questioned about these cases, denies their truth. No other evidence is available with respect to them and no finding can be made. Inasmuch, however, as one of MEYER's own battalion commanders is responsible for the story related in paragraph 140, it is likely to have some foundation in fact.

Recommendation

145. That OSBF HANREICH be reinterrogated to obtain all possible information respecting the atrocities in question for the assistance of any Russian investigation and for the purpose of determining the nature of MEYER's personal example and attitude as known to others in his Regiment and Division to the laws and usages of war, and consequent probable responsibility for the atrocities chargeable to his Division in Normandy.

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EXHIBIT No. 26

SITUATION 3 CDN INF DIV
2200 HRS 11 JUN 44

YARDS 1,000 0 1,000 2,000 3,000 4,000 5,000 YARDS
MILE 1 ½ ¼ 0 1 2 3 MILES

30 CORPS
APPX 'E'
MANVIEUX
ARROMANCHES
BERNIERES-SUR-MER
COURSEULLES-SUR-MER
ST. AUBIN-SUR-MER
2 ARMY TAC
21 ARMY GP TAC
1 CORPS
50 INF DIV
CREULLY
BAYEUX
PONT-EN-BESSIN
ST. LO
SEULLES R.
3 CDN INF DIV
BASLY
51 INF DIV
OUISTREHAM
3 INF DIV
LE FRESNE-CAMILLY
THAON
COLOMBY-SUR-THAON
9 CDN INF BDE
CAIRON
SECQUEVILLE-EN-BESSIN
8 CDN INF BDE
VILLONS-LES-BUISSONS
7 ARMD DIV
BN POSNS UNCERTAIN
7 CDN INF BDE
BRETTEVILLE L'ORGUEILLEUSE
PUTOT-EN-BESSIN
ROTS
EPRON
AUTHIE
CUSSY
LA VILLENEUVE
CRISTOT
NORREY-EN-BESSIN
LE MESNIL-PATRY
CARPIQUET
CAEN
BENOUVILLE
6 AIRBORNE DIV
CANAL DE CAEN A LA MER
HEROUVILLE
TOUFFREVILLE
SANNERVILLE
BANNEVILLE LA CAMPAGNE
BRETTEVILLE-SUR-ODON
FAUBG DE VAUCELLES
FLEURY-SUR ORNE
ETERVILLE
ODON R.
ORNE R.
FRENOUVILLE
BOUGY
ST. ANDRE-SUR-ORNE
ST ANDRE DE FONTENAY
CAUMONT
VILLERS

PREPARED FOR THE HISTORICAL SECTION, GENERAL STAFF, CANADIAN MILITARY HEADQUARTERS, LONDON BY CPL. F. SHADLOCK, R.C.E.

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EXHIBIT No. 27

A.

The following units composed the 12 SS Panzer Division (Hitler-Jugend):

12 SS Tank ("Panzer") Regiment
25 SS Pz. Grenadier Regiment
26 SS Pz. Grenadier Regiment
12 SS Pz. Artillery Regiment
12 SS Anti Tank Battalion
12 SS Pz. Engineer ("Pionier") Battalion
12 SS Pz. Signals Battalion
12 SS Anti Aircraft (Flak) Battalion
12 SS Divisional Escort Company.

PERSONALITIES

N.B. The names listed below and respective ranks and appointments cannot be regarded as reliable, but are taken from statements made by German PW. In many cases prisoners were not certain of the spelling of names or precise tenure of appointments.

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EXHIBIT No. 27.

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B.

DIVISIONAL HEADQUARTERS

Div Comd - Brigadefuhrer FRITZ WITT
(Until 10 Jun)
Brigadefuhrer KURT MEYER
(Until 7 Sep)

Ia - SBF HUBERT MEYER

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EXHIBIT No. 27

C.

12 SS Tank Regiment

C.O. OSBF MAX WUENSCHE (Captured Aug)

I Battalion

C.O. - SBF PRINZ (Killed mid Aug)

II Battalion

C.O. - SBF ARNOLD JUERGENSEN

Coy Comds - HSF BECK (Later ADC
Gen. GEYR.
Killed 8 Jun).

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EXHIBIT No. 27

D.

25 Pz. Gren. Regt.

Comd - OSBF - KURT MEYER (Until 10 Jun)
OSBF - KARL HEINZ MILIUS.

I Battalion

C.O. - SBF HANS WALDMULLER (Killed Aug)

Coy Comds - OSF GROSCHE (1)
Lt SAUER (2)
OSF DUEVEC (3)
USF HARTUNG (4)

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E.

II Battalion

C.O. - SBF SCAPINI (Killed D plus 3)
HSF SCHROTT (Killed Aug)
OSF HAVERMEISTER or HABERMEISTER

Coy Comds - HSF KREILEIN (Killed) (5)
Lt HUG (5)
HSF Dr. TIRAY (6)
HSF SCHROTT (7)

Pl Comds - USF GOTZE (1 Pl 5 Coy)
USF WELLING (3 Pl 6 Coy)
Lt HUG ((4 Pl 5 Coy)

III Battalion

C.O. - SBF KARL HEINZ MILIUS (Until 10 Jun)
HSF STEEGER
Adjt - USF STAHL (killed)
USF BERGMANN

Coy Comds - OSF HAVERMEISTER or HABER-MEISTER
HSF STEEGER
HSF SCHROTT
O/Lt FRITSCH (9)
OSF HUMBOLDT (STEBOLT) (9)
OSF DIETRICH (10)
OSF STAHL (11)
OSF EINICKE (WIENEKE) (11)
OSF HEBBES (HUBBES) (12)
USF GORRES (12 Mortar Pl) (POW)

692198

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EXHIBIT No. 27

F.

13 Coy - Lt KOMINSKI

14 Coy - HSF BRANDEL

15 Coy - HSF V. BUTTNER (Killed)
HSF FUSS
Haupt EACKER (Killed)
Haupt POEHNIKE

Pl Comds - USF FUSS - (Killed)
USF FEHLING - (Killed)
HSchF PENG - (Killed)
USF ENNER - (Killed)
S SchF HAGETORN - (Killed)

16 Coy - OSF WERNER

2 Pl - USF FEHLING

3 Pl - HSchF BOIGK

Regt MO - SBF GOETTERNICK

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EXHIBIT No. 27

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G.

26 Pz. Gren. Regt.

Comd - OSBF WILHELM MOHNKE
Adjt - OSF KAISER

I Battalion

C.O. - SBF BERNARD KRAUSE

Coy Comds - HSF ECKERDT or EGGER (1)
OSF GROSCHEL (1)
U/Lt SAUER (2)
OSF DUVEL

II Battalion

C.O. - SBF BERNARD SIEBKEN

Coy Comd - OSF SCHMOLKE.

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EXHIBIT No. 27

H.

C.O. - SBF ERICH OLBOETTER (Killed Aug)

14 Coy - HSF STOLTZE

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H3056 - 0062

EXHIBIT No. 27

I.

12 SS Pz Artillery Regiment

Comd - OSBF SCHROEDER

HqTp - HSF PINKERNEL

I Battalion

C.O. - OSF TIMMERBEIL

Tp Comds - USF HAKE (who replaced TIMMERBEIL)
USF MULLER (6)

II Battalion

C.O. - SBF SCHOPS (Killed)

III Battalion

C.O. - SBF HAGEMEISTER (Killed May)

Grenade Unit - MUELLER

692203

EXHIBIT No. 27

12 SS Anti Tank Battalion (?)

C.O. - SBF JACOB HANREICH

Coy Comds - OSF HURDLEBRINK (1)
OSF WACHTER (2)
HSF SIEGERT (Supply Coy)

Pl Comd - USF RAVE

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K1

12 SS Engineer Battalion (Pi. Bn.)

C.O. - SBF SIEGRIED MUELLER

Adjt - OSF BAUER

O.C. Bn Hq - HSF PINKERNEL

O.C. No. 1 Coy O/Lt TOLL

O.C. No. 2 Coy OSF PAUL KURET

O.C. No. 3 Coy HSF TIEDTKE

O.C. No. 4 Coy OSF BISCHOFF.

No. 2 Coy Pl Comds

1. USF BAUER

2. H SchF KILIAN

3. OSchF GERHARDS
DEMUTH

Br Col B (attached No. 3 Coy) - Untersturmfuhrer RICHTER

1 Ass. Boat Pl. Unterscharfuhrer HEMKEN

" " ERRATE (sec. leader)

2 Pontoon Pl " PISSARCK

" " ECKERT (sec. leader, later sec. leader 3 Coy)

3 " " GERSTENHAUER

Tross Br Col " BOECKER (Speiss)

2(?) Pl 3 Coy OSchF HEIDRECKE

2 Pl " USchF ECKERT

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EXHIBIT No. 27 2997-PS 60

K2

2 Coy

Sturmann	HOERMANN	KP 12426
SS Mann	GRAMS	12381
	HELLER, JOSEF	12399
	KACHLER	12439
	ROTHWARGE, KARL	12599
	SAUTGER	12603
	WEBER, GUNTHER	12695
	WEHNSEN	12697
	WIESNER, KARL	12703
	BRUDER, RICHARD	12303

2 Coy Tross

S SchF	DEMUTH
O SchF	WINKOVSKY
B SchF	KEGEL
U SchF	NOLTENSMEIER
RF	ARNOLD
SS Mann	NUNN
	KNAUF
	STERNMETZ
	CINSER
	MARLOW
	SCHMARZINSKI
	STEPHAN
	MENSER
	HEZER

A 692206

H3056 - 0066

SECRET

SECRET

Auth: SC, AEF
Init: HLA
Date: 20 Aug 1944

SUPREME HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
FWD, APO 757

AG 000.5-2-AGP 20 August 1944

SUBJECT: Appointment of Court of Inquiry.

TO : All Concerned.

1. A Court of Inquiry, consisting of the following named officers is appointed, to meet at the call of the President, for the purpose of investigating and reporting on such matter as shall be referred to it:

Colonel Paul B. Tombaugh, U.S. Army
Supreme Hq, A.E.F. President
Lt.Col. J.H. Boraston, C.B., O.B.E.
(T.A.R.O.Spec.List)(British)
Supreme Hq, A.E.F. Member
Lt.Col. R.J.S. MacDonald, Essex Scottish
(Canadian)
Supreme Hq, A.E.F. Member
Lt.Col. John P. Page, E.D., Toronto Scot
R. (MG) (Canadian),
Supreme Hq, AEF Waiting Member

with, in attendance,

Capt. J.R. Gauthier, R.C.M.P.
(Canadian)
Sgt. J. Faucher, E53452, C.Pro.C.
(Canadian)
Sgt. Clayton J.Lein, Jr., 36502949,
Supreme Hq A.E.F.
One court reporter (enlisted man), to be designated.

2. In its report, the Court will state (inter alia):

a. The numbers, ranks, names and units of all soldiers concerned, and the names of all enemy units and/or formations in the neighborhood of the alleged incidents at the time.

b. Whether the matter involves Allied soldiers who were entitled to be treated as prisoners of war.

c. Whether injuries or deaths involving Allied soldiers were caused by acts in violation of the laws and usages of war, and, if so, the names of the persons directly or indirectly responsible and their units and/or formations.

3. The Court is authorized to travel to such places in the combat zone in Northwestern Europe as may be necessary to carry out the assigned mission.

-1-

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SECRET

EXHIBIT No. 1

AG 000.5-2
SUPREME HQ, A.E.F., FORWARD, APO 757, US ARMY,
20 AUG 44.

By command of General EISENHOWER:

/s/ E. C. BOEHNKE,
/t/ E. C. BOEHNKE,
Colonel, AGD,
Adjutant General.

DISTRIBUTION:

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Canadian Military Hq	1
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21st Army Group	1
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First Canadian Army	1
Second British Army	1
First U.S. Army	1
Third U.S. Army	1
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G-1 Div. Supreme Hq, AEF	5
AG Records	8

A TRUE COPY

/s/ H. J. SWANSON
Captain, AGD.

H3056 - 0068

SECRET EXHIBIT No. 2

SECRET

SECRET
Auth: SC, AEF
Init: MKG
Date: 13 November 1944

SUPREME HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE

AG 000.5-2-AGP

MAIN, APO 757
13 November 1944

SUBJECT: Appointment of Court of Inquiry

TO : All Concerned

Paragraph 1, letter, this headquarters, file and subject as above, dated 2- August 1944, as amended by letter, this headquarters, 4 October 1944, is further amended to add the following names:

Lt. Col. Charles S. Cutting, U.S. Army
Supreme Hq, A.E.F. Member

Lt. Col. H. Couvreur, Belgian Army
Member

By command of General EISENHOWER:

/s/
T. J. DAVIS,
Brigadier General, USA,
Adjutant General.

DISTRIBUTION:
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War Office.....1
War Department.....1
Canadian Military Hq.....1
Twelfth Army Group.....1
21st Army Group.....1
First U. S. Army Group.....1
First Canadian Army.....1
Second British Army.....1
First U. S. Army.....1
Third U. S. Army.....1
CG, Com Z, APO 887.....1
G-1 Div, Supreme Hq AEF.....3
AG Records.....2

SECRET SECRET

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CONFIDENTIAL

GAP 000.5-2 (69)

EXHIBIT No. 3

SUPREME HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE

1 /dbk

CORRECTED COPY

AG 000.5-2-GAP-AGP

MAIN, APO 757
11 February 1945

SUBJECT: Appointment of Court of Inquiry.

TO : All Concerned.

1. A Court of Inquiry, consisting of the following named officers, is appointed to meet at the call of the President for the purpose of investigating and reporting on such matters as will be referred to it:

Lt.Col. B.J.S. Macdonald ED, Essex Scottish Regiment (Canadian), Supreme Hq, AEF. President
Lt.Col. J.H. Boraston, CB, OBE, (T.A.R.O. Spec. List)(British), Supreme Hq, AEF. Member
Lt.Col. Charles S. Cutting, O-900472, Inf., U.S. Army, Supreme Hq, AEF. Member
Lt.Col. to be designated (Canadian), Supreme Hq, AEF. Member
Lt.Col. John S. Voorhees, O-168382, FA, U.S. Army, Supreme Hq, AEF. Member
Lt.Col. L.J. Genn, Royal Artillery (British) Supreme Hq, AEF. Member
Lt.Col. John P. Page ED, Toronto Scottish Regt. (MG)(Canadian), Supreme Hq, AEF. Waiting Member
Lt.Col. Charles S. Bushman, O-121428, Inf., U.S. Army, Supreme Hq, AEF. Waiting Member
Lt.Col. H. Couvreur, 8 Chasseurs a Pied, Belgian Army Waiting Member
Cdt. P. Ruteau, Cavalry (Armoured)(French), Supreme Hq, AEF. Waiting Member

with, in attendance,

Capt. A.E. Andrews Canadian Army
Capt. F.A. Barnes Canadian Army
Capt. G.K.M. Johnston Canadian Army
Capt. E.W. MacDonald Canadian Army
Capt. T.W. Platt Canadian Army
Lt. R. Barre Canadian Army
Lt. R.E. Robichaud Canadian Army
SSM G.J. Norwood (W.O.I) S1588645 RASC
Sgt. J. Faucher, Kb3452, C. Pro. C.
T/4 P. Maiorana, 36577856, U.S. Army
all, Supreme Hq, AEF.

2. In its report, the Court will state (inter alia):

a. The numbers, names, ranks and units of all soldiers concerned, and their status at the time of the incident under investigation.

b. Whether injuries or deaths involving Allied soldiers were caused by acts in violation of the laws and usages of war, and, if so, the names or descriptions of the persons directly or indirectly responsible and their units and/or formations.

CONFIDENTIAL

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3. The Court is authorized to travel to such places in the European Theater of Operations as may be necessary to carry out its assigned mission.

By direction of the Supreme Commander:

s/ T. J. DAVIS

t/ T. J. DAVIS
Brigadier General, USA,
Adjutant General.

DISTRIBUTION:

Each individual	1
War Department	1
War Office	1
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Third US Army	1
Seventh US Army	1
Ninth US Army	1
Fifteenth US Army	1
First Canadian Army	1
Second British Army	1
CG, Com Zone, APO 887	1
G-1 Div, Supreme Hq AEF	50
AG Records	1

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EXHIBIT No. 4

SECRET

SUPREME HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
G-1 Division

8 March 1945

GAP 000.5-2 (25)

Lt.Col. B.J.S. Macdonald, E.D.,
PRESIDENT
Supreme Headquarters, A.E.F.,
Court of Inquiry.

12th S.S. Pz. Div. (H.J.) Case

1. I am directed to forward herewith all relevant papers in connection with the above case, for the purpose of the preparation by the Court of a supplementary report to those already distributed re the shooting of Allied Prisoners of War by the German Armed Forces, at

a. Le Mesnil Patry, Les Saullets, Buron and Authie
b. Chateau d'Audrieu
c. Mouen
d. Les Fains
e. St Sulpice sur Risle
f. Argentan

2. Under the authority of this headquarters letter AG 000.5-2 AGP of 11 February 1945, subject: "Appointment of Court of Inquiry" you will take such necessary further evidence, and review all documents concerning the above cases and any others respecting this enemy division during the Normandy campaign in June 1944.

3. Your report will contain Findings, the Reasons therefore, and Recommendations, if any, for future action.

For the ACC of S, G-1:

JOHN P. PAGE
Lt.Col., AAG
Special Inquiries Branch

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RECORD OF THE EVIDENCE EXHIBIT No. 5

of

Pte F. TORBANISCH

Private FRIEDRICH TORBANISCH is called and, having been duly sworn, is examined as follows:-

Lt.Col. BORASTON: What is your full name ?
A FRIEDRICH TORBANISCH.

Q What is your rank ?
A Private. (Grenadier).

Q To what Regiment did you belong when you were taken prisoner ? I want to know your unit.
A I was not in the front; I was a deserter since the 4th April.

Q From what unit did you desert ?
A Fifteenth Company, Twenty-fifth Regiment, SS Division Hitler Jugend.

Q What is your age ?
A Eighteen and one-half years. I am going to be nineteen on the 27th March.

Lt.Col. MACDONALD: Where did you live ?
A SASSANHFART, near BANBERG, BAVARIA.

Q Do your parents live there now ?
A Yes.

Q Are you single or married ?
A Single.

Q What languages do you speak ?
A I speak Flemish. I was with the Belgian Resistance movement and worked with them.

Q Do you speak French or English ?
A No.

Q When did you first become attached to the 25 SS Panzer Regiment ?
A 15th June 1943, but it was not voluntarily; I was transferred into it.

Q With what unit had you been serving prior to that time ?
A No others.

Q Had you been with a Hitler Youth organisation prior to that time ?
A We had to belong after our tenth birthday.

Q Where did you serve with the Twenty-fifth Regiment ?
A At first we were in BELGIUM. BEVERLOO in BELGIUM. I was there for training. The railroad station is BOURG LEOPOLD.

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Q How long were you there ?
A Until January.

Q What year; 1944 ?
A Yes.

Q And where did you go from there ?
A From there I went to MONTAGUE.

Q Where is that ?
A Also in BELGIUM; five kilometres from DIEST.

Q And how long were you there ?
A Until the 4th April.

Q What were you doing at the last place; DIEST ?
(Interpreter: He gave another name for it; MONTAGUE).

Q What were you doing there ?
A I was practising close combat.

Q Where did you go when you left MONTAGUE ?
A To FRANCE.

Q What part of FRANCE ?
A L'AIGLE, near CAEN.

Q And how long did you remain there ?
A As we came out of the transport I deserted.

Q Was that at L'AIGLE ?
A Yes.

Q Did you ever serve at any time in ITALY ?
A No; not at the front.

Q Where did you serve in ITALY ?
A I was not in ITALY at all.

Q Were you still in the Twenty-fifth Panzer Grenadier Regiment at the time you deserted ?
A Yes.

Q Who was the commander of the Twenty-fifth Panzer Grenadier Regiment at that time ?
A Panzer MEIER Standartenfuhrer.

Q Who was in command of your company ?
A Captain POEHNIKE. I can't spell it because I don't know how it is spelled.

Q And which company was this ?
A Fifteenth Company, Reconnaissance Company.

Q Who was your battalion commander ?
A We were a regimental support unit, not battalion.

Q Were you attached to Regimental Headquarters ?
A Yes, we were attached to Regimental Headquarters. We were a regimental unit.

Q Who were the other officers in your company ?
A Untersturmfuhrer FUSS. Untersturmfuhrer FELING. Hauptscharfuhrer PEUG. Untersturmfuhrer EXNER. Those are all the officers and the Captain, who was company commander.

Q Was he Hauptmann or Hauptsturmfuhrer ?
A He was a Hauptmann. He came from the Wehrmacht.

Q Were you given any orders as to what you should do in the event of capturing Allied soldiers ?
A Yes, we had secret orders.

Q What were these orders ?
A I gave those to the White Army Intelligence Service.

Q Did you give those orders from memory or did you have a copy of them ?
A No, I gave them from memory all that I could remember, but my memory was still very fresh.

Q How were these orders communicated to you ?
A They were read to us and we had to sign.

Q What did you sign ?
A That these secret orders were known to us.

Q When were these orders read to you ?
A That was in April 1944.

Q And was this while you were at DIEST ?
A Yes, in MONTAGUE.

Q Who read the orders to you ?
A The Stabscharfuhrer Spiess.

Q What was his name ?
A HAGETORN.

Q Who were present when this order was read ?
A The Company was in formation.

Q Were the officers on parade ?
A No, we had roll call at 6 o'clock at night and there the orders were read and later on we had to sign.

Q Can you remember the date on which this occurred ?
A No, I don't know that any more.

Q Can you say whether it would be at the beginning or the end of April ?
A It was right at the beginning of April, either first, second or third, just before we left for FRANCE.

Q Did Speiss add anything to what he had read in the way of orders ?

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A No, he didn't add anything to it; he just told us that we had to sign that we had heard the secret orders, but we couldn't tell them to anybody else, otherwise we would be shot as spies.

Q How long did you serve with the White brigade after you deserted ?
A Since May. They kept me supplied with clothing and food and also brought me to a farmer where I could work in my free time when I wasn't busy as a spy.

Q Are you in a Prisoner of War Camp at the present time ?
A Yes, I am now in a Prisoner of War Camp.

Q I show you what purports to be a photographic copy of the orders which you said were read to you; will you look at these papers and see whether they contain the substance of what you remember of the orders that were read to you in April by the Spiess ?
A Yes, this paragraph referring to the first one is right. Second paragraph also is correct. The third order is right too. Fourth is correct. That they shouldn't take any prisoners. The second paragraph of the fourth order is right too. The fifth order is right. Sixth order is right. The general paragraph is also right.

Lt.Col. MACDONALD: These will be entered as Exhibit A1 for the first page and A2 for the second.

Q Do you remember the date upon which you related these orders to the person who copied them down in this form ?
A I know the person, but I don't know the date.

Q Was it in the month of April ?
A No, it was later, after I deserted.

Q What was the date upon which you deserted ?
A I don't remember that either. I only know that we came to FRANCE on the 4th April and after that I deserted.

Q How long after that date ?
A We went in FRANCE early in April.

Q How many days or weeks was it after you arrived in France that you deserted ?
A About two or three days later.

Q Where did you go when you deserted ?
A Back to BELGIUM.

Q How long did it take you to get there ?
A I arrived there on Pfingsten. Pfingsten is a German holiday which follows seven weeks after Easter; it includes the Sunday and Monday. (The interpreter explains: The witness is referring to the Monday). It was sometime in May.

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Q Did it take you over a month to get back to BELGIUM ?
A Yes, it took longer.

Q And how long after you got back to BELGIUM was it that you told someone about these orders ?
A When I got the civilian clothes; but I don't know when

Q Would it be within a few days after you got to BELGIUM ?
A It might have been some days later. It might have been in June, in July, I don't remember; but these orders always remained the same; they are not changed even after commitment of the troops.

Q How were you able to remember in such detail the contents of these orders ?
A We had to know them.

Q Did you have to memorize them ?
A He read them to us and he told us that we had to know them; and if we didn't know them we would be punished.

Q And are you quite sure that everything that you have read on Exhibits A1 and A2 was read to you by the Speiss on the occasion that you have mentioned ?
A Yes, we had to sign that we had heard these secret orders.

Q I notice in the fourth order you say the officers have stated that the British do not take prisoners as far as SS soldiers are concerned; is that something which you have added or is that a part of the order itself ?
A (Interpreter reads from the exhibit). That is the way we have been told, the way it is stated in the order, and for that reason we should not take any prisoners either.

Q Is that what the Speiss said at the time ?
A Yes, he said that the British don't take any SS; don't take any prisoners when they come to SS prisoners, so we wouldn't take any either.

Q How have you been treated since you have been a Prisoner of War ?
A Until now was good; until yesterday. I was locked up. Up to now I was treated very well in every Prisoner of War Enclosure.

Lt.Col. BOURSTON: What was that ?
A Until now I was treated very well in every Prisoner of War Camp.

Lt.Col. MACDONALD: Has anything been done to force you to give this evidence or this information ?
A No.

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A 092217

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Q. Is your present complaint that since you were brought to this camp for interrogation yesterday that you were locked up separately ?

A. Well, I was put in with two others later on, but even there the bedding was not very good.

Q. You have not been threatened, however, or intimidated in any way ?

A. An officer was talking to me yesterday, but I don't know what he was saying; I couldn't understand him, I don't know what he was talking about. I imagined he was mistaken and thought I was an escapee.

Q. What did the officer have to say to you ?

A. He was speaking in English to me; I don't know what he was talking about. He asked me in English and I could not understand and he asked me if I could understand. I told him, no.

Q. Was that all that was said ?

A. Yes, and then I was brought back to my cell.

Q. Witness, this was purely a temporary arrangement made by the camp authorities as you are only here for a day or so.

A. Yes, I was pretty sure that somebody made a mistake and probably thought that I escaped somewhere else. (Witness asks if he can say something).

Lt.Col. BOWSTON: We will give you a chance after the inquiry.

Lt.Col. CUTTING: What is the difference in observance on secret orders when compared with others ? What is the difference between secret orders and any other orders ? How are they described to you ? Do the secret orders vary or are different from other orders when they are read out to a formation or a line as they were ?

A. Yes, there is a difference. The whole company comes in a tight formation and they are announced in a less loud voice so that no passing civilians can hear them.

Q. Did they tell them not to speak to anybody outside their units about them ?

A. Yes, that is with the secret orders.

Lt.Col. BOWSTON: You said that you knew the name of a person to whom you gave this summary of the secret orders; will you tell us what his name was ?

(Witness writes down name) LOWAS SWEI, house number 208, village of ASSENT. That is where I was when I gave them the secret orders.

Q. How long exactly were you at L'AIGLE ?

A. It was evening at 1030 when the company was

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unloaded from the train and then we drove to our bivouac area and I was with a motorcycle; so I went with my motorcycle the other way in order to escape on my way back to BELGIUM. The next day it was known; it became known that I had deserted and the SS Police started looking for me and I had to shoot an SS officer.

Q So that you weren't actually at L'AIGLE at all yourself ?
A No, I wasn't there where the company was.

Q Do you know the name of the officer that you shot ?
A No, I had to hurry, otherwise the other police would have caught me.

Q Why did you desert ?
A I was no volunteer with the Waffen SS. I was forced to serve with the SS.

Q Did you actually serve with the White Brigade in BELGIUM ?
A Yes, I worked with them.

Q Were you in any engagements with them ?
A No, I didn't fight.

Q How did you come to be taken prisoner ?
(Interpreter: He was taken by British forces, sir).

Q What insignia did you wear to show that you were a member of the White Brigade ?
A On my suspenders I wore the Belgian flag.

Q On your suspenders; what do you exactly mean by suspenders ?
A Braces.

Q Did you wear your braces outside or were they under cover of a coat ?
A No, not outside; but we recognised each other by a certain twitch of the eyes.

Q So that actually there was nothing outside to show, nothing obvious, in your clothing, on the outside of your clothing, to show that you were a member of the White Brigade ?
A No; but we were carrying weapons as protection against the Gestapo. I received the weapons from this LORAS SWEI.

Q Who was your section commander ?
A PETERS was commander of the White Brigade, but he didn't know me at first and I didn't know him. It was only when the first troops arrived that I went to the citadel at DIEST and he got to know me.

Q When you say the first troops; do you mean the first Allied troops ?
A Yes, the Allied troops.

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Q. By whom were you taken prisoner ?
A. I wasn't exactly taken a prisoner. The policeman came much later; about the third or fourth of November and took me away from the farm.

Q. Was that Allied military police or Belgian civilian police ?
A. That was the Belgian civilian police and the White Brigade didn't know that they came to get me.

Q. Did the Belgian police hand you over to the British military forces ?
A. Yes, they had orders to arrest me.

Q. Do you know an Obersturmfuhrer REGEN-BOGEN ?
A. No.

Q. Do you know Sturmmann HENZ BAHR ?
A. No, we had plenty of Sturmmann, but I didn't know any of them because I wasn't interested from the first day.

Q. I am just going to ask you whether you know a certain number of names, on the chance that you may. If you do know them, please say so.
A. Yes, I am going to say.

Q. Do you know an officer, I don't know his rank, named MOELLER ?
A. Not from our company.

Q. Do you know an officer called Obersturm-fuhrer MEIER ? What company did he belong to ?
A. I don't know that either, but I have heard the name. It was with the Division Hitler Jugend.

Q. Was he in a reconnaissance unit ?
A. No, I don't know that; he wasn't in the Fifteenth Company anyway and only the Fifteenth Company is a reconnaissance unit with the regiment.

Q. Did you know a Captain MEIER ?
A. That may be some mistaken testimony, and this man in question may be the Standarten-fuhrer MEIER. That is the regimental commander.

Q. Do you know a Sturmfuhrer BREMER ?
A. No, I don't know.

Q. Do you know a man, probably an NCO, called WILLI KOSCA ?
A. No.

Q. Unterscharfuhrer HUGO WOLF ?
A. It may be possible that our company got different non-coms after I deserted because, ours, I know all of them.

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Q. Do you know Obersturmfuhrer KIRCHNER ? At that time he was probably Untersturmfuhrer.

A It is quite possible that there might be such a man in the regiment. I am not sure. He might be in the tenth or eleventh company.

Q Do you know the name at all ? Do you recognise the name ?

A The name sounds familiar, but I don't know the name; but he was a company commander.

Q You said at the beginning of this interrogation; you asked whether you might ask any questions, if there are any questions or statements that you would like to make; you may ask them now, but I won't guarantee that I shall answer your questions.

A I would like to know whether I could go back to the farm where I worked ?

Q Your question will be recorded.

A How am I to interpret that ?

Q That it is recorded and I am afraid that is all I can tell you now.

A I would like to know what is going on back home. I have never been registered; never been processed or given a prisoner serial number. May I communicate with my people ?

Q This Court is set up for a special purpose; but any questions you may put to the Court, which are not within the authority of the Court, will be passed by the Court to the proper authorities.

A I told this man LORAS SWEI that I should be in BELGIUM intelligence, that he should find a way to pass word to my parents and say where I am, and also that when some spies come in winter or any time why, they would try and find shelter with them; and I want to know if I can go there.

Q What you are saying is recorded and will be passed to proper authorities.

A That is all, only I would like to wash myself, because I feel like a pig.

Q Yes, we will arrange for it.

(The witness withdraws)

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SECRET EXHIBIT No. 6

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RECORD OF THE EVIDENCE

of

Grenadier GEORGE MERTENS

Grenadier GEORGE MERTENS was called and having been duly sworn was examined as follows:-

Lt Col MACDONALD: What is your full name?
A GEORG MERTENS.

Q What is your rank?
A Grenadier.

Q What is your Prisoner of War number?
A 31G1/112,666. That is the number I received in France.

Q How old are you?
A Eighteen.

Q With what unit were you serving at the time you were taken prisoner?
A S.S., 12th Panzer Division.

Q With what battalion and with what regiment?
A 25th Regiment, 3rd Battalion.

Q When and when were you captured?
A LUXEMBOURG, 29th December.

Q With which company were you serving?
A No. 10 Company.

Q Who was your Company Commander?
A Oberleutnant DIETRICH.

Q Is he any relative of SEPP DIETRICH?
A As far as I know he is not. He was a Lieutenant from the Wehrmacht.

Q Who was your battalion commander?
A Hasf. BRUECKNER.

Q And who was the Regimental Commander?
A SBF. BUDAENS.

Q Who was the Divisional Commander?
A The Divisional Commander was changed several times. The last one was Brigaderfuchrer GRASS. Previously it was Brigaderfuchrer KRAEMER.

Q When did KRAEMER cease to command the division?
A That was during our training, about the middle of November.

Q Do you know to what command he left?
A I don't know but I heard that he became Commander of another division.

Q How long had you been with the 12th S.S. Division?
A Since the 11th of September.

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Q Who was the divisional commander at the time you became associated with the division?
A KRAEMER.

Q Where were you training?
A First of all we did a week after calling up at GUBEN on the ODER. We were then until mid-November at DIEPHOLZ, north of BREMEN and then in COLOGNE for three weeks.

Q With what class were you called up?
A Class 1927.

Q And I take it then that you were inducted during 1944?
A Yes, only just half a year ago.

Q Had you been with the H.J.?
A Yes, sir, it was compulsory.

Q Where is your home?
A NEUWIED on the RHINE.

Q Were you performing any military duties prior to your call-up?
A No, I was working as a mechanic in an arms factory. The firm was called Winkler and Duennebier.

Q Where were you first committed in action?
A That was at HOHNSFELD, in the MALMEDY area.

Q What was the date when you first came in contact with Allied Forces?
A 20 or 21 December.

Q How were you told that you would be treated if you were taken prisoner by the Allies?
A We were told that we would be shot.

Q That is that if you were taken prisoner you would be shot by the Allied Forces who took you prisoner?
A Yes, because we were told that they would not take any S.S. prisoners.

Q And as a consequence of that fact were you not told that you would not take prisoners?
A No, we were not told anything about that.

Q What was the attitude of your comrades with respect to taking prisoners in view of that warning that you had received?
A We thought that was propaganda to get us to fight to the last.

Q In other words you did not believe the warning that if you were captured you would be shot?
A No, we didn't.

Q Was that the opinion only of yourself or did others hold that same view?

A No, no one believed that. We believed that on the Russian front prisoners mihgt be shot but we certainly did not believe that of the western front.

Q Who told you that prisoners would be shot?
A It was said in conversation in the Company, the Company Commander having announced it to the whole company. He said we should not surrender because we would be shot if we were taken prisoner.

Q Who was the Company Commander?
A DIETRICH.

Q Was DIETRICH wounded or killed subsequently?
A Yes, he was wounded.

Q Is he alive to the best of your knowledge at the present time?
A I don't know what sort of a wound he had. I only heard that he was wounded.

Q Were you ever addressed by your Regimental Commander?
A I only saw the Regimental Commander once, that was MILIUS.

Q When was he Regimental Commander?
A That was while we were at DIEBHOLZ. He was only Regimental Commander for about four weeks.

Q Now will you tell us who the Regimental Commanders were during the time that you had connection with the regiment?
A First of all MILIUS, then SBF BUDAENS, that was all.

Q And who were the Battalion Commanders from the time that you were connected with the 3rd Battalion?
A First of all the Battalion Commander was HSF LAMMERDING.

Q And who succeeded him?
A HSF. BRUECKNER.

Q And did he command you when you were committed in action?
A Yes.

Q Did you ever hear that men from your regiment had shot Canadian prisoners?
A I have never heard that.

Q You surely heard that your division has a very bad name for its treatment of prisoners have you not?
A Yes, during the invasion time.

Q And you must know that that reputation was deserved, don't you?
A Yes.

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Q Did you hear about some of these incidents where prisoners were shot?
A No,. I haven't.

Q Did your Section Leaders think that was a pretty good way of treating prisoners?
A We never talked about that.

Q Where did you hear that your division had a bad reputation with respect to taking prisoners?
A I didn't hear that until I was a P.W. I heard it from soldiers who had been in various parts of the front.

Q Are you speaking now of German soldiers?
A Yes, German soldiers.

Q I notice you are not wearing any S.S. badges. Why is that?
A I have taken them down.

Q Why?
A Because I didn't want to be an S.S. man.

Q When did you decide that?
A We couldn't take them down while with the German unit so I didn't take them down until I became a prisoner.

Q Do you mean to say you had to join the S.S. whether you wanted to or not?
A Yes. I was told before being called up that I could only join either the Waffen S.S. or the Hitler Youth Division. As the Hitler Youth Division was not ready for recruits at that time I was put into the Waffen S.S.

Q Well you eventually reached the Hitler Youth Division didn't you?
A Yes.

Q Did you transfer voluntarily?
A I was only in the Waffen S.S. for a training period before going into the Hitler Jugend Division. I wished originally to go into an ordinary Armoured Division but they told me that the only Armoured troops I could go into would be the S.S. Armoured troops so I had no choice but to go from the S.S. training into the Hitler Jugend Division.

Q How many older brothers have you?
A I have no older brother.

Q What is your father's occupation?
A He is a bricklayer.

Q Is he at present, so far as you know, employed at that occupation?
A No, he is in the army.

Q What branch of the army?
A He is in the Volksgrenadiers. He is forty-five and those units are not really active troops.

Q Have you older sisters?
A No. I have brothers and sisters but they are younger.

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EXHIBIT No. 6

Lt Col BORASTON: Do you know that Panzer MYER has been taken prisoner again?
A No.

Q Is that known in the division?
A I have not heard any conversations about that and haven't taken any interest in it.

Q You say that you heard after you had been taken prisoner that the 12th S.S. had a bad reputation. How did you get that impression from your fellow prisoners?
A I could hardly believe it. I heard it when interrogated first.

Q Did any of your fellow prisoners talke to you about it?
A Yes, they did.

Q Were they members of the 12th S.S.?
A No, they were men from all sorts of units.

Q What did they tell you?
A They said that the H.J. Division was known as the "Murder Division" and that during the invasion period they had committed atrocities.

Q Did any of them describe to you the atrocities that had been committed?
A They said that the division had fought recklessly.

Q What was your reaction to that?
A I could hardly believe that.

Q Did you contradict them?
A I couldn't say, but I couldn't believe it.

Q Didn't you say that it was not true?
A As far as I could tell it was not true though I could not say what had happened during the invasion period.

Q Did you say to any of those who had brought this charge against your division that it wasn't true?
A No, I didn't say so but I couldn't believe it.

Q Was it before or after that you had heard these stories from your fellow prisoners that you took off your S.S. badges?
A Before.

Q Hadn't you had some idea of the same thing yourself before they had spoken to you?
A I didn't know anything clear about it.

Q But you had some suspicion about it, is that correct?

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A Yes, because I often heard "H.J. Division, Murder Division".

Q Was that before you were taken prisoner?
A Yes.

Q And from whom did you hear that?
A It was said among ourselves - "H.J. Division, Murder Division".

Q Was that when you were in training?
A Yes.

Q Weren't you told by your Section Commanders or by some other person some of the stories on which this name was founded?
A I heard that the division had behaved recklessly and had never surrendered. I didn't hear much about that during our training period.

Q As your division was known never to have surrendered, wasn't it also known as a division that never took prisoners.
A We were always told never to surrender but I didn't hear anything about not taking living prisoners.

Q Can you give any reasonable expression as to why your division was called "Murder Division".
A Because our division must have behaved recklessly during the invasion.

Q When you say "behaved recklessly" does that mean must have killed prisoners?
A Yes, I suppose it would have included that.

Q Did you hear any specific stories when it had killed prisoners?
A No.

Q Did you ever hear a story of an occasion when eighteen Canadians were killed after they had surrendered?
A I never heard anything about it.

Lt Col MACDONALD: Had your regiment been in action at the village of AUTHIE in Normandy?
A I don't know at all accurately where the division was in Normandy. I have only heard that it was near CAEN.

Q Now you said that the first time you heard about the bad reputation of the unit was when you were interrogated. Are you still sticking with that statement?
A Before capture, in the company, I have often heard the expression "H.J. Division, Murder Division", but I couldn't imagine what that really meant. It was not until coming over here that I heard from other prisoners that the division had a bad reputation.

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Q You said a little earlier though that you also heard it when you were interrogated first, is that correct?
A Yes, that's so.

Q When did you take your badges down, before or after you were interrogated?
A I took my badges down before the interrogation. It was at that time that I heard more in detail about the bad reputation of my division.

Q Don't you think it is a bad reputation for a division to have to be called the "Murder Division"?
A Yes.

Q So that you knew from the beginning that you belonged to a Division which had a very bad reputation?
A Yes, when I came to the division it was already called the "Murder Division" so that it must have had a bad reputation by that time, but I didn't know anything about it before I was posted into it.

Q Was the division proud of its reputation and name?
A No.

Q You certainly weren't taught that it was a bad thing to kill Allied soldiers were you?
A Our Section Leaders did not tell us that it was a bad thing to kill prisoners. They would certainly have preferred for us to kill them.

Q From what did you draw that conclusion? Did they say so?
A That was the view taken by all the Leaders, particularly those above the Section Leaders.

Q Since you have formed that opinion I presume that it must have been from things they said to you?
A They certainly would have preferred to take no prisoners, that was often said and it must have been because they themselves took no prisoners during the invasion time.

TO THE INTERPRETER: Mr. Roome, will you read back that question and answer to him and make certain that he is correctly reported?
A Yes.

(The interpreter translates the preceding question and answer to the witness.)

Lt Col MACDONALD: (continuing the examination): Are you correctly reported?
A Yes.

Q Did they tell you they hadn't taken any prisoners?
A No.

A 092228

Q How did you know they did not take any prisoners?
A I am only saying they would certainly have preferred us to have shot our prisoners.

Q Did they say so?
A No, they didn't say so, but I think they would have preferred it.

Q How could you tell that unless they said so?
A The Company Commander told us we should fight to the last and not surrender. That must include radical measures of other sorts.

Q What do you mean by "radical measures of other sorts"?
A For instance to take no prisoners. They didn't say we should take no prisoners, they said to fight "Radikal Vorgehen" and I took that to include taking no prisoners. The Battalion Commander once said "I require of you a 'Rucksichtslosen Einsatz'".

Q Were you given any secret orders prior to being committed into battle?
A We had orders about German Airforce personnel who were sent into the enemy lines to give false information. They were to be recognized because they were wearing a special ribbon on American uniforms.

Q And were any secret orders given to you with respect to taking prisoners?
A No.

Q Is it not true that you were told that you should continue shooting even if the Allied troops wanted to surrender?
A I don't think so.

Q We are told that such orders were issued in your division. Do you say that is not true?
A I imagine that is included in the expression "Rucksichtslosen Einsatz".

Q We are also told that orders were issued in your division that if prisoners were taken they were to be shot as they were being marched to the rear and the explanation was to be given that they were shot while trying to escape. Do you deny that such orders were given?
A No such order was given to us. That may have been the case during the invasion before I came to the division.

Q Did your section commanders ever tell you how to shoot a prisoner?
A No.

Q If you were going to shoot a prisoner what part of the body would you shoot him in?
A I don't know.

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Q I am asking you now not because you say no orders were issued but as a soldier. How would you shoot him to be sure of killing him instantly?
A I would not want to kill a man. I don't know where I would aim.

Q You are not serious about that?
A What do you mean by shooting?

Q What are the main vital parts of a man where, if shot, he would be instantly killed?
A The head.

Q What part of the head?
A The temple is the place which kills quickest. If I did want to kill a man I would put the pistol to his temple.

Q What about the back of the head at the top of his spine?
A I don't know about that.

Lt Col DORSTON: What is the name of the Battalion Commander who told you you were to fight "Rucksichtslosen Einsatz"?
A BRUECKNER.

Q Did any other of your officers tell you the same thing?
A Yes, the same expression was used by the Company Commander.

Q What is his name?
A DIETRICH. The Battalion Commander first told us this and these instructions were repeated when the Company Commander addressed us shortly before we went into action.

Q And did the other Company Commanders address their companies in like manner?
A I don't know about that, our company was not with the others before we went into action.

(The witness withdraws)

A 092230

SECRET EXHIBIT No. 7

RECORD OF THE EVIDENCE

of

Grenadier BERNHARD HERHOLZ

Grenadier BERNHARD HERHOLZ is called, and having been duly sworn, is examined as follows:-

Lt Col MACDONALD: What is your name?
A BERNHARD HERHOLZ.

Q What is your rank?
A Grenadier.

Q What is your Prisoner of War Number?
A 3191,111,766.

Q How old are you?
A Seventeen.

Q What is the date of your birth?
A 4th of August, 1927.

Q With what unit were you serving at the time you were taken prisoner?
A 10th Company, 3rd Battalion, 25th Regiment, Hitler Jugend Division.

Q That is the Division known as the 12th S.S. Panzer Division, Hitler Jugend?
A Yes.

Q Where is your home?
A East Prussia.

Q Whereabouts?
A SCHIGGENBEIL, DISTRICT OF BARTEN-STEIN.

Q Is your father living?
A Yes.

Q What is his name?
A GOTTFRIED.

Q What is his occupation?
A Labourer. During the war he has been called up to the army and has since been posted to the Feldgend-armerie. (Field Police).

Q Have you older brothers?
A No.

Q With what branch of the army is your father serving, the S.S. or the Wehr-macht?
A Wehrmacht. I have a picture with me of him.

Q With what class were you called up?
A With class 27. I was the youngest of the group with which I was called

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up and I came straight to the army without doing my labour service. I was called up on the 11th of September, 1944. It was with class 1927 but most of the others were some months older than I was.

Q Had you previous to your call-up been in the Hitler Jugend?
A No, I was called up straight from apprenticeship.

Q How did you come to go into the S.S.?
A There was no question of voluntary enlistment. I came home off work one day and found my calling-up papers.

Q When you say you came up from being apprenticed -- apprenticed to what or in what vocation?
A Electrician.

Q That is your civilian occupation you are referring to is it?
A Yes.

Q Where did you take your first training in the S.S.?
A We were actually called up at GUBEN but we only stayed there long enough to get our kit after which we went to get our training at DIEBHOLZ.

Q How long were you in training at DIEBHOLZ?
A About seven weeks.

Q Were you immediately allotted to a battalion and a regiment at that time?
A Yes, at that time I belonged to 9 Company, 3rd Battalion, 25th Regiment.

Q And where did you go from DIEBHOLZ?
A The place was called GLOIL.

Q Where is that?
A Near COLOGNE.

Q Were you in an operational role there or were you simply continuing with your training?
A No, we still were doing training.

Q How long did you stay there?
A About three weeks.

Q And where did you go from there?
A Then we came to the front.

Q What portion of the front?
A That was near HOHNSFELD, just before Christmas. Our transport stopped there.

Q Are you telling us that you were at GLOIL until just before Christmas?
A Yes, we left there about a week before Christmas.

Q Was it in December or in November that you went to GLOIL?
A That must have been at the end of November.

Q Where and when did you first make contact with Allied formations?
A In our first action we didn't see any Allied troops at all. We were simply under artillery fire but saw no enemy troops.

Q And did MILIUS command the division at one time too?
A Yes, he acted as Divisional Commander for a few days and then became Regimental Commander again.

Q How long did MILIUS command the regiment?
A All the time when I was there. Two months roughly. I don't know about the time before I joined.

Q Was he in command when you came?
A Yes.

Q And was MILIUS pretty well liked by the N.C.O.'s.
A No.

Q Do you know why that was?
A There was talk about the first time he went into action with the division and of his behaviour in connection with the H.D.V., or Army Regulations. He acted too much according to the book.

Q What do you mean precisely by "acting too much according to the book"?
A He did everything strictly according to regulations and applied every provision of H.D.V. regarding how many hours duty were to be done a day.

Q Was there any gossip about a quarrel between MILIUS and his predecessor, MYER?
A Yes, it was said that MILIUS led the division badly.

Q But what has MYER to do with that?
A It was because MILIUS led the regiment and the division badly. I don't know what it had to do with MYER.

Q Did you hear that MYER had been taken prisoner of war?
A No, I don't know anything about that.

Q You knew that he commanded the division in the early days of the invasion did you not?
A The first division, I understood.

Q Did you not know that he also commanded your own regiment in the days of the invasion -- the 25th Regiment?

A 092233

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A That may have been the 1st H.J. Division but we were in the new 2nd H.J. Division.

Q Now when you say the new division, you knew, I suppose, that that division, the old division, had a very bad name for its treatment of prisoners did you not?

A We didn't know much about that in East Prussia. Men of the 1st H.J. Division came from the main part of the Reich.

Q You did know, however, that your division was called the "Murder Division", did you not?

A I knew that, but I didn't want to join the S.S. myself.

Q Why was it called the "Murder Division"?

A I don't know a thing about it. I had never seen any Englishmen or Americans until I was pulled out of my fox hole and taken prisoner.

Q No, but that is not the point. You yourself called it the "Murder Division" or other German soldiers called it the "Murder Divison" did they not?

A We didn't call ourselves the "Murder Division". Other soldiers were always saying bad things about the S.S. As for our crowd, we were all called up at seventeen and our morale was low.

Q Why did the other soldiers call the S.S. - or say bad things about them?

A Because S.S. and Infantry don't get on well together.

Q Why is that?

A When I was interviewed on calling-up and asked what I wished to join I applied to join the airforce. I was called a cowardly swine and it is for treatment of that sort that the S.S. gets a bad name.

Q Why were you called cowardly when you wanted to join the airforce?

A It is no reason but that is the sort of thing they do before calling up in Germany.

Q Who called you a coward?

A The S.S. N.C.O. Clerks, doctor, etcetera.

Q Well why do you suppose they considered it to be a braver thing to serve in the S.S. than in other branches of the service?

A They only do that as a way of persuading the youngest and the strongest men to join the S.S. They don't mind the old and the feeble going into the infantry.

Q Well now you have said that the S.S. troops generally bore a bad reputation. Did you know that your division particularly bore a bad reputation?

A Yes, I knew that and that is why I didn't

wish to join it.

Q Now why did it have that particularly bad reputation, that is your division?
A I don't know why. I wasn't in the 1st H.J. Division. It must have been because they behaved badly.

Q In what way do you think they probably misbehaved?
A I have noticed several times in Germany how badly they behaved in public - as if they owned the world, etcetera.

Q Now I suppose that you were told that you were to fight very hard and that you were not to surrender?
A Yes, we were told in Germany that we were to fight to the last and not to surrender and would be shot by our own officers if we tried to desert.

Q And were you told that if you were taken prisoner that you might be shot -- that is by the Allies?
A No, we were told we would be shot by our own people if we showed any signs of wanting to surrender.

Q Were you told that you would be well treated or badly treated by the Allies if they captured you?
A We were told we would be worse treated then the Infantry would be.

Q Do you mean the 12th S.S. or the S.S. generally by comparison with the Wehrmacht Infantry?
A No, the whole S.S.

Q Did your Company Commander explain why S.S. troops who were taken prisoner were likely to be worse treated than other Infantry?
A. No, he didn't explain that to us.

Q Weren't you rather surprised to hear it?
A It was unpleasant for young soldiers to hear that but the only reason I could think of was because we were better fighters than the others.

Q Why should you think that because you were better fighters you would be worse treated?
A I don't know.

Q Would you yourself be inclined to treat a good fighter whom you had captured worse than a fellow who wasn't a good fighter?
A No.

Q Why should you think that the Americans or British or the Canadians would treat a good fighter worse than they would treat a coward?

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A I don't know, and I don't believe it either.

Q Well then you must try and think of another reason why your S.S. were likely to be treated worse when captured. Now think again.
A I don't know, I suppose because the S.S. have a bad reputation everywhere.

Q Have you taken off your S.S. badges?
A They were torn off me by American Parachute Troops.

Q Who captured you?
A American Paratroopers.

Q And do you say that they took off your badges?
A Yes, they took my collar badges off.

Q You appreciate that enquiry can be made as to whether they did or not?
A Yes. The Americans tore off my collar badges but I took the shoulder marks off.

Q Why did you take the shoulder badges off?
A Because I never wanted to be in the S.S. and in the P.W. camp that I was in everybody took them off, about fifteen thousand of us.

Q Did you take off the signs that you wore on your left shoulder too?
A Yes, I took off the Eagel. Everybody in the camp did the same.

Q And didn't you take off the insignia off your collar too?
A No, that was done by the troops who took me prisoner.

Q Why did you take off the rest of your badges as soon as you got to camp?
A Everybody else in the camp did, so I did.

Q And why did you all with one accord take off your badges?
A I don't know why it was. When I arrived at the camp they said, the other P.W.'s, "take off those things quick or you will get in the shit".

Q Wasn't this the reason - that the -- we will call it the 1st, or 12th S.S. Division -- had done terrible things in Normandy at the beginning of the war and you know it?
A The 1st H.J. Division did behave badly, but that was nothing to do with us and there was nobody from East Prussia in the 1st H.J.

Q I am not saying that this had anything to do with you or with the division when you joined it but didn't you all know what the division had done in the earlier days?

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A Yes, some of our N.C.O.'s who had been in Normandy and had not gone to the N.C.O.'s course told us about some of the things that happened in Normandy.

Q Now, can you remember any one of those things that were told you?
A Most of it was stories about behaviour to girls and how they got hold of food for themselves.

Q Weren't some of the stories about how they treated Allied prisoners?
A No, they said that things were very bad in CAEN and they would rather desert than go through it again.

Q Didn't any of them tell you about how they had treated Canadians whom they had taken prisoner?
A No, I didn't hear anything of that sort.

Q Do you expect me to think that stories concerning girls and the stealing of food was sufficient to give that division the reputation it had?
A It may be incredible but I don't know anything more about it.

Q But you have told the Court that you knew of the reputation which the division had and that some of your section leaders had told you why it had it. Now I want you to tell me what they told you.
A I have already told you all they told me was about women and about stealing food.

Q Have you ever heard that the S.S., the old S.S., the 12th S.S., had a reputation for the killing of prisoners?
A No, I don't know about that.

Q Did you ever wonder why it was called the "Murder Division"?
A It made me feel sick and I wrote to my mother saying that I didn't like it and she replied that I should try to leave the division as quickly as I could but no one told me exactly what the division had done to get that reputation.

Q Then you did hear that the Division had been guilty of atrocities in Normandy including the killing of prisoners?
A I had heard that they behaved badly in Normandy towards civilians but I didn't hear of their having shot any prisoners.

Q Did you see any prisoners shot during the German attack in the ARDENNES?
A No, we didn't take any prisoners.

Q You saw prisoners taken by other people?
A I saw no prisoners actually captured, I simply saw some prisoners being taken to the rear while we were going forward.

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Q How were those prisoners being treated?
A They were being marched along with one guard to every twenty P.S.'s.

Q Whereabouts was it that you saw them?
A About two kilometers before our transport column halted at HOHNSFELD. We whould not be compared with the 1st H.J. Division. We were young soldiers of three months service and five weeks of that had been spent moving about.

Lt Col MACDONALD: What do you mean by "how they got their food" when you spoke of the stories that were told you?
A They said that you got short rations at the front but in the end you got more to eat there than anywhere else because you simply went into a house and took what food you wanted.

Q And what sort of stories were you told about their treatment of girls?
A They used to take women with them in the transport and have all sorts of fun with them.

Q Did they take these women against their will?
A They persuaded them to get into the vehicles and then took hold of them and drove off with them. Later on they let them go.

Q Do you know what the word rape means?
A Yes.

Q Is that what you mean they did to them?
A Yes.

Q Do you understand by rape that it means having sexual intercourse with a woman against her wishes, in other words forcing her?
A Yes, I understand, and that did occur.

Q And did the rest of the boys in the new division think that that would be pretty good fun when they got to the front too?
A No, we didn't want to go to the front. We were afraid.

Q But didn't you think this would be a compensation?
A No, I should rather have stayed at home.

Q What was the general attitude towards this matter of raping women, was that thought to be alright?
A No, they didn't like it either and none of us wanted to go to the front.

Q You mean raping would be alright as long as you didn't have to do it at the front, is that your opinion?
A No, I don't, it wouldn't be good.

(The witness withdraws)

SECRET

2997-PS

RECORD OF THE EVIDENCE EXHIBIT No. 8

of

Brigadefuhrer K. MEYER

Brigadefuhrer KURT MEYER is called and examined as follows:-

Major-General BARKER: (To the Interpreter): Will you say to Brigadefuhrer MEYER that this is an inter-Allied Board of Canadian, British and American officers who are making certain investigations and he is called upon to give us testimony in this inquiry. (Interpreter does so).

Lt.Col. MACDONALD: What is your full name ?
A KURT MEYER.

Q Have you been known by the nickname "Schnelle" or "Panzer MEYER" ?
A Yes.

Q What is your rank ?
A When I was taken prisoner I was a Standartenfuhrer, which is equivalent to Colonel.

Q Is that your present rank ?
A I have learnt from the CALAIS Prisoner of War Radio Service and the prisoner of war newspaper that I have been appointed major-general. I have no official news to that effect.

Q Is that the correct title ?
THE INTERPRETER: It is general-major.

Q What formation did you command prior to your capture ?
A The 12th SS Panzer Division, (Hitler Jugend).

Q When and where were you taken prisoner ?
A In BELGIUM on the 7th September.

Q In what part of BELGIUM ?
A South of LIEGE.

Q Are you married or single ?
A I am married.

Q What is your wife's first name ?
A KATE.

Q Have you any children ?.
A Yes, I have four girls. The youngest was born this January.

Q What is your home address ?
A LUDWIGSLUST, MECKLENBURG. The street is GRABOWER ALLEE, No. 14.

Q Are your parents living ?
A My mother is alive; my father is dead.

Q Where does your mother live ?
A OPPLEBEN, near HELMSTETT.

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Q What was your father's occupation ?
A When I was born he was a factory worker. He was then wounded in the last war and died of his wounds.

Q Have you any brothers ?
A No.

Q Where and when were you born ?
A On the 23rd December 1910 at JARXHEIM in BRUNSWICK.

Q Is that near MAGDEBURG ?
A It is 50 or 60 kilometres to the South-West of MAGDEBURG.

Q What was the natureof your education ?
A I was at an elementary school, the first school.

Q Do you speak or understand English ?
A No.

Q Have you ever lived or travelled in ENGLAND, the UNITED STATES or CANADA ?
A No.

Q What was your civilian occupation or profession ?
A I studied to be a merchant from 1925 to 1928.

Q Did you actually engage in that business ?
A No. I was unemployed in 1928 until 1929, except for a short period of employment as a miner. I then had a short spell of employment on the commercial side of a sugar factory and in 1929 I joined the provincial police.

Q What is your Nazi Party number ?
A I believe (I am not absolutely certain) it is 316714.

Q And what is your SS number ?
A 17559.

Q In what year did you join the Hitler-Jugend?
A I was never in the Hitler-Jugend, which was only founded in 1928. I was already interested in the Nazi Party before that date.

Q When did you actually join the Nazi Party ?
A 1930.

Q Will you state the nature of your Party activities and offices and rank held in the Party ?
A Until 1934 I was a member of the Party. From 1934 I was a soldier in the SS and the Leibstandarte.

Major-General BARKER: What is a Leibstandarte ?
A It is Adolf Hitler's Guard Regiment.

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EXHIBIT No. 8

Q Is that part of the Hitler-Jugend or of the SS ?
A It was a part of the armed SS.

Q The Waffen SS ?
A Yes, the Waffen SS.

Lt.Col. MACDONALD: You said that you served for a period of time with the provincial police; with what branch of the provincial police was that and for what period of time ?
A I was in the armed provincial police from the 1st October 1929 until the 15th May 1934.

Q Did you have any particular duties while you were connected with the police ?
A No; simply armed police duties. I was section leader, infantry leader.

Q What was the nature of your preliminary military education ?
A First of all the general police school. Then in 1934 I had retraining for the armoured forces, then a course for company commanders, then a course for staff officers, then a course for regimental commanders and occasional courses in engineering and other special operations. Do you wish me to give the names of the places where the courses were held ?
A No. Would you give an account of your military history from the time you became connected with the Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler ?
A I was platoon commander from 1934 to 1936, company commander from 1936 to 1940, I commanded a battle group (kampfgruppe) from 1940 to 1943; in 1943 I was appointed regimental commander when the Hitler-Jugend Division was reorganised, and when our divisional commander was killed I succeeded him as divisional commander.

Q What was the date of your appointment as regimental commander ?
A I cannot tell you exactly to the day I think it was in April or May 1943. May I continue ?
Q Yes
A I only actually took active command of my regiment in August 1943 after completion of a course.

Major-General BARKER: That was the 25th Panzer Grenadier Regiment ?
A Yes.

Lt.Col. MACDONALD: And on what date did you assume command of the 12th SS Division ?
A It was certainly on the same day on which my divisional commander was killed; I believe it was the 10th June but I am afraid I cannot tell you exactly to the day.

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EXHIBIT No. 8

Q On what day was your divisional commander, Brigadefuhrer WITT, killed ?
A I cannot tell you exactly; I think it was the 10th June.

Q That would be about four or five days after the commencement of the invasion; is that correct ?
A Yes, that would be it.

Q And you assumed command at once on his death ?
A I was instructed to take over command on the 10th and was appointed divisional commander on the 15th.

Major-General BARKER: Where was WITT killed ?
A Near CAEN.

Q How was he killed ?
A By artillery fire.

Lt.Col. MACDONALD: Did you assume command, then, on the 10th ?
A I took over command on the same day on which WITT was killed though I cannot tell you the exact day.

Q But from what you have said we will conclude that it was on the 10th June; are we correct ?
A Yes.

Q Now will you state please the nature of your war service. Where did you first see action ?
A During the Polish campaign I commanded an anti-tank company. After the Polish campaign I took over a company of motor-cyclists and I went through the campaign in the West with this cyclist company.

Major-General BARKER: What division was this cyclist company in ?
A In the Leibstandarte. After the close of the campaign in the West I formed a reconnaissance unit out of my cyclist company.

Q On what date did you organise this reconnaissance unit ?
A I cannot tell you the exact date but I began the formation of this unit at METZ in August 1940.

Q When you formed that unitwas it with the idea that it would be used in any particular theatre of operations, for example, in FRANCE or in ENGLAND, or where ?
A There was no such intention. It was simply a reconnaissance unit as provided in the German military regulations.

Q Where did your unit go from METZ ?
A They were transferred to ROUMANIA in the spring of 1941; I believe it was in February.

Q You were in ALSACE in all that intervening time ?
A It was just outside METZ.

Q Have you any knowledge of the attempted invasion of ENGLAND in September 1940 ?
A I do not know much about it; it was spoken of and we did some training in embarkation and disembarkation.

Q Did you ever discuss amongst the German officers the attempted invasion of ENGLAND in September ?
A We heard talk of the plan.

Q Do you know whether they ever attempted to put that plan into execution ?
A It appears that it really was intended to carry the plan out. It may, however, have been simply to impress our troops, but the preparations were certainly thorough.

Q Do you know whether an attempt was ever made to carry out that plan ?
A No such attempt was made. We regarded the whole matter afterwards as an attempt to mislead maybe the German troops, maybe the whole Western world.

Q Do you think that the Germans ever really had an intention to invade ENGLAND in 1940 ?
A Yes, I believe that.

Q Do you know at what point they expected to make this invasion ?
A No, I do not know that.

Q Do you know of the attempt to invade ENGLAND in September 1940 ?
A No, I know of no such attempt.

Lt.Col. MACDONALD: You were speaking of your service in ROUMANIA. Will you go on, please ?
A From ROUMANIA we went into BULGARIA, and then, when the frontier was opened, into YUGOSLAVIA and on into GREECE. We went into the pass south of MONASTIR and came into contact with British and Australian troops. We then went South-West through KASTORIA and JANINA. I was then sent down to the CORINTH CANAL to stop further embarkation and by means of a rapid operation we crossed the Canal and captured PATRAS. As far as I was concerned that was the end of the Greek Campaign.

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Q Will you go on from there ?
A We were then rested and sent to RUSSIA across the frontier about a week after the beginning of the operations. I was then fighting on the Russian front on the Southern sector until, I think, July 1942. The unit was then sent to NORMANDY to reform.

Major-General BARKER: Why do you think that Hitler invaded RUSSIA, went to war with RUSSIA ?
A I cannot tell you that. I believe he thought that after further strengthening RUSSIA would attack EUROPE with the object of achieving the aims of internationalism.

Q Do you really believe that in your own heart ?
A That was our opinion at the time. At present it is incomprehensible.

Lt.Col. MACDONALD: When was it that you left RUSSIA ?
A June or July 1942.

Major-General BARKER: Now at that time what position did you hold and in what unit did you belong ?
A I was a major and in command of the recce unit which I had formed in METZ.

Q In the Leibstandarte ?
A Yes, in the Leibstandarte.

Lt.Col. MACDONALD: Was your unit at a place called JEFREMOVKA ?
A May I ask in what part of the front that was ?

Q I understand it is in the neighbourhood of KHARKOV.
A We were near KHARKOV, to the North of that place. I have never seen the name JEFRE-MOVKA.

Q When you were in POLAND do you remember having been at a place called MODLIN ?
A No. There was a strongpoint, a fortified town called MODLIN, but we were not there.

Q You were not there ?
A I was not there nor, as far as I know, was the Leibstandarte.

Q How far from that place did you s erve ?
A I could tell you more exactly if I had a map. We were in advance of the fortified area but outside the fortified area itself; 15 kilometres is an estimate.

Q Will you state again what you did from the time you left RUSSIA in June 1942 up until the time you were appointed command-ing officer of the 25 Panzer Grenadier Regiment ?
A We went from RUSSIA to NORMANDY to rest and in January 1943 we were sent back to the Russian Front. The intention was to send us to the ROSTOV-STALINGRAD area but that was found impossible and we were put in the KHARKOV Front.

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Major-General BARKER: Where did you go in NORMANDY when you were moved there in 1942 ?

A To CONCHES. I lived with my staff in a big house between CONCHES and EVREUX; it was a chateau.

Q Where were you when the DIEPPE landing was made in August ?

A We were in this CONCHES area. My unit was called upon to be in readiness to take part in operations, but there was no time for that.

Q Did the Germans at that time think that the DIEPPE operation was a full-scale attempted invasion or just a raid ?

A No, it was believed simply to be a reconnaissance.

Lt.Col. MACDONALD: Will you describe the nature of your second campaign in RUSSIA ?

A I was in command of a battle group (kampfgruppe). We were at the front in the region of KUBIANSK and West of KHARKOV. We were then in the counter-offensive North of KHARKOV. At the capture of KHARKOV I entered the town at the North-East corner. That was the end of active operations as far as I was concerned. I remained in KHARKOV for a time instructing on an NCOs' course, after which I was sent into the Reich to take part in a course for regimental commanders at the armoured troops' school (panzer truppen schule).

Q Was that a regiments' course at MUNSTER ?

A At ZOSSEN and DOEBERTZ, or rather at KHAMPNITZ, to be more exact.

Q Did you at any time lecture at a regiments' course at MUNSTER ?

A No. After the course I went to BELGIUM where the division was formed up. I took command of a regiment.

Major-General BARKER: And what regiment was that ?

A The 25th Panzer Grenadier Regiment.

Lt.Col. MACDONALD: What decorations and awards have you received ?

A In the Polish Campaign I received the Iron Cross Second Class and a wound stripe. In the West I received the Iron Cross First Class and the Infantry Assault Badge (Infanterie Sturm Abzeichen). In the Greek Campaign I received the Knight's Cross and a Bulgarian and Roumanian decoration. In RUSSIA, in December 1941, I received the German Cross in gold. In the spring of 1943 (I cannot remember the exact month) I received the Oak Leaves for the recapture of KHARKOV. Later on I received the

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Silver Decoration for hand-to-hand fighting (nahkampfspange). In NORMANDY I was awarded the Swords to my Oak Leaves.

Q What were the circumstances of your capture ?
A I was on the road and I met an armoured spearhead.

Q Were you with your troops at the time ?
A No, I was not with my troops. My actual unit was in the FALAISE Pocket and the greater part of the division was in the Reich being re-formed. At the moment of my capture I was with a battle group which was under the command of one of my regimental commanders. I was on my way to a course the re-forming of the division.

Major-General BARKER: What was the date of your capture ?
A 7th September 1944 in BELGIUM.

Q Part of your unit at that time was in the FALAISE Pocket ?
A All that remained of the troops fit for active fighting was in the FALAISE Pocket. I had myself been wounded in the FALAISE Pocket. I then made my way out and had been ordered to re-form my division behind the front. The troops still fit to fight were concentrated under another commander to continue fighting.

Q How much of your division was lost in the FALAISE Pocket ?
A Not very much was lost because the greater part of the division had already been withdrawn and was, on the road East in order to re-form. Round about 600 men and some armoured vehicles were all that remained in the FALAISE area, and a small amount of artillery as well.

Q Were they small detachments of all units, or were they from one unit ?
A No, they were from various units in the division.

Lt.Col. MACDONALD: What was the nature of your wound ?
A A wound in the head.

Major-General BARKER: How serious was it ?
A It was a piece of steel that struck me in the head. I had concussion and had to hand over the command to another officer.

Q Where were you when you were wounded ?
A On the road about 2 kilometres to the North-East of the edge of FALAISE.

Q Was your division engaged at that time or were you leaving for GERMANY ?

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A We were still fighting at that time. I was on the way to one of my battalion commanders.

Q What date were you wounded ?
A I am afraid I cannot say without -----

Q About what date was it ?
A Soon after the 20th August, I should think it was.

Q After you were wounded did you become a litter case or were you able to sit up and be evacuated that way ?
A No, I was a sitting case.

Q How soon were you able to return to duty after your wound ?
A I did not leave my troops because I know from the situation that they were bound to be encircled.

Q How did you get to BELGIUM ?
A When we came out of the Falaise Pocket the army commander sent for me at ROUEN and then we were sent to a place North of BEAUVAIS in order to rest my units. A few days after this we were sent further back still to a place North of NAMUR.

Q How much of your division was left at that time ?
A Do you mean in the fighting ?

Q No. You said "we went back". How many of you were able to withdraw ?
A It is hard for me to say how many there were exactly. We had the remains of the Armoured Regiment, we had the remains of the Artillery Regiment and what was left of the Anti-Tank and Engineer units, but these were men not fit to go into action because we had no armoured vehicles or guns. Still the greater part of the troops not fit for action in the division was there.

Q When you were captured were you in the uniform of your rank ?
A Yes.

Q Were you on foot or in an armoured vehicle ?
A I was in a small 4-seater car.

Q What unit captured you ?
A It was a United States armoured unit.

Q Did the American troops recognise you as a divisional commander ?
A Yes, I was wearing my badges of rank and my decorations which were, I note, taken away from me. Having been wounded on the head again at my capture, I was

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sent to hospital at NAMUR.

Q How did you lose your divisional commander's uniform ?
A I was wearing, being a member of the armoured forces, an armoured force uniform which consists in the summer of green drill. There are no epaulettes on this sort of uniform, but badges, etc., worn on both arms. When I left the NAMUR hospital in September it was already cold weather and the Belgian troops who were responsible for guarding me supplied me on receipt with German trousers and a German battledress. The Belgian NCO who issued me this kit was called GAULLE.

Q From that time on, then, you did not wear your badges of rank; is that correct ?
A I did continue to wear my badges. I used to put this new uniform over or sometimes under my summer uniform and it was dressed in this way that I left BELGIUM.

Q Did you ever abandon your badges of rank, stop wearing them ?
A No.

Q Never ?
A Never. I did not stop wearing them and I can bring evidence to that effect. While I was at COMPIEGNE the NCO in charge of the guard gave me a better coat, but this did not fit and I gave it to Lieutenant AUMUELLER in exchange for some kit of his. The lieutenant lives at WIESBADEN. He gave me his officer's badges as there were none on the coat which I had been given at NAMUR. I received an extra pair of epaulettes from a major from the battle group. His name is WILK and he had been captured at AACHEN.

Q When you were at COMPIEGNE were you in the officers' cage there ?
A Yes, I was with the officers there. I was the senior officer.

Q How did you happen to get into the cage with the other ranks ?
A There was a door between the various parts of the camp and this was not kept shut.

Q How did you happen to go over and stay with the other ranks ?
A I simply went over to the tailor's shop to get myself a pair of trousers, the pair I am now wearing, made out of a blanket. On the tunic which I drew at NAMUR there were no badges at all. There were no epaulettes or badges of any sort on the coat.

Q Were you recognised by the officials in charge of the camp as a senior German officer throughout the time you were there ?

A I was the senior German officer present and was consulted as such; I had, however, no actual duties in that capacity.

Q But did the Americans at COMPIEGNE consider you as the senior German officer ?
A Yes, and in the case of roll calls I reported the German officers present.

Q Did you ever go out on work parties while you were a prisoner of the Americans ?
A No. Officers were not called upon to work. I wish to add something: I never left the camp with a working party but once, because we were bored, two other officers and I worked for a while with the camp, also with the object of seeing whether there was a possibility of escaping.

Lt.Col. SCOTLAND: We have evidence to the effect that you did work in COMPIEGNE. What were you wearing on the occasion on which you admit working ?
A I was wearing my uniform with a grey overcoat over it.

Q Were there any badges on the overcoat ?
A There were no badges.

Q What was the difference, then, between you and the other soldiers ?
A There were no other soldiers there. The other officers and I went to the gate where prisoners could apply for work as those who did had better rations.

Q Did you report to the American NCO as officers or as other ranks ?
A We did not report at all. We simply stood there wearing our overcoats.

Lt.Col. MACDONALD: Was it not to further your attempt to escape that you did that ?
A No.

Major-General BARKER: What was the nature of the work you were doing ?
A The American NCO took us to repair some wire inside the camp. I can describe this NCO. He was seriously wounded in the leg in NORTH AFRICA and then came to ENGLAND.

Lt.Col. BORASTON: How many were doing this ? Were they all wearing the same sort of overcoat without any badges of rank ? How many officers were there in COMPIEGNE ?
A 180 to 200.

Major-General BARKER: Did any of the others work ?
A I do not know. There were only two with me at the time of which I speak.

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Q Who were they ?
A Leutnant AUMUELLER and Oberleutnant WAGNER.

Q Were you wearing badges ?
A Yes.

Q But with coats without badges ?
A Yes.

Q So that as far as the Americans could see you were ordinary soldiers ?
A Yes.

Lt.Col. BORALSTON: That applies to all three ?
A Yes.

Major-General BARKER: How many times did you do that; how long did you keep that up ?
A Only once for about an hour.

Q How long were you at COMPIEGNE ?
A About four weeks.

Q How long before you left COMPIEGNE did this happen ?
A A fortnight to three weeks. It was in the first eight days or so and we did it in order to get better rations.

Q Did you actually get better rations ?
A No, unfortunately not. We were disappointed to find that we did not.

Lt.Col. SCOTLAND: Was the food so bad, then ?
A The food was actually quite good but it was very short, particularly at first.

Q Why, then, if the food was not bad, did you attempt to work ?
A In order to keep up our strength.

Q These questions are being put in order to get your answer to a certain question. Your answer to that question has not yet been sufficient. I will put this question to you now: You started this work with the object of carrying out a plan to escape from COMPIEGNE. Is this the case ?
A No. May I add something further ?

Q Do you mean that you are going to say Yes or No ? We want a clear answer. Are you going to modify your No ?
A No.

Q Right then, we are not interested in what you have got to say.

Lt.Col. MACDONALD: You agree that it is your duty as a soldier to endeavour to escape if it can be done, do you not ?
A Yes.

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Q Did not you tell us that you had considered the possibility of escape ?
A We did consider it but we found that it was impossible and senseless to attempt to escape.

Q We have information, however, that you did make plans in that regard with the "lager fuhrers"; do you deny that ?
A I admit having discussed the idea of an escape in the first few days but I deny having made any definite plan to do so.

Q I notice that even now you are not wearing your SS badges. Why is that ?
A It is because I received this information from the camp command. I have written home for a proper uniform but have not yet received it.

Q Is it not possible for you to put the national emblem on the left sleeve, where it should be if you are SS ?
A Yes, I could do that. I should also, I suppose, remove the collar badges.

Q Why have you not done that ?
A I received this coat only a few days ago. As a rule I do not wear uniform at all. We wear prisoners of war clothes.

Q Have you worn SS badges at any time since you have been taken prisoner ?
A I wore badges of rank through until COMPIEGNE. They were not SS badges of rank because the German summer badges are the same for the SS as for the Army.

Q But that is not an answer to the question: Have you at any time, from the time you were captured, worn any of the SS insignia ?
A I have not; nor did I before my capture. All officers and men wearing the summer uniform did not wear SS badges as such.

Major-General BARKER: If you were issued with SS badges now would you prefer to wear them or prefer not to wear them ?
A I should wear them.

Q Do you feel that it is a special distinction in which you take pride or satisfaction to wear the SS badges ?
A The badges are those of the unit with which I have served for a long time. I am not ashamed to wear them. Many of my friends have fallen and I am not ashamed to wear these badges.

Q Is it customary for most members of the SS to remove their SS badges as soon as they are captured ?
A The first I heard of it was when I was a prisoner and a United States soldier came up to several SS men and said: "Take off your SS badges or you will be badly treated", and then in NAMUR I saw some young

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SS men picked out and I was told they were going to be shot.

Q Because they were members of the SS ?
A Yes.

Q Do you believe that ?
A Since the Belgians themselves told me afterwards, yes, I do.

Q Shot by the Americans ?
A No, by the Belgians.

Q Do you believe that any Americans did that to the SS ?
A I have no knowledge of that.

Q Have you any tattoo marks on your body indicating that you are a member of the SS ?
A Yes, I have blood group tattoo marks, which I believe are now in force in all armoured forces.

Q A blood group tattoo mark ?
A Yes.

Q But what I meant was SS badges or any tattoo marks identifying you as a member of the SS ?
A No, I have not such an identification.

Q Do you know of any regulation or custom amongst the SS members to have SS badges tattooed on them ?
A No.

Lt.Col. MACDONALD: Is it not true that in the SS the blood group is tattooed under the left arm ?
A Yes, that is right.

Q And is it not true that only in the SS was a blood group so tattooed until recently ?
A I believe it is now also done for armoured troops.

Q But until it had recently been applied to armoured troops, the SS were the only people who had their blood groups so tattooed ?
A I believe that this applied only to armoured troops in the SS but I am not absolutely certain.

Lt.Col. SCOTLAND: When were you tattooed ?
A I am not certain but I think in 1936 when I became leader of an armoured recce troop.

Q Are you quite sure ?
A Yes, it must have been 1935 or 1936.

Q I suggest that it was 1939 that they were tattooed first of all; you were in the Leibstandarte. Was it not when you joined the Leibstandarte ? It was only the Leibstandarte that was first tattooed. They were the first to be tattooed ?
A No. It developed as experience concerning armoured weapons was collected.

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Major-General BARKER: Is this a true statement now, that every SS man now can be said to have the blood group tattoo mark on him ?

A I do not think so. It may have been true until 1940-41 but since then only the armoured troops in the SS have the tattoo. May I explain the reason for that ? The reason is that an infantryman always carried an indication of his blood group on his identity disc or in his paybook, whereas a member of a tank crew will have very few clothes on in a tank, particularly in the summer, and if a tank is hit he will jump out half naked and his uniform will burn. Therefore we had the blood group tattoo in the armoured troops.

Q Now do panzer units other than the SS have this identification of blood group tattooed on them ?

A I have heard that it has been introduced among non-SS panzer troops but I could not swear to it.

Lt.Col. MACDONALD: What was the nature of your second wound which you say you incurred at the time of your capture ?

A A blow on the ear with concussion and internal bleeding.

Q What was the nature of the blow ?

A It was a stroke from the butt end of a rifle.

Q Was this incurred in the course of your resisting capture ?

A No, it was during my removal to the rear. I had already been removed 100 yards back and my badges of rank and my rings had already been taken off me.

Q So that you were not wounded in resisting capture ?

A No.

Q Had you at any previous time been captured ?

A No.

Q Other prisoners have stated that you had been previously captured ?

A That can only have occurred because I was believed to have been captured in the FALAISE Pocket.

Q After that, when you returned to the unit, you are reported to have had a disagreement with your successor HILIUS ?

A I do not know of this. When is this said to have occurred ?

Q Will you give us the history of the 12th SS Panzer Division (Hitler-Jugend) ?

A The division was established in the summer of 1943 and first went into action in

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NORMANDY. It fought on until the FALAISE battle and then most of the division was withdrawn to the German frontier to be re-formed, whereas the troops fit to continue fighting went on in action in the SEINE and I believe in the ARDENNES. I do not know any more because I myself was taken prisoner.

Major-General BARKER: Precisely where was the division reorganised ?

A BEVERLOO, at the barracks in BEVERLOO in BELGIUM. That was where my own unit was stationed but others may have been outside the actual camp.

Q At the time the Hitler Jugend Division was organised were they told that it was to be a special division or an elite division in any way ?

A No. There was no special selection. Any young volunteers were included in the formation.

Q Was membership in the division restricted to members of the Hitler-Jugend movement or men who had been trained in the Hitler-Jugend movement ?

A No. In fact in the rear formations of the division we had Germans from outside GERMANY, and even Italians and Russians.

Q But in the fighting troops we understand that membership of the division was restricted to men who had been trained in the Hitler Youth movement ?

A We only had lads of 17 to 18 entering the division, and there are no young lads of that age in GERMANY who have not been in the Hitler Youth.

Q Why do you say that you had only lads of 17 or 18; were not older men taken into the division as well ?

A 99 per cent. of the division were lads of the age I have mentioned.

Q Was that because they were specially selected for that division ?

A No.

Q Were the members of the Hitler-Jugend Division given special indoctrination or teaching of any kind ?

A No. They were called up and immediately sent to the barracks for training.

Q Do you consider that the young men brought into the Hitler-Jugend Division were better than those put into the Hermann Goering Division, for example, or some of the other SS divisions ?

A I do not know. I had no opportunity of checking up on that. I simply know that my own troops fought well.

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Lt.Col. SCOTLAND: Did you not yourself select the NCOs for your division ?
A No. 600 NCOs from the G.A.F. were sent to me at KHARKOV in RUSSIA and I took charge of a course at which they were re-trained for infantry work.

Q Were these the men who were then drafted into your division ?
A I did not know it at the time, but part of them were drafted to me.

Q When you came to BEVERLOO was the division already organised ?
A Yes. I had been to a course myself and when I arrived the NCOs had already been to BEVERLOO to pick out recruits, who had already had eight weeks' training. When I arrived the NCOs had already got the units organised.

Q Did you take over this regiment to make it a specially good regiment ?
A I took over this regiment and hoped to make it a specially good regiment. I wanted to make it a first-class regiment.

Q Did you give them any special indoctrination ?
A No. I was not fully satisfied with the quality of my division. The material was good but their training was not to my satisfaction.

Major-General BARKER: What steps did you take to improve morale and spirit especially ?
A We gave them as much special training as we could and, more particularly, we had all training carried out under active service conditions. This was particularly necessary because most of the men were to go into action for the first time.

Q Who was the first division commander ?
A Major-General WITT.

Q Was WITT a Regular Army soldier ?
A He had been in the Army since 1934.

Q He was a professional soldier, a Regular ?
A Yes.

Q Was WITT a member of the SS ?
A Yes, he was.

Q Were all of the officers of the Hitler-Jugend Division members of the SS ?
A No. At least 50 per cent. of the officers were from the Army. That included some battalion and company commanders.

Q Was there any feeling amongst the officers in the division as to a difference in status and position of officers of the Wehrmacht and the SS ?
A No. The only feeling we had was that as we had a young division there was more enthusiasm than would have been the case with a reserved division.

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Q Did the officers in the division who came from the Wehrmacht wear SS badges while they were with the division ?

A No. They were Army badges but in the summer uniform which I have mentioned we all wore the same type of badge. At least 90 per cent. of the officers from the Wehrmacht applied for transfer to the SS and when they were formally transferred they started wearing SS uniform.

Q Were all members of the Hitler-Jugend Division when it was first organised volunteers or were they just drafted into it ?

A I believe they were all volunteers. I was not present when the division was formed but from the impression I have gained I believe that they must all have been volunteers.

Q Had WITT been an active member of the SS prior to the formation of the division ?

A Yes.

Q Where did the division first go into action ?

A North of CAEN.

Q That was the first time they ever saw fighting ?

A Yes.

Q Are you aware of the present trend of military events in GERMANY ?

A Yes, I do know the course of events. I am informed of it.

Q What do you think yourself personally is the present military position of GERMANY ?

A From a military and from a human point of view it would be illogical to continue to fight

Q Why do you think GERMANY continues to fight ?

A If the war was only between GERMANY and the Western Powers we should not be continuing to fight now, but the people have such strong feelings against RUSSIA, where s many of our men have fallen, that we continue to resist.

Q Do you think that if the power of decision were in the hands of OKW., the military leaders, that they would continue the war ?

A I believe that we should strengthen our Eastern front, hold that front, allow the Allies to march Eastwards and when the Allies have crossed the ELBE we would then cease to resist in the East and let our Eastern frontier be held by the Allies.

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Q Do you think that that is liable to be the course taken by the Germans ?
A I imagine a large number of high officers, including SS officers, believe that that should have been started in June 1944 when the first landings occurred.

Q Do you think that that is liable to be carried out now ?
A Yes.

Q Do you realise that resistance by the Germans on the Western Front has practically collapsed and that our crossings of the RHINE are being made practically without opposition, that the spearheads are striking boldly into GERMANY and are having very little difficulty ?
A Yes. I believe, however, that there is some deception there. I believe that the German Command have learned a great deal from their experience in NORMANDY and their strength will lie not mainly on the East bank of the RHINE but further inland. In this way we may have avoided the worst of the bombing.

Q You believe that they will attempt to stabilise a front further back in GERMANY than the RHINE ?
A Yes. There are old fortifications inside GERMANY.

Q Then you do not consider the present action on the Western Front as indicating a desire on the part of the Germans to let the Allies push on ?
A No, not yet.

(At 1245 hours the Court adjourned)
(At 1445 hours the Court re-opened)

THE WITNESS again appeared before the Court.

Lt.Col. MACDONALD: You mentioned this morning that you had heard that since your capture you had been promoted. To what rank did you hear you had been promoted ?
A I heard the story of my promotion in the camp newspaper and on the wireless. The promotion was to the rank of General-Major and Brigadefuhrer.

Q In other words, your SS rank, you heard, was Brigadefuhrer ?
A The official title is Brigadefuhrer and General-Major.

Q What would be your understanding of the term "political soldiers" ?
A That we fight for a certain cause, namely the Fatherland.

Q Well, then, in what respect is a political soldier different from any other kind of soldier ?

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A There is no difference. I consider the expression "political soldier" is a modern slogan.

Q Would you use that term with respect to the members of the Wehrmacht ?
A Yes, I would. It could be employed for anyone who fights. In general, however, it is not an expression that is used.

Lt.Col. SCOTLAND: Have you not had in GERMANY lately any instruction about CROMWELL ?
A I cannot remember.

Q Were you not told about CROMWELL's Army in the 17th century, that a political army was a national army ?
A A national army ?

Lt.Col. MACDONALD: Which do you regard as the national army of GERMANY; the Wehrmacht or the SS ?
A There is no longer any difference.

Q There was at one time, though, was there not ?
A You might say there was a difference until 1939.

Q And that the persons who belonged to the S S prior to 1939 would be called political soldiers as opposed to the Wehrmacht; is that not so ?
A Those were men who had signed on for four years whereas the term of service in the Wehrmacht was for two years only.

Q But that is not an answer to the question. The question I asked you was: Is it not correct to describe the members of the SS prior to 1939 as political soldiers as opposed to the Wehrmacht who were not political soldiers but national soldiers ?
A Yes.

Q So that in using that term in a radio speech that you gave in July last year with respect to the members of your division, you were still making a distinction, were you not, between the Wehrmacht and your own troops ?
A I have often insisted in talking to soldiers on the necessity of a soldier knowing what he is fighting for and not going into battle blindly. He must know the object of his efforts.

Q And is that what you mean by the term "political soldiers", that your soldiers were going into battle with this idea ?
A Yes, that was my intention. I wish them not to go into battle blind.

Q Where was your regiment located in BELGIUM prior to its move to FRANCE ?
A In BEVERLOO.

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Q Was your regimental headquarters in BEVERLOO ?
A Yes.

Q Was it at any time at DIEST, or near there ?
A Yes, we were moved to DIEST in the early part of 1944.

Q So that immediately prior to your move to FRANCE you were in DIEST ?
A Yes.

Q And were some of the troops attached to your regimental headquarters also in MONTAGUE, which is very close to DIEST ?
A No. In DIEST there was only a transport repair workshop.

Q What was there at MONTAGUE ?
A If I might have a look at the map I could answer better. One of my units must have been at MONTAGUE, probably a company.

Q Which company was it ?
A A company of motor-cyclists was in that place under the command of an army captain whose name I shall remember in a minute.

Q Was it Hauptmann POPHNIKE ?
A No, I do not recognise that name. There was no such officer in my regiment.

Q Was it the 15th Company ?
A Yes, it was.

Q And were those the officers in it: Untersturmfuhrer BUSS, Untersturmfuhrer FELING, Hauptscharfuhrer PEUG and Untersturmfuhrer EXNER ?
A Yes, they were there. They were all killed in the NORMANDY Campaign.

Q Would you also agree that the Spiess of that company was Stabscharfuhrer HAGETORN ?
A Yes. He too was killed at BRETTEVILLE in NORMANDY.

Q He was the Spiess of that company ?
A Yes, I think so.

Q Now when did you move from DIEST ?
A I cannot say exactly; in the spring of 1944.

Q Was it in the first few days of April ?
A That is possible.

Q And to what place did you move ?
A Into NORMANDY.

Q Where was your regimental headquarters ?
A In a small village which I might find on the map. (Map is handed to witness). It was here, in the chateau of LA TRINITE, near L'AIGLE. (Witness indicates this place, being map reference ROUEN-PARIS Map,

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Sheet 7, 1/250,000, MR 5748).

Q What portion of your division was stationed in L'AIGLE itself ?
A I do not know for certain because I had not then taken over the command of the division, but, as far as I know, there was only one transport maintenance unit there.

Q And what portion of the division was stationed in the chateau at ST SULPICE just North of L'AIGLE ?
A I am afraid I cannot say. It may have been part of mine or of another division.

Q And what troops were stationed at RUGLES ?
A I am afraid I cannot say that either. I can only give details regarding the area occupied by my regiment. e were not there long enough for me to be able to say anything further.

Q When you moved forward into NORMANDY and later assumed command of the division had you some troops left back in the L'AIGLE area ?
A No. When I took over the division as far as I know there were no troops unless there may have been some vehicle maintenance units there.

Q But it is possible that there were some vehicle maintenance units there ?
A It is possible, though, as far as I know, the unit of that sort which was in L'AIGLE was destroyed by a bomb attack.

Q And it is possible there were some vehicle maintenance units in RUGLES when you took over command, that is, on the 10th June ?
A No, that is not so.

Q Well, when did the troops leave RUGLES ?
A They must have been moved out on the day that the invasion started.

Q Do you know an Obersturmfuhrer KIRCHNER ?
A No.

Q How long did your regimental headquarters remain at the chateau LA TRINITE ?
A From the time at which we left DIEST until the beginning of the invasion.

Q And to what place in NORMANDY was your regiment moved at the commencement of the invasion ?
A May I show you on the map; shall I mark it for you with a pencil ?

Q Yes, please.
A (Witness marks on CAEN Sheet 7 F/1 1/50,000, entered as Exhibit "B" to this examination, the route taken by his regiment).

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EXHIBIT No. 8

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Q How have you marked on this map with a blue pencil the route taken by your regiment in reaching its defensive position North of CAEN ?

A Yes, I have marked our route until North of CAEN, where we met other troops.

Q When did you take up the position which you have indicated North of CAEN ?

A We took up that line incompletely on the evening of the 7th June and completed our occupation of it during the following night.

Q Will you mark the place occupied as a regimental headquarters ?

A It was on the road junction I have marked in blue.

Q Will you now also indicate your divisional headquarters ?

A The division did not arrive there until a few days later. It was in the house near the road and rail crossing. (Witness indicates with a triangular pennant the position of the divisional headquarters, being at map reference 004671).

Q And when did your division take up its position in the South which you have just indicated ?

A The division moved in on the morning of the 8th and remained there until I took over command. On the same day that I did so I moved the divisional staff West to VERSON. I am known to the mayor of that place because I had a man shot there.

Q Now you are speaking of one of your own men ?

A Yes, because he was guilty of rape and I had him shot in the presence of the representatives of the local town.

Q Would you be good enough to mark the position of the divisional headquarters when you took over ?

A I cannot mark it exactly on this map. It is in the part immediately West of the church. Shall I write the figures showing the divisional headquarters ? (Witness does so, showing successive locations of the divisional headquarters). After VERSON we moved to LOUVIGNY, and then into CAEN itself. I have marked the four successive divisional headquarters with the Roman figures I to IV.

Q Will you now please indicate the boundaries between your regiment and the 26th when you took up your defensive position ?

A It is hard for me to do that because the 26th did not arrive until about a day after ours, and in the meanwhile we had Air Force troops from the aerodrome at CARPIQUET and the aerodrome South of CAEN, and troops which had returned from the front between our regiment and the 26th. However, I can say that our troops were in occupation of ST CONTEST

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inclusive, while there were Air Force units at CUSSY and CARPIQUET, as far as MARCELET inclusive, while the 26th Regiment when it arrived took up a position with its left on FONTENAY LE PESNEL, where it was in touch with the right wing of the Panzer Lehr Division. The final arrangement of our position was undertaken when all the troops were present and when the troops returning from the front had also been included.

Q When was that final disposition made ?
A The final arrangement was made on the 9th. On the night of the 8th/9th June I extended my front to the West to a point just East of LA VILLONEUVE, where I was in touch with the 23th.

Q Will you now draw on this map the boundaries of the regiments in your division as they were established on the 9th June ?
A I have marked my own front with the boundary on my right with the 21st Division and the boundary on my left with the 26th Regiment.

Q Now how far to the left did the 26th Regiment hold ?
A When I took over the division the troops of 26th Regiment furthest to the left were in CRISTOT and were retreating towards FONTENAY, so I can mark a line West of that place as the left boundary of the regiment.

Q Now what division was on the left of your division ?
A The Panzer Lehr Division.

Q When did the Air Force troops leave; when were they relieved ?
A The last left on the evening of the 7th and the morning of the 8th.

Q So that at that time the 25th and 26th Regiments had taken over the whole front within the divisional boundaries which you have just indicated ?
A That is correct, as from the evening of the 8th. That is correct after the last units from the coast had come back on the morning of the 9th.

Q Now which of your battalions were in the foremost forward defended localities ?
A They were all three forward.

Q In what order ?
A No. 1 on the right, No. 3 on the left and No. 2 in the middle.

Q And what battalion of the 26th Regiment was on the left of your regiment ?
A I am not certain whether it was No. 1 or No. 2.

Q And did the 26th Regiment have its three battalions up also ?
A Yes.

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Q Now where at this time was the reconnaissance battalion located on the 8th/9th June ?
A When I took over the division the reconnaissance battalion was at a point I will indicate on the map. It had been taken out of the line. It was immediately South or South-West of EVRECY; I cannot say exactly. (Map reference AUNAY-SUR-ODON, MR 9259).

Q And where was your engineer battalion, the pioneer battalion ?
A After the troops whom we relieved had gone, the engineers were between the right and the centre battalions of Regiment 26 in an area North-West of ST MAUVIEU and South-East of LE MESNIL PATRY.

Q And where was the artillery regimental headquarters ?
A The staff of the regiment was always in the immediate neighbourhood of the divisional headquarters, whereas the battery headquarters were in various places according to the situation.

Q And I presume that the signals and the anti-tank battalions were split up in a similar manner ?
A Yes. Their headquarters moved according to the operational situation.

Q Now were there any changes in the location of any of the units in the division between the 8th and 9th June and the 17th June ?
A The positions of the various units in the division altered continually according to the operations which occurred. In one case I received reinforcements in the shape of a battalion from another division, but it is difficult for me to say exactly what alterations occurred without knowing exactly what operations took place on that day. On the whole, however, the positions were as I have indicated except that we steadily moved backwards. In the last third of the battle for CAEN I had a position immediately South-West of the city, but when the front moved back South-West from that point my units were taken South of the city and concentrated there.

Q Now, so far as you can remember, was there any change during that period I have just mentioned, that is from the 8th/9th June to the 17th, inhe location of the reconnaissance battalion ?
A When I took over command I sent the recce battalion forward to reinforce the Lehr Division and during the days mentioned I had not the recce battalion under my orders on my front.

A 092263

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EXHIBIT No. 8

Q Where did they make their headquarters while they were supporting the Panzer Lehr Division ?
A I cannot tell you that because while the battalion was not with me it was not under my orders. It came under me a few days afterwards.

Q Where did the reconnaissance battalion go after it came back under your command ?
A The recce battalion went further East, except for a few detachments which remained with me South of CAEN. The main part of the recce battalion was at ST SILVAN (map reference CHERBOURG and CAEN 1/250,000, Sheet 3A and 8, MR 103554). The point was about 10 kilometres from the road.

Q Now what changes took place from the 8th June to the 17th in the positions held by the engineering battalion ?
A I cannot say the exact date. I only know that after a heavy attack in the neighbourhood of ST MAUVIEU the engineering battalion was taken out and was also sent back to the South-East for a rest.

Q Did the engineering battalion on the 17th have a headquarters at MOUEN ?
A No, that is not possible.

Q What troops were located in MOUEN on the 17th June ?
A That must have been the fresh division which came up from our left rear to take over our positions. This was the time at which my headquarters moved from VERSON in the neighbourhood of LOUVIGNY.

Q What troops of yours had been in MOUEN prior to that move ?
A None of my troops were stationed in MOUEN. We moved back from the line I have marked to the road through MOUEN, but none of my troops can be said to have been there.

Q What was the name of your engineering battalion commander ?
A Sturmbannfuhrer MUELLER.

Q His headquarters would normally be represented by a sign bearing the letters MU, would it not ?
A Yes, that is right.

Q We have evidence that such signs were in the village of MOUEN.
A His headquarters was much further forward than that. It was in the neighbourhood of ST MAUVIEU, and the only part of his unit in MOUEN might have been his rear transport.

H3056-0123

Q At what point was the headquarters of the 26th Regiment established on the 8th/9th June ?

A In the wood North of GRAINVILLE-SUR-ODON (map reference 9064). It was about half a mile North-East of this road junction. (Witness indicates road junction in the centre of square 8964 which is West of GRAINVILLE-SUR-ODON previously referred to. Witness marks map accordingly).

Q Was there a formation headquarters at the village of RAURAY ?

A Where is that ?

Q Here. (MR 8865).

A That could only have been the temporary headquarters of an armoured unit which moved forward to the attack from positions South-West of the village. No part of my division had its headquarters there.

Q Now what headquarters was established at ARDENNE ? (ANCE ABBAYE, MR 9970).

A Previously there had been the battle headquarters of artillery units with observers on the towers, and of Air Force troops. When I moved in I had my battle headquarters there. When we arrived, there were also parts of the 21st Panzer Division who were present when we moved in.

Q You say you established your battle headquarters there; do you mean your regimental headquarters or your divisional battle headquarters ?

A That was my regimental battle headquarters. When I took over the line I have marked in blue I moved my personal headquarters forward to ARDENNE, but it was not my staff headquarters proper. It was only my own orders point.

Q Did you ever use that point as a divisional orders point or command post ?

A No. I was there several times with General GEYR because it was an excellent observation point, and I spent several hours there during the day.

Q I show you a church on this map South of CAEN, map reference 009673. What headquarters was that ?

A The headquarters was not in the church but further South-West down the road. It was my battle headquarters and was, I think, the first building you come to moving North-East from the railway.

Q What sort of a building was that ?

A It was a sort of big cottage. I was only there for part of an afternoon. I was only there to take over duties after the death of the divisional commander and I then moved the divisional headquarters, as I have said, back to VERSON.

H3056-0124

EXHIBIT No. 8

Q Now when the reconnaissance battalion went in there, where did it have its headquarters on the 8th June ?
A The reconnaissance battalion went over to the Lehr Division. This applies only to part of the recce battalion, the forward elements.

Q Where were the rest of the elements ?
A The remainder who were not fit for the front line because they were waiting for material, transport, etc., remained in the neighbourhood of EVRECY, and when the front moved further back they went East.

Q Would you disagree with this statement, that the reconnaissance battalion on the 8th June had its headquarters in the CHATEAU d'AUDRIEU, near PAVIE and AUDRIEU ?
A I cannot say; I had not taken over command of the division at that time. When I took over command of the division the recce battalion was already in the neighbourhood of EVRECY.

Q As a result of any inquiries which you subsequently made were you able to ascertain that that is where they were on the 8th June ?
A I know from the war diary that the objective of the recce battalion before that time had been the town of BAYEUX. It had actually reached a railway, and these men might well have been at AUDRIEU, but I do not know where the recce battalion headquarters was or where any fighting occurred.

Q Which battalions of your regiment recaptured the village of AUTHIE on the afternoon of the 7th June ?
A It was the Third Battalion.

Q And was it the Third Battalion also that went on and recaptured the village of BURON ?
A The armoured elements took the villages of AUTHIE and BURON and the infantry then moved forward and occupied a line between those villages.

Q Which portion of the tank battalion put in that attack ?
A The armoured unit PRINZ.

Q That was not part of your division, I take it ?
A Yes, that was part of my division.

Q In other words, you mean the First Battalion of the Panzer Regiment in your division ?
A Yes. I think it was the First but it may have been the Second. I had not much experience of the division at that time.

A 092266

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EXHIBIT NO. 8

Q Now which troops recaptured the villages of MESNIL PATRY and LES SAULLETS on the 11th June ?
A It must have been the 26th Regiment.

Q Do you know what armoured elements assisted them in that attack ?
A I cannot say for certain. It may well have been the Panzer elements of the Lehr Division which, as I have said, were on the left of that part of the front, particularly as I had withdrawn my own Panzer units towards CAEN.

Q You were in command of the division, however, at the time this attack was put in. Can you say definitely what troops put in that attack ?
A The ground was very broken up and on my left the commander of the Lehr Division worked closely together with the commander of my sub-unit which cooperated independently of me. This was the only time that this occurred. There are several attacks I can give fuller information about, but this was not in any case an attack on any large scale.

Q Now what troops of your division were stationed at the village of LES FAINS on the 12th June ?
A There cannot have been any of my troops there, for my left boundary is the line marked near FONTENAY LE PESNEL and I had no troops West of that.

Q Now when you took over command of the division who was your immediate superior ?
A That depended very much on the operations. First of all it was the First Corps; then it was the 5th Panzer Army under General EBERBACH, who is now a prisoner.

Q What was the First Corps commander's name ?
A DIETRICH.

Q And was he continuously the corps commander under whom you served from the time you assumed command of the 25th Regiment until you were eventually captured ?
A He was my corps commander from the moment when I took over the regiment until FALAISE. During the FALAISE battle he took over command of the 5th Army.

Q And who was DIETRICH's immediate SS superior officer ?
A If you mean in the last fighting then it was EBERBACH, the Army commander.

Q No; I mean in the SS organisation itself ?
A There is no such relationship.

Q From whom would you take your administrative SS orders, or at least from whom would DIETRICH take his administrative SS orders ?

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A From the Army commander and from the Army corps commander.

Q I understand that in tactical matters when an SS division comes under the command of a Wehrmacht general, that they act in accordance with his tactical orders, but in so far as administrative orders are concerned they act under the orders of their SS superiors ?

A As long as I have been divisional commander I have not had experience of that.

Q So that you cannot say by anything that you know yourself from whom DIETRICH took his orders ?

A He certainly received orders regarding the fighting from the Army commander.

Q And from whom did he receive orders respecting other matters ?

A As far as I know, those orders also came from the Army commander only, but I have not been stationed in GERMANY since 1939 and do not know the procedure.

Q Perhaps I should make myself clear: Shall I say in personnel matters rather than administrative matters ?

Major-General BARKER: Having to do with the comings and goings of SS personnel; the assignments and promotions ?

A With regard to promotions, names were submitted to the divisional commander who would give his opinion upon them, and upon other opinions inside GERMANY the divisional promotions would depend.

Q And whom did the divisional commander consult on such matters ?

A He would discuss the matter with the Corps commander.

Q And with whom would the Corps commander take it up, if necessary ?

A The Corps commander could take the matter up with the Army commander or with the High Command of the Army, the OKH. In my own particular case I know that the OKH and the GOC discussed the matter before I was promoted.

Lt.Col. MACDONALD: Who succeeded you in command of the 25th Regiment ?

A. MILIUS.

Q And how long did he continue in command ?

A I do not know how long it was. I was taken prisoner myself.

Q Was he still in command of the regiment at the time you were taken prisoner ?

A Yes, and he then took over the remaining troops of the division who were fit to fight.

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Q And who on the 7th June commanded the First Battalion of the 25th Regiment ?
A WAIDMULLER.

Q And was his rank Sturmbannfuhrer ?
A Yes.

Q How long did he continue to command that battalion ?
A He was still commanding when I was taken prisoner. I may be mistaken there, but I believe so.

Q Who commanded the Second Battalion on the 7th June ?
A SCAPPINI.

Major-General BARKER: Was he an Italian ?
A I think his father came from ITALY.

Lt.Col. MACDONALD: What was SCAPPINI's first name ?
A HANZ.

Q And what was WAIDMULLER's first name ?
A It was also HANZ. I am sure of this and I think the name is also right with regard to SCAPPINI.

Q And how long did SCAPPINI continue to command the Second Battalion ?
A He was killed two days later.

Q And who succeeded him in command of the battalion ?
A SCHROTT.

Q What was his first name ?
A I cannot remember; he was killed.

Q When was he killed ?
A He was killed in BELGIUM, on the Franco-Belgian frontier.

Q Did he continue to command the Second Battalion from the time he took over until his death ?
A Yes.

Q Who commanded the Third Battalion on the 7th June ?
A MILIUS.

Q What was MILIUS' first name ?
A I am not sure. I think it was HANS GEORG.

Q Did he continue to command that battalion until he took over command of the regiment ?
A Yes.

Q Who succeeded him in command of the Third Battalion ?
A Hauptmann STEEGER.

Major-General BARKER: Is he the same one who was captured in July ?
A Yes.

Lt.Col. MACDONALD: Did he continue to command the Third Battalion up until the time he was captured ?
A Yes.

A 092269

EXHIBIT No. 8

Q Now who commanded the 26th Regiment on the 7th June ?
A MOHNKE.

Q What was his first name ?
A WILLI.

Major-General BARKER: Is he the one who now commands the 1st SS Panzer Division ?
A It is likely to be.

Lt.Col. MACDONALD: He was a Standartenfuhrer ?
A Yes.

Q And did he continue to command the regiment from the 7th June until you were captured on the 7th September ?
A No. Before that he gave up command of the regiment and took over command of the 1st Panzer Division.

Q When was that ?
A Before the battle of FALAISE; no, after the FALAISE Pocket.

Q And was his adjutant's name Obersturmfuhrer KAISER ?
A Yes.

Q Who was the commander of his First Battalion on the 7th June ?
A I can give you the names, but I am not certain of the numbers: SIEBKEN, KRAUSE and OLBOETTER.

Q What was KAISER's first name ?
A I do not know.

Q And KRAUSE ?
A Bernard.

Q And SIEBKEN ?
A Also Bernard.

Q OLBOETTER ?
A Erich. OLBOETTER was killed.

Q When was OLBOETTER killed ?
A Towards the end of August.

Q And did these three, KRAUSE, SIEBKEN and OLBOETTER, continue to command the three battalions of the 26th Regiment from the 7th June until your last information with respect to them ?
A SIEBKEN, yes. KRAUSE was sent back to GERMANY to re-form some other unit.

Q When was he sent back ?
A In the middle of August.

Q Who commanded the tank regiment on the 7th June ?
A WUENSCHE.

Q And was his first name MAX ?
A Yes.

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Q He was an Obersturmbannfuhrer ?
A Yes.

Q And did he continue to command that regiment until he was captured in August ?
A Yes.

Q Who commanded the First Battalion ?
A I think it was PRINZ, but I am not certain whether he commanded the First or Second.

Q And did he continue to command a battalion of that regiment throughout ?
A Yes. He was killed North of CAEN.

Q When was that ?
A Early in August.

Q Who commanded the other battalion ?
A JUERGENSEN.

Q And what was JUERGENSEN's first name ?
A ARNOLD.

Q And did he continue to command that battalion as long as you know ?
A He was sent back to GERMANY during the battle of FALAISE.

Q Was he succeeded by a Hauptsturmfuhrer BECK ?
A BECK was killed on the 8th June.

Q What was his command ?
A BECK was an aide-de-camp of General GEYR.

Q He himself had never commanded a battalion in the Panzer Regiment?
A No, he had been a company commander.

Q What was the name of the Ia at Divisional Headquarters ?
A MEYER.

Q What was his first name ?
A I cannot think for the moment.

Q Was it HUBERT ?
A Yes.

Q And for what period of time did he hold that appointment ?
A He remained until I was captured.

Q Was he related to you ?
A No.

Q Who commanded the artillery regiment from the 7th June ?
A SCHROEDER.

Q What was his first name ?
A I cannot tell you.

Q Who commanded the First Battalion of the regiment ?

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A I might recognise the name if it was said to me, but it does not occur to me.

Q TIMMERBEIL ?
A TIMMERBEIL, yes; he took over after his predecessor had been killed.

Q And was his predecessor URBANITZ ?
A Yes.

Q And when was URBANITZ killed ?
A That must have been during the battle of the Falaise Pocket.

Q And TIMMERBEIL did not then serve as a battalion commander in the battle of CAEN ?
A No, he did not.

Q Who was the commander of the Second Battalion; EUCHMANN ?
A No.

Q SCHOPF ?
A No.

Q Who commanded the Third Battalion ?
A HAGEMEISTER. He was killed in the battle of FALAISE.

Q Are you sure that he was killed ?
A Yes.

Q And who commanded the Fourth Battalion ?
A There were only three. Maybe you mean the grenade unit belonging to the regiment ?

Q Yes. What is that, then ?
A MUELLER.

Q What was his first name ?
A I do not know.

Q Who commanded the reconnaissance battalion from the 7th June ?
A I think it was BREMER, but I am not certain.

Q What was his first name ?
A GERHARDT.

Q Who commanded the anti-tank battalion ?
A HANREICH JACOB; he also was killed.

Q When was he killed ?
A In the FALAISE Pocket.

Q Did BREMER continue to command the reconnaissance battalion from the 7th June until after the FALAISE battle ?
A No. When I took over the division BREMER was wounded.

Q On what day was he wounded ?
A I think on the first or second day.

Q In other words, the 7th or 8th June ?
A I think it was the 7th June.

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Q Who succeeded him in command of the battalion ?
A One of the company commanders took over, but I do not know his name.

Q Was BREMER seriously wounded or was he able to report again for duty ?
A In a few weeks he was back at duty.

Q When did he return to duty ?
A About 10 days or two weeks afterwards; towards the end of June.

Q Was he evacuated completely from the battle area during the intervening period ?
A He spent a time in hospital and then a short time reorganising his troops in the rear.

Q What was the nature of his wound ?
A A wound in the foot.

Q How did he sustain that injury ?
A I believe it was a shell fragment.

Q Who was in command of the signal battalion ?
A He was killed; I cannot remember his name.

Q PANDEL ?
A Yes.

Q When was he killed ?
A Between FALAISE and ROUEN.

Q Who commanded the AA, anti-aircraft battalion ?
A PENDT.

Q What was his first name ?
A I cannot tell you.

Q Did he continue the command of the battalion throughout ?
A Yes.

Q And you have told us that Sturmbannfuhrer MUELLER commanded the engineering battalion ?
A Yes.

Q What was his first name ?
A I cannot tell you that either.

Q Did he continue to command from the 7th June until the battle of FALAISE ?
A No, he was wounded.

Q When was that ?
A He was wounded in the first days of the battle at his battle headquarters which I showed you on the map. It was at point 63 in map reference 920693.

Q And on what date was this ?
A During the Allied attack, roughly on the 15th June.

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Q Who succeeded him in command ?
A The battalion was taken out of the line.

Q Was no one appointed to succeed him ?
A The senior company commander took over while the battalion went back. I cannot tell you his name.

Lt.Col. PAGE: Was it PINKERNEL ?
A Yes, I believe it was.

Q When BREMER of the reconnaissance battalion was wounded did REICHENSTEIN take over from him ?
A No, I have not heard from REICHENSTEIN since I took over the division. I believe that he must have been sent back from GERMANY before the fighting started.

Lt.Col. MACDONALD: Was there some staff officer who took over from BREMER ?
A It was one of the company commanders. BREMER came back a fortnight or so later and took over again.

Q Who was in command of the reconnaissance battalion when you took over command of the division ?
A The duty of battalion commander was being done by the senior company commander. BREMER continued to count as battalion commander as he was not seriously wounded, and was not far off.

Lt.Col. SCOTLAND: Was the company commander HAUTZMANN ?
A There was an officer named HAUTZMANN there.

Lt.Col. MACDONALD: What were the names of the company commanders ?
A Apart from REICHENSTEIN, who had already left, and HAUTZMANN I cannot think of any names.

Q When did REICHENSTEIN leave ?
A I did not see REICHENSTEIN at all during the battle of NORMANDY. He must have gone back before that, I think, and I believe he had heart trouble.

Lt.Col. PAGE: What was the name of the signal officer in the reconnaissance battalion ?
A I might recognise the name if it was said to me.

Q SCHENK ?
A There was someone called SCHENK in the unit, but I do not think he was signals officer.

Lt.Col. SCOTLAND: KIRCHNER ?
A No, I do not think so.

SECRET

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Lt.Col. BOWSTON: Did the cyclist unit which you trained as a reconnaissance unit ultimately form the basis of the reconnaissance battalion of your division ?
A No, it was nothing to do with it.

Lt.Col. MACDONALD: What were the names of the company commanders in the engineering battalion ?
A I could probably confirm the names if I heard them, but I cannot think of any.

Q Who did you say succeeded MUELLER ?
A MUELLER came back to duty as his wound was not severe, but the engineer battalion, having suffered severe losses, did not go back to the front.

Q If MUELLER was wounded in the course of the general Allied attack around the 15th June when was it that he came back to duty ?
A He was with me in the FALAISE Pocket. At that time most of the troops were marching back in the direction of the SEINE. He was only there in order to remain with me and was not in command of his unit in the Pocket.

Lt.Col. PAGE: Can you remember any of the company commanders in the engineer battalion ?
A PINGEMEL. There was then a captain and he was killed very soon.

Q Would that have been TIEDT ?
A Yes, TIEDT.

Q And was there one called KUHET ?
A I cannot remember that name.

Q Was there one called BISCHOFF ?
A There was an officer named BISCHOFF, but I do not know whether he was company commander.

Q And one called TOLL ?
A Yes, TOLL was the captain who was killed.

Lt.Col. SCOTLAND:- And the First Company ?
A I know the names of some of the company commanders. I do not know what they commanded as I had nothing to do with the organisation.

Q TRONKE ?
A No.

Q KUHET ?
A In what unit is this ?

Q The Second Company of the Engineer Battalion.
A No.

Q And who was the adjutant of the engineer battalion ?
A BAUER was the adjutant.

EXHIBIT No. 8

It.Col. MACDONALD: Now did you have good discipline in your regiment while you were in command of it ?
A Yes.

Q And was the discipline in the division good at the time you were in command ?
A Yes.

Q Generally, could you be assured that orders would be promptly obeyed without question ?
A Yes, except that we had less control over the rear sub-units where there were Italians.

Q What orders or instructions, if any, were given to the soldiers of your regiment during the training period, as to the treatment of enemy prisoners ?
A To get the prisoners out of the fighting area as soon as possible and to pass them back through company, battalion and regiment so that the Command could use the information given as soon as possible.

Q When was this instruction given ?
A All the time.

Q Are you familiar with the terms of the Geneva Convention ?
A Yes.

Q And you were also, at the time you were in command of your regiment, I assume ?
A Yes.

Q Was anything explained to the troops of your regiment, or to the troops of your division while you were in command of them, as to their duties and rights under the Geneva Convention ?
A Yes. As this was in most cases the first fighting our troops were in, they were given instructions about it before they went into action and I think I am right in saying they were also given written orders.

Q What was the nature of the verbal instructions that were given and what was the nature of the written instructions ?
A The oral orders were with regard to the behaviour of our troops in the field and to prisoners of war, and the written orders were with regard to the rapid evacuation of PW and their handing over to the military police.

Q Were the troops instructed up to what point it was within the terms of the Geneva Convention for them to kill the enemy opposing them ?
A Not at all; no prisoners may be killed at all.

Q Was any explanation given as to when an enemy became a prisoner ?

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A Yes. As soon as he throws away his weapons or is wounded and becomes incapable of fighting.

Q Were these, orders, that were issued to your knowledge, or is that merely your present interpretation ?
A No. I myself gave these orders and I made certain that they were carried out as applying both to officers and the other ranks.

Q Did you have any orders from Higher Command, either written or otherwise, with respect to the treatment of prisoners ?
A No special instructions. It was simply instructions to send prisoners back as fast as possible. Instructions came from above as to where the new collecting points for prisoners of war were established.

Q Did you issue or authorise or direct the issue of any order, written or verbal, secret or otherwise, to your regiment or division permitting, authorising or directing the shooting of prisoners or the denial of quarter ?
A Never. That would immediately undermine our own morale.

Q What do you mean by saying that it would undermine the morale of your own troops ?
A If a young soldier was instructed in that way he would soon refuse to accept discipline and would be useless as a soldier.

Q How do you know that ?
A That is a matter of long-standing historical experience, that if discipline is abandoned then a soldier is useless..

Q Did you at any time express the view to you subordinates that they should avoid taking prisoners except for interrogation ?
A No.

Q Did you ever, in writing or otherwise, forbid the shooting of prisoners or the denial of quarter ?
A I have not actually, as far as I can remember, prohibited the shooting of prisoners in writing but I have given written orders as to how my troops should behave towards prisoners on the field of battle. But, as far as I remember, there was either an Army or Army Group order referring to the Geneva Convention and instructing that troops should behave properly with regard to prisoners.

Q Did you at any time after the 7th June have reason to issue any fresh orders with regard to the treatment of prisoners ?
A No. On the 7th about 80 prisoners, both officers and other ranks, were brought to our headquarters and sent back.

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Q We are told by men from your division who had served in RUSSIA that they frequently did not take prisoners there, but that was because RUSSIA was not a signatory to the Geneva Convention; can you confirm or deny that evidence ?

A That is not the case. I agree that the fighting was very tough in RUSSIA but as a rule prisoners were taken and I myself had a Russian prisoner driver for a long time.

Q You do know, though, that prisoners were shot on both sides in RUSSIA, do you not ?

A I do not know whether any were shot on our side; none were shot by the fighting troops.

Q You know that your High Command now admits that Russian prisoners are not taken, do you not ?

A No, I do not know that. If that should be the case I can only attribute it to the fact that the Russians do not take any prisoners. That is just the reason why GERMANY is still fighting.

Q And I take it that because you do not take prisoners is the reason why Russians frequently do not take prisoners ?

A The position was that in the early days of the Russian Campaign, 1941-42, Russians would, after a time, surrender. In the second stage no one on either side usually surrenders.

Q And in the second stage was it common that prisoners on both sides were shot ?

A I do not know about what happened on the German side. All I can say is that men of my own, whom we lost, were afterwards found shot.

Q Do you say that in your own experience you have no knowledge of German troops shooting Russian prisoners ?

A Not among my troops.

Q Does that also apply to civilians ?

A Yes. Civilians have not been attacked.

Q Do you say, then, that at no time within your knowledge or experience have any troops connected with your command executed civilians in RUSSIA ?

A Yes, I can say that with confidence.

Q Did you authorise your junior commanders to state in orders that the enemy, referring particularly to the Canadians, did not take prisoners ?

A No. We did not even know that we were fighting Canadians.

Q Did you ever authorise such a statement with respect to either the British or the Americans ?

A No.

A 092278

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Q Did you ever hear such a statement made during the period of time that you were with the 12th SS Division with respect to any of the British, Americans or Canadians ?
A Yes. I heard the story during the battle of FALAISE when German troops were found shot in a village near FALAISE. This report came from Corps or Army headquarters; I do not remember which.

Q Was there any story current during the fighting in June that British, Americans or Canadians did not take prisoners ?
A It must have been towards the end of June. Might that have been FALAISE ?

Q Well, the fighting in FALAISE did not take place until August. It could not have been then.
A I can only remember the case of FALAISE, and not of any earlier case. On the contrary, prisoners of ours have come back and said that they had been well treated.

Q Did you ever hear of the capture of a british or Canadian order that SS would not be taken prisoners ?
A No.

Q When did you know that you were being opposed by Canadian troops ?
A I think it was on the morning of the 8th June.

Q Were any Canadian or British prisoners ever executed, to the best of your knowledge, in the 12th SS Division in supposed retaliation for the shooting of SS or German prisoners ?
A Not under my command. I have never heard of it in any case. I might add that during June I received an inquiry as to whether Canadians had been shot in my sector. I made the inquiry and was able to reply that while I had been in command there had been no such case.

Major-General BARKER: From whom did that inquiry come ?
A It came from DIETRICH, the Corps commander. He had received the inquiry from the Fuhrer's Headquarters.

Q Do you know what prompted that, why that question was ever raised ?
A According to the letter from Corps it seemed that there had been foreign or English reports that Canadians had been shot by German troops and it was desired to find out where this had happened, and here again reference was made to the provisions of the Geneva Convention.

Lt.Col. MACDONALD: Were any orders issued by Higher Command that Commandos were to be denied quarter ?

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A I do not know anything about that. I can only remember that in 1942 orders were issued that parachutists in civilian clothing need not be regarded as prisoners, but the ordinary rules of war applied to prisoners in uniform.

Q Is not your recollection of that order at fault ? Did it not say that paratroopers descending far behind the line, whether in uniform or not, were to be regarded as saboteurs ?

A No. The order which I refer to I know relates to civilians. It must have been after the DIEPPE landing.

Q Do you say that you are not familiar with an order that Commandos were not to be treated as ordinary prisoners ?

A I do not know of any such order. I had no occasion to study such orders before 1942, having been in RUSSIA.

Q I show you a photostatic copy of an order in German which will be entered as Exhibit C1, dated 18th October 1942. Here is also the original which however will not be entered as an exhibit. Is that a true photostatic copy of the order to which you refer with respect to the treatment of paratroopers ?

A Yes, that is the order.

Q I show you also the last page of this photostatic copy. Was that included in the order ?

A I do not know this order, which presumably went only to divisions; I had not seen it.

Q Do you mean to say that in 1942, when you heard about this matter first, you were not instructed in accordance with paragraph 2 of the order that all parachutists which were met outside the immediate combat zone must be exterminated ?

A No, I do not know anything about that. No, these orders are presumably division orders, which did not go down to battalions or equivalents, but the divisional commanders were able to publish them by extracts.

Q You appreciate that your answer does not sound very reasonable when the order is intended to be directed to those who would come into contact with such paratroopers ?

A I can only say that the orders would go down to division in written form and the divisional commanders would then give instructions to their troops on the basis of the orders. I have not seen the second paragraph in these orders.

Q Now you have admitted having seen and being familiar with the order which I first

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showed you, dated 18th October 1942, being six paragraphs ?

A Yes, I have seen that.

Q And you have also stated to the Court that you had no knowledge of any order that per chutists or Commandos were to be exterminated ?

A No, I have not heard of any such order.

Q Take a look at the order Exhibit C1 and read it again, in paragraph 3. In the second last sentence of the paragraph you will observe that it says: "Even if these men acted as if they wished to surrender no quarter must in principle be given to them" ?

A I know of the contents of these orders. I can remember their being read.

Major-General BARNER: Do you remember that particular sentence and paragraph ?

A No. I can remember the general sense of the orders, namely that men dropped in civilian clothing should be treated as spies and those in uniform as soldiers.

Q You observe that the order says nothing whatever, though, about civilian clothes or uniforms ?

A Yes, I see that now.

Lt.Col. MACDONALD: And that paragraph which you have just read is the only paragraph of any importance in the whole order and is the paragraph on which you would have to act ?

A We did not take much notice of these orders at the time because we were not a fighting unit then. We had just come from RUSSIA and we were a stationary unit well behind the front, and I imagine for this reason the orders were not sent on to battalions.

Q No I am going to ask you now, MEYER, about some orders of which you should have very direct knowledge. You have told me that a company of your regiment, the 15th, was stationed at MONTEGUE near DIEST ?

A Yes.

Q We have evidence in this Court from personnel of that company that a secret order was read to them on parade just before leaving for FRANCE, and they were warned that they would be shot if they divulged the order. What do you know about that order?

A I cannot understand that.

Q And you have admitted that the Spiess of that company was HAGETORN ?

A Yes.

Q The evidence before this Court is that this order was read to the company by HAGETORN, and I want you to look at it,

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Exhibit A2. I want you to look at Order No. 4 especially.

A I do not know this order. I can see that from the first paragraph. I do not know that order; I would swear the holiest oath that I do not.

Q The 15th Company was attached to your regimental headquarters, was it not ?

A Yes, but it would lay about 10 kilometres away.

Q Such an order would not be read by the Spiess if it had not been authorized by Higher Command, would it ?

A I can only imagine that this order was put together by the Spiess himself, because just in that particular company it would have been quite impossible to have such an order officially issued, as the commander was Captain BARKER, a good old-fashioned Prussian officer whose name I have just remembered.

Major-General BARKER: What do you mean when you say he was a "a good old-fashioned officer" ?

A I meant that a man of that sort would never permit such a piece of folly as that order.

Q Well, then, what sort do you mean ?

A I meant he was an officer with sufficient experience on all the fronts to know that such an order would fall back on the heads of our own troops.

Lt.Col. MACDONALD: We are told that all the members of this company were required to sign that they had heard the order, that they were required as well to memorise and know it by heart, and were subject to punishment if they were unable to repeat it ?

A I can only say that the rule is that such orders shall be read by the company commander; secondly, that a soldier never gives a signature for a secret order and, anyway, secret orders are never read out to the whole troops.

Q If the Spies did read this order one would assume that he would not on his own authority issue such a radical order; you would agree with that, would you not ?

A I can only reply that I certainly did not issue that order and I am certain that the company commander did not either. As regards the Spiess in question, he lost his job during the NORMANDY Campaign. He came before a court martial and was finally sent back to duty, and killed. If you have any prisoners from the company you can easily find out that this Spiess was arrested by our police at CAEN and he lost his job as a result. The actual place was a village about 5 kilometres

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east of GACE.

Q For what was he deprived of his job ?
A Because he could not train his men and could not be an example to them.

Q Was it because he had issued this order ?
A No, I did not know anything about that order. The cause was improper behaviour.

Q How are secret orders normally issued to companies ?
A Usually the secret order comes down to the battalion commander. He sends for the company commanders and reads the order to them.

Q And how does the order reach the private soldier ?
A The contents or spirit of the secret order are included in instructions given by the company commander to his troops. The company commander has not himself seen the order and cannot possibly himself read it out to his troops.

Q If it were desireble to issue such an order as you have just read, in order to eliminate the possibility of anybody being held responsible for the issue of it, would it not be done in precisely the way in which the man from this Company have described it ?
A No, I do not agree.

Q How would it be done, then ?
A We have not given any orders of that sort and I have no experience in the matter. Such an order is a piece of pure folly.

Q There is evidence also, MEYER, that a similar order was acted on in the engineering battalion of the division on the 8th June by the Spiess of the 3rd Company ?
A In that case it must have been a divisional order, but I never received such an order. I can say for certain that no such order was given me by our commander.

Q If it was a divisional commander's order and WITT was your divisional commander in April and also in June, how could such an order have reached the 15th Company connected with your regimental headquarters in the early part of April without your knowledge ?
A It is quite impossible that an order of that sort should come through to the company from the division. If such a thing was ever issued it must have been put together from the imagination of the NCO in question, or as the company commander was not available he had to

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invent something.

Q. This Court has conducted an inquiry into atrocities that have been committed since the beginning of the war. In the absence, through death or capture, of many witnesses, only a few of the atrocities actually committed are now capable of proof. More, in all likelihood, will be proved after the war is over. So far, however, from the 6th to the 17th June, with respect to your division alone, the Court has obtained evidence that at least 106 Allied prisoners were shot in 30 separate incidents by the officers and men of your division. How do you account for this if there was no such order issued as you have just been shown ?

A. It is the first I have heard of this matter, except about the inquiry from Corps which I mentioned earlier. The whole thing is incomprehensible to me. If you say it is true then it must be, but I can find no explanation for it. My division has had nothing but praise from Corps and from Army Group.

Q. (To Interpreter) Will you read this question to him: "That of those prisoners shot, at least 41 were shot in 7 incidents by or on the direct orders of officers of your division. Of these officers, 3 were battalion, regimental or divisional commanders. If, as you say, there were no orders permitting this (but rather forbidding it) how do you account for this state of affairs, this shocking lack of discipline, with even Battalion Commanders disobeying your orders? Does it not appear that it was generally known that this sort of thing was not only permitted, but approved, encouraged and in fact ordered by yourself and your predecessor in command?" (Interpreter reads the above question in German to witness).

A. I can only say that I am deeply shocked by this and I would like to add that in July we captured a whole Canadian staff, including the commander and the adjutant, and I spoke to them in quite a friendly way and they were sent back by my own troops.

Q. What battalion was that ?

A. I can show you on the map where these officers were captured. I would like to add that if I had issued orders of that sort then I would not have had a 36-year-old man shot in the presence of the French authorities for raping a French girl. This occurred in VERSON, the place I have already mentioned.

Q. Will you show us where the staff you

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have just referred to was captured ?

A Between MALAISE and CAEN. They were captured at point 140. We sat in my car in the valley south of the point and had the talk which I have mentioned. They were captured in the woods immediately North of point 140. My headquarters at the time were just East of SOUMONT (FRANCE 1/250,000 Sheet 3A and 8, MR 154670).

Q Now do you say that you had no knowledge whatever of any of these atrocities at the time ?

A I did not know anything of it at the time; I have only just heard about it.

Q But you did hear about certain atrocities having occurred at CHATEAU d'AUDRIEU and NOUEN from the Fuhrer's headquarters ?

A I can simply give you the general tone of the orders. It was an inquiry asking what unit had been responsible for the shooting of British soldiers in a farm in a certain village. The village was not named and reference was made to the Geneva Convention. The soldiers were to be reported at once.

Q What investigation was it possible for you to make as a consequence of that information ?

A I issued orders to all battalion and regimental commanders to discover at once whether in their sector any such incident occurred and to report back. I received a nil report from all my commanders and a similar report was sent up to Army.

Q When did you receive this particular inquiry from headquarters ?

A It must have been in the month of July; I cannot say anything more accurate than that. I know it went to all the divisions on the Eastern Front.

Q Do you mean to say that in the reference that you got from headquarters nothing was said as to the units which might have been involved ?

A I simply had a return from all my subcommanders that nothing had happened in their sectors.

Q Yes, but that is not the question I asked you: I asked you if it is true that nothing was said in the inquiry that you had from headquarters with respect to the units under your command that might have been responsible for these atrocities ?

A No, nothing of that sort was said. It was stated, however, that the inquiry came from the International Red Cross through the Fuhrer's Headquarters, nor was any mention made of the place.

Major-General BARKER: How did they ever

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expect any inquiries to be made if they did not name the place ?
A. The only method was to apply to unit commanders for information as to what had occurred in their sectors.

Lt.Col. MACDONALD: Now I want to read from the reply that the German Government made to this protest (A copy of which will be entered as Exhibit D): "Nevertheless there has been a thorough investigation". Now the "thorough investigation" that was carried out was an inquiry without reference to any of the facts directed to all your subordinate commanders as to whether they knew anything about this; is that correct ?
A. Yes, it was an inquiry directed to all divisional commanders on the Western Front.

Q. And that is all that was done ?
A. The divisional commanders were instructed to pass the inquiry on to their regiment, battalion and company commanders.

Q. Was this inquiry directed to your division specifically or was it directed to other divisions as well ?
A. No, to all divisions.

Q. Now the reply also says that "regarding the June 7th case nothing accurate could be confirmed because of absence of parties concerned owing to the succeeding battle". Now how was it possible for the German Government to refer to an investigation, naming a date and certain parties, if this information was not passed on to you ? I cannot explain that.

Q. Now will you tell me also how the German Government would get the information to justify this statement: "Regarding the June 17th case, that part of the SS Panzer Pionier Battalion 12 which took part on that day was almost totally destroyed on June 26th" ?
A. That is what I told you before. The battalion suffered heavy losses and when the battalion commander returned the battalion was sent back into the line.

Q. Yes, that may be true, but does it not also indicate that the German Government must have informed you with greater particularity as to the dates and the battalions involved when they asked for the inquiry ?
A. No, I did not have any further information from the German Government than I have told you. I am sure that no mention was made as to any dates or places, but it is possible that information on the subject was obtained by Corps through the legal machinery without

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reference to me. I know that during operations matters of discipline, legal matters and so on, are managed on a Corps level by the adjutant's department and the results are sent to the divisional and other commanders later on. They cannot take any part in them because they are concerned with operational matters.

Q Was any order received from any formation higher than your own with respect to the treatment of prisoners ?

A At the same time as the orders to which I have referred instructions were issued to all units stating that the Geneva Convention was to be applied strictly in the West.

Q Now you told me earlier in your examination that there were no second orders issued with regard to the matter of prisoners from the time the NORMANDY Campaign started until you were taken prisoner ?

A Those were not orders, strictly speaking, regarding the treatment of prisoners. It was simply a reference to the inquiry from the Fuhrer's Headquarters.

Lt.Col. SCOTLAND: (Question put in German and not translated.

A I remember getting the telegram asking a question about prisoners. I cannot remember whether it came from Corps, Army or Group Headquarters, but I do remember getting the telegram. I remember instructing my senior staff officer to send the request for information to the unit commanders and I agreed to the reply which was sent back to Corps. It is in my recollection clearly enough that I was asked the question. I remember also seeing on the telegram that came in that there was a distribution list which showed that it had gone to all divisions in the field.

Major-General BARKER: Did it mention the village of PAVIE ?

A I insist that there was no place named on the telegram I got from Corps or Army. I cannot remember whether I got it from Corps or Army.

Q Did not you mention a farm just now ?

A I insist that reference was made only to a place, but not named.

Lt.Col. MACDONALD: It has been said that men from your division were responsible for certain atrocities against civilians at the village of [illegible]. Do you know anything about that ?

A No, I do not know anything about that. Where is the village ?

Q It is in the vicinity of LILLE.

A No, I do not know anything about that, nor has my division ever been there. When is that said to have occurred ?

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EXHIBIT No. 8

Q We have been informed by a senior German officer prisoner of war that the village of ACQS was punished following the blowing up of a section of railway line by French patriots, and 90 to 110 men and women were killed there. Do you know anything about that ?

A I do not know anything about that. We have never been near LILLE. That could easily be proved.

Q Did a similar incident occur at ST MARTIN-on SEINE ?

A We were not in any fighting on the SEINE.

(The witness withdraws)

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SECRET EXHIBIT No. 9

RECORD OF THE FURTHER EVIDENCE

of

Brigadefuhrer K. MEYER

Brigadefuhrer KURT MEYER is recalled and further examined as follows:-

Lt Col MACDONALD: Do you know an Oberst WACHSMUTH who commanded the military hospital at BRUSSELS? He is now a prisoner of war.

A No.

Q You told us yesterday that it was the First Battalion of your 25th Regiment which recaptured the village of AUTHIE. Is that the battalion commanded by Sturmbannfuhrer WALDMULLER?

A No, the First Battalion lay on the right.

Q Was that not the battalion you told us recaptured AUTHIE on the 7th June?

A No. As I marked on the map yesterday, the First Battalion was on the right, the Second in the centre and the Third and the Air Force personnel on the left.

Q Well, then, which battalion of your regiment was it that recaptured AUTHIE?

A The Third Battalion.

Q That is the battalion commanded at that time by Obersturmbannfuhrer MILIUS?

A Yes.

Q And associated with him in that attack was the PRINZ Battalion of the Panzer Regiment?

A Yes, the Panzer Regiment went in first and the infantry followed.

Q Under whose command was the operation carried out?

A MILIUS.

Q Did you go into the village yourself after it had been recaptured?

A Yes, I went to AUTHIE myself after we had captured the village which lies in front of it. I went to that village when my line was extended. I went there two or three days after we captured the village, making a tour through EPRON, then ST CONTEST, BURON, GRUCHY and a farm West of AUTHIE. We then went West to ROTS and then back to CAEN along the main road from VILLENEUVE.

Q If the attack on AUTHIE was on the 7th June when was it that you made this tour?

A That was after the complete recapture of that group of villages. It must have been on the 9th June. Yes, I remember it was on the 9th June, the day before the death of our divisional commander whom I accompanied on this tour. You have a picture

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of the tour, showing me and the divisional commander in a car.

Q Did you actually go through the streets of AUTHIE or did you bypass that on the West?

A No, we went from GRUCHY South through a group of houses lying West of AUTHIE, then via an A.A. position of ours South of AUTHIE to ROTS, which lies further West. We did not go through the actual streets of AUTHIE. Shall I mark the exact front to show where we went? (Witness marks his tour with a red pencil). I suggest that I should mark the battalion's sectors so that it can be seen which was held by which. I have marked in red from East to West: No. 1 Battalion under WALDMULLER, immediately West of FPRON; No. 2 Battalion under SCAPPINI West of GAIMANCHE; No. 3 Battalion under MILIUS between BURON and a point West of GRUCHY; an A.A. unit North-West of the group of houses lying West of AUTHIE and an engineer company West of that and immediately East of VILLENEUVE. Further West of VILLENEUVE we had no contact with other troops at that time because another division was actually moving forward. We had an observation detachment in BRETTEVILLE l'ORGUEILLES, which actually fought in that place before withdrawing through VILLENEUVE to point 69.

Q Was there a headquarters established at ROTS at that time?

A No. Previously there had been parts of the 21st Division and of the coast defence troops which withdrew through that place.

Q Did the pionier battalion establish their headquarters in ROTS on the 10th June?

A No, the engineer troops to which I referred were the engineer company of Grenadier Regiment 25, which was not my grenadier battalion. This company's battle HQ was in the middle of square 9670.

Q How will you also indicate on Exhibit "B" the position of each battalion headquarters?

A No. 1 Battalion had its headquarters about 300 yards West of the railway in the position which I have marked for No. 1 Battalion. The Second Battalion H.Q. was immediately behind the right wing of the position marked for it in red. The Third was in the garden marked in green on the map behind the centre of the line indicated as this position. This was outside the village itself.

Q And your regimental headquarters on the 7th June was there, was it not?

A My regimental headquarters was in the houses opposite the prison marked on

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the road from CAEN towards BAYEUX (MR 003690).

Q You indicated yesterday as the first position which you took as regimental headquarters this position here?
A That was the divisional headquarters. I have marked the regimental headquarters here.

Q Well, now, you say it is here?
A My first marking was not accurate. I now recognise clearly that it was opposite the prison. I could certainly show it exactly on a large-scale street map.

Q Now, to make Exhibit "B" correct, will you say again what the pennants which you have marked on here as numbers I, II, III, and IV mean?
A The one marked Roman I is our divisional battle headquarters. That was where I took over command of the division on the death of the previous commander.

Q That was then on the 10th June?
A You must know better than I do exactly when he was killed.

Q No, but you told us yesterday it was on the 10th. We are not trying to catch you.
A I assume and believe that it was on the 10th, but I am not absolutely certain of the date.

Q Well, it was when you took over command, which you told us yesterday was on the 10th June?
A I worked there for an hour and moved my headquarters down to a point marked Roman II on the map.

Q And that was on the 10th June?
A It may have been on the 10th.

Q Was it on the 10th June?
A I do not know for certain. During the operations I did not pay any attention to the date.

Q Why do you say now you cannot be certain, when you said yesterday that it was definitely on the 10th June?
A In answer to a question from the officer sitting on the right of the room yesterday I agreed that it would probably be the 10th, but it might conceivably be on the 11th. Surely you yourselves can find out, as you yourselves published the news on the wireless? I can assure you I took over command of the division on the day on which my predecessor was killed.

Q And you have already told us this morning that the reason you knew it was the 9th that you made the tour of this front was because it was the day before your divisional commander was killed, and he was

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killed on the 10th?

A I said that because we had already agreed that the date of my predecessor's death was the 10th. I simply said that I made the tour on the day before the old commander was killed.

Q Which was the 10th, you say. All right. The position marked I was occupied, then, on the 10th June for a few hours and you then moved to VERSON, which is marked II; is that correct?

A On the day on which I took command of the division I remained on point I for an hour or so and then moved to point II.

Q And did you then move your divisional headquarters to a third position?

A Yes, I moved it again to the point marked III, where we remained for about two days.

Q And when did you move from VERSON to LOUVIGNY, No. III?

A I cannot tell you exactly.

Q Were you at VERSON for a matter of days; was it after, say, the 17th, the 18th, that you moved?

A We did stay in VERSON several days. I cannot give you the exact date or number of days. The Mayor of VERSON would be able to tell you that for he would remember the shooting of the soldier.

Q But I do not know anyone who would know better than you would. You were the divisional commander and you had to report on your activities. You have had to think of these things before?

A That is not a correct assumption. I had too much to do with operations, and particularly, anxiety about reserves to worry about exact dates.

Q You went to VERSON, then, on the 10th June. Were you there for five days or longer?

A I cannot say for certain that I moved on the 10th. It was on the day that the divisional commander was killed. I cannot say the exact number of days, but I can tell you when we left in terms of the operational position.

Q You can tell us, though, whether it was less or more than five days, can you not?

A It was certainly not more than five days.

Q And roughly how long did you stay at LOUVIGNY?

A Two days.

Q And was it from that position that you withdrew into CAEN?

A Yes, and we stayed in CAEN until we abandoned it.

Q That would be early in July?

A Yes. I left CAEN on the morning of the day on which our troops abandoned it. When your troops entered CAEN from the West I was in the centre and left the city.

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Q In fact it was the 9th or 10th July, was it not?

A I am afraid I cannot remember the date. I am sure it must be easy enough to establish. I left the city in any case on the morning on which it was abandoned. The troops of my division did not remain in the city but withdrew South and then round to the East. The last troops in the city belonged to the 21st Armoured Division and a security battalion of the city of CAEN.

Q Now you have stated that the position which you have shown for your regimental headquarters on this Exhibit "B" is incorrectly shown. Will you mark on there where it should be?

A I cannot define the point absolutely exactly on this map but, basing my indication on the prison, I am marking it a few yards North-West on the other side of the road.

Q In other words, 003690. The flag marked IV, however, correctly shows your final divisional headquarters; is that right?

A I cannot show that quite exactly either, but it was in a cellar belonging to an old barracks. This was almost at a church which suffered a direct hit by one of your bombs and collapsed. This is probably the church marked on the map with a circle North of the main road. (The map is altered to show the proper location). I think that was the place, though I am not certain as the church was not being used and may not be marked on the map.

Q Would you now be good enough to mark on Exhibit "B" the position of the three battalions in the 26th Regiment as they were held following the 10th June?

A I can only mark the battalion positions from the time on which I took over command of the division. I cannot give you the exact boundaries on this map. When I took over command the 26th Regiment was in the area between CRISTOT and LE MESNIL PATRY. I ordered it to fall back to a new line which I have marked with four red marks. On the right, North of NORREY-en-BESSIN was the Fourth Battalion. Next to this, South of LE MESNIL PATRY, was the engineer battalion which I had not moved but which remained until its destruction in the position in which my predecessor had left it. I am not sure of the numbers of the other two battalions, but they lay East of this, one in the Northern part of FONTENAY LE PESNEL and the other between that and the engineer battalion.

Q Would you also now please mark the headquarters of each of these battalions?

A No. 1 was in the park behind the right centre of its line; the engineer battalion had its headquarters slightly South of point 63. It was in a bunker. The headquarters of the other two battalions together was in a park South-East of FONTENAY LE PESNEL (MR 884670).

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Q You have said that you left the pionier battalion as you originally found it in the area of LE MESNIL PATRY; is that correct?

A Yes, but the line I have marked for the engineer battalion corresponds to its forward positions, and I will now mark the true line of that battalion. The battalion headquarters was not at point 63 but further South (MR 913677). In front of the battalion's main line I have marked two forward defended positions. I have also remarked the First Battalion's position, which was really North of ST MAUVIEU, and not on NORREY. Its headquarters was in a park East of the church in ST MAUVIEU.

Q Now will you mark on there also the regimental headquarters of the 26th Regiment?

A The regimental headquarters was in open country, about map reference 897648. It was to the South-East of the road running from NOYERS to CHEUX.

Q Was there a command post further up than that?

A Yes, the regimental commander had a post at the headquarters of the two battalions in FONTENAY LE PESNEL.

Q Now yesterday you expressed the view that it did not seem probable to you that any unit of your division would have been found in LES PAINS. There is definite evidence, however, that elements of the Third Battalion of the 26th Regiment were in that place on the 12th June?

A They can only have been elements of the recce battalion which, as I told you yesterday, was operating with the Panzer Lehr Division. That can be relied upon, for the boundary I marked in blue is reliable, and indeed further South, where I am working it now, it went more to the East still.

Q What was the field post number of the reconnaissance battalion?

A I cannot tell you that; I do not know.

Q With what letter did it begin?

A I do not know that either.

Q How many prisoners were taken in the capture of AUTHIE?

A I cannot tell you exactly how many were taken at AUTHIE, but I know that between 100 and 150 were captured in the whole operation round there. I myself spoke to a number of officers just North of ST GERMAIN and sent off a squad of about 100 myself along the railway to our divisional headquarters. The wounded were brought back by your and our troops together to the road at ST GERMAIN, and then sent by road transport to the hospital at LOUVIGNY. I can remember

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that exactly because one of your men died there and I ordered him to be buried in our military cemetery with a cross showing his name and number.

Q These prisoners whom you saw on the 7th June, you saw them at ST GERMAIN; is that correct?

A Yes. I was going out to see WALDMULLER from ST GERMAIN, and they were brought down from CUSSY, so that I met them just North of ST GERMAIN.

Q The normal method of evacuating these prisoners would be through the command post at ARDENNE and then back to the divisional headquarters?

A Yes. In fact, now you mention it, I can remember having been up in that direction myself a few minutes before and having seen them brought back from CUSSY through the neighbourhood of ARDENNE. The prisoners in question were taken in the area between CUSSY and BUHON, and were brought South in the way I have told you. I went back myself and then when I came forward to go into the line further East I saw these same prisoners again North of ST GERMAIN.

Q Q The normal method, then, of evacuation from ST GERMAIN would be by this road to the West of the prison and down that road, the CAEN-VILLERS road, to divisional headquarters?

A Yes, that is correct. We came down the road running along the prison within sight of the railway and then cut off the corner between that road and the CAEN-VILLERS road, striking this road again near divisional headquarters.

Q Striking the CAEN-VILLERS road?

A Yes. I think, though I am not certain, that the next procedure was to send the wounded to LOUVIGNY, as I have told you, and the others by the road going South through ETERVILLE, because the other road going South from FLEURY was under constant fire.

Q These prisoners that you saw were all Canadians, were they not?

A Yes, I was not there long, but I believe they were all Canadians. There were two or three officers in the front, including one man of about 40.

Q One or two of these officers were majors, were they not?

A It is possible. Yes, I think there was a major there. Yes, I recollect speaking with one of the officers about children because we both had families. One of them was a major in the forties.

Q Now you have referred to the fact that there was a man who died, one of the prisoners, and that he was later buried

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in a military cemetery. Was it not two who died?

A I could not say whether there was more than one. The facts are that the doctors consulted me with regard to the one who I know died. I believe he had a stomach wound. In any case my instructions were that he was to be treated exactly as one of our killed and to be buried with a cross in the cemetery.

Q The one who had the stomach wound was taken to the hospital in CAEN, where he died. Is that not so?

A Our hospital was in the park at LOUVIGNY, but some very seriously wounded who could not be sent back because of the enemy's grip on the city were sent to a civilian hospital in CAEN itself.

Q Was any report made to you as to how this soldier came to be wounded in the stomach?

A No. I presume he was taken somewhere North of CUSSY and brought down to the road at ST GERMAIN by stretcher, after which he was sent on by transport. The doctor told me that he had serious injuries to the bowels and that it was a very serious case.

Q Were you told about two prisoners who were injured on the road between ST GERMAIN and Divisional headquarters?

A No.

Q Did you never hear that two men were injured on that road and killed, and that they were later buried near a school along the BRETTEVILLE road?

A I was on that road often enough but I did not see or hear anything of that sort. The explanation may be that the divisional military police were responsible for conducting prisoners back. Each regiment had a squad of divisional police for those parties and it is possible that consequently I was not informed of this matter.

Q Actually the burial of these two men at the school was filmed. Have you ever seen these films or heard of them?

A No.

Q What time of day was it that you saw these prisoners?

A It must have been in the early part of the afternoon between 12 and 2 probably.

Q You spoke of the chap who had been wounded in the stomach as having been buried in a military cemetery; where was that?

A In the park immediately North of LOUVIGNY beside our military hospital.

Q Will you mark with this green pencil

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the positions last occupied by your troops in this sector. (Witness proceeds to do so).

A Those were the positions. In the last fighting North of the ORNE I have marked the left wing in green. The right boundary remained unchanged. The troops between EPAON and ST CONTEST were withdrawn by transport through the city on their way to the South. Those in ST GERMAIN went on foot in the early morning into part of the city South of the ORNE and took up positions near the bank of the river. Those in VERSON and North of the village were withdrawn by transport along the road through ETERVILLE. Should I mark the final position that all these troops took up?

Q Yes.

A The troops which took up new positions in CAEN were relieved by another division, after which I had no more troops in the CAEN area.

Q When did this relief take place?

A That was on the day after the capture of CAEN.

Q Would that be about the 10th July?

A It must have been about the 10th July.

Q On what day was BAEMER wounded?

A I cannot say for certain. I was not then in command of the division. It must have been on the first or second day.

Q In other words, the 7th or 8th June, do you mean?

A Yes.

Q Who was in command of the 21st Division on the 7th June?

A FEUCHTINGER.

Q And did he continue in command during the operation at CAEN?

A I forgot to mention that a change was made. The 21st Division was replaced by an Air Force field division and only certain armoured units of the 21st remained in the line. Those troops were used in the last stages of the battle to cover the retreat of other troops from CAEN itself.

Q When was the 21st Division relieved in the area North of CAEN?

A I cannot say exactly. I had not much to do with it but it must have been on or shortly after the 20th June.

Q Now what unit of the 21st Division was on your right, on the right of your regiment?

A It was a Panzer grenadier regiment, the number of which I cannot remember.

Q Who was its commander?

A I do not know that either.

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Q Did you not meet him or make contact with him?
A Yes, I met him and spoke to him for a few minutes. I should remember the name if it were repeated to me.

Q Now who commanded the Panzer Lehr Division on June 7th?
A I cannot remember the name; it was a generalleutnant of a noble family who shortly afterwards was awarded the Swords.

Q Did he continue in command of that division for some time after the 7th June?
A I do not know of any change in that division.

Q And what unit was on the left flank of your division?
A The Panzer Lehr Division was withdrawn about the same time as my division was withdrawn. There was a Panzer grenadier regiment of that division on my left but I do not know the name.

Q Do you know the name of the regimental commander?
A No.

Q Was General ROMMEL in command of the general operation at that time?
A Yes, and ROMMEL was in my headquarters several times.

Q Was he in your headquarters on the 7th June?
A No.

Q Do you know whether he was in either your regimental headquarters or at divisional headquarters around the 7th or 8th June?
A He certainly was not at my regimental headquarters on the 8th. I do not know about the division; that is possible.

Q When was the first time that he was at your headquarters?
A I cannot tell you when the first time was. The last time was only half an hour or so before he was injured. RUNDSTEDT was with me too.

Q Was RUNSTEDT in your headquarters on the 7th or 8th June?
A No. General von GEYR was there in the early morning of the day on which the divisional commander was killed. He later became commander of the 5th Army.

Q Are you on terms of personal friendship with HITLER?
A I know him and I met him for the last time in the spring of 1943.

Q It is reported that you were on very good terms with him and that in fact he made a gift to you of a couple of dogs; is that correct?
A No. Who suggested dogs?

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Lt Col PAGE: What did he give you?
A So far, he has not given me anything and he is not likely to now.

Lt Col MACDONALD: Now I would like to get from you a detailed physical description of the personalities in your division and would ask you to give me that information with respect to each as I ask you these questions.
A Yes. You must remember that I can only do that up to a certain point. I took over the division during operations and had not got acquainted with many of the commanders before that.

Q Yes, but you will be familiar with a good many of these officers. From what part of the country did MILIUS come?
A MILIUS came from POMERANIA. He was not fighting after the campaign in the West, but was teaching in a school.

Q What was his first name?
A KARL HEINZ.

Q Was he married or single?
A Married, with two or three children.

Q How old was he?
A I think 34 or 35.

Q How tall was he?
A About 1 metre 78.

Q And what would he weigh?
A About 80 kilos.

Q Was he a slim or heavily built man?
A Muscular.

Q Dark or fair?
A Fair.

Q What was the colour of his eyes?
A I am not sure; probably blue.

Q Did he wear a moustache?
A No.

Q Glasses?
A No.

Q Were there any scars on his face?
A No.

Q Was there any physical peculiarity about his appearance by which you would readily recognise him?
A No, nothing that I can remember.

Q Do you know whether he was wounded at any time?
A Yes, he was wounded in the campaign in the West, but I do not know what sort of wound it was.
Q And do you know what his present employment is?
A No.

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Q Did you regard him as a successful commander?
A He is a calm, hard-working and objective officer.

Q Is it true that you charged him with being the murderer of your division, having thrown men recklessly into battle?
A I cannot remember that. When is that said to have occurred?

Q Is it a statement that would be truthful if you made it?
A I cannot remember that.

Q That is not an answer to my question, though.
A If you would show me the point on the map where that occurred I might remember the circumstances. Sometimes things are said on the field of battle which one regrets afterwards.

Q That is not what I am now asking you. I am asking you if it is your opinion that he was the murderer of your division, having thrown men recklessly into battle?
A No. That is not my opinion.

Q Did you feel that he had handled the division well?
A He did not command the division.

Q Did you feel that he had successfully performed his duties as commander of the 25th Regiment?
A In so far as the circumstances permitted, he did as well as could be expected, though a man with more experience might have acted differently.

Q In other words, you were not satisfied with the way in which he commanded your former regiment?
A In view of the difference of temperament he led the regiment in a different way from the way I had done.

Q But will you tell us, please, whether in spite of those differences in temperament you were satisfied with the way he commanded the regiment?
A I had no reason to make any big complaint.

Q Now you say there were differences of temperament. In what respect was there a difference of temperament?
A I would say that in action a great deal can be done with a small number of troops, particularly in defence, if the commander has sufficient nerve. A man with less experience may think that he needs a stronger force for the job and will consequently not keep enough in hand for later emergencies.

Q Is that, then, your criticism of MILIUS' command?
A Yes. He lacked the necessary experience, but he would have acquired this during operations and in fact he was in the course

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of doing so.

Q Now I want to tell you that it has been established to the satisfaction of the Court that in the village of AUTHIE at least 33 Canadian soldiers were murdered after having been taken prisoner by members of the group which you have told us was commanded by MILIUS?

A I consider it impossible that MILIUS gave an order to that effect or even that he knew about it, for in that case he would have informed me. I should say that it is quite impossible that he gave an order and I cannot believe that he know of it. MILIUS' troops were in AUTHIE, but I consider it impossible. There were Air Force troops in the immediate neighbourhood of the village also. They were at FRANQUEVILLE in the A.A. position I have already mentioned.

Q Who do you think should be held responsible for these murders?

A I cannot believe that MILIUS gave the order, nor that he knew about it. He has just as little to do with it as I. As it was my regiment I can understand your regarding me as responsible. I can only say again that MILIUS certainly did not give an order to that effect.

Q What is WALDMULLER's first name?

A HANS.

Q What part of the country does he come from?

A BAVARIA, I think.

Q Is he married or single?

A Married.

Q How old was he?

A About 38.

Q How tall was he?

A About 1 metre 72 or 73.

Q How much would he weigh?

A 70 kilos.

Q Was he dark or fair?

A Dark.

Q What was the colour of his eyes?

A Dark.

Q Did he wear a moustache or glasses?

A No.

Q Were there any scars on his face?

A No.

Q Was there anything about his appearance by which you could particularly distinguish him?

A No, though he had been wounded three or four times.

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H3056-0160

Q Do you know the nature of those wounds?
A I do not know. It was before my time.

Q Do you know what his present employment is?
A No.

Q To the best of your knowledge he is still alive, of course?
A Yes, I think so.

Q How was he last employed, to the best of your knowledge?
A Battalion commander.

Q Still with the 25th Regiment?
A Yes.

Q Hauptmann STEEGER. What was his first name?
A I do not know his christian name.

Q From what part of the country did he come?
A BAVARIA.

Q Was he married or single?
A Married.

Q How old was he?
A 31 or 32.

Q What did he weigh?
A About 70 kilos.

Q Was he dark or fair?
A Darkish.

Q What was the colour of his eyes?
A Blue, I think.

Q Did he wear glasses or a moustache?
A He wore glasses but no moustache.

Q What type of glasses did he usually wear?
A Horn-rimmed.

Q Black horn-rimmed?
A I do not know.

Q Did he have any scars on his face or were there any other signs by which he could be readily recognised?
A No. You have got him here anyway.

Q Standartenfuhrer WILHELM MOHNKE. From what part of the country did he come?
A From LUEBECK.

Q Was he married?
A Yes.

Q How old was he?
A 34; about.

Q And how tall was he?
A 1 metre 80 to 82.

Q What would he weigh?
A About 80 kilos.

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Q Was he a heavily built man or slight?
A Slender.

Q Was he dark or fair?
A Dark.

Q What was the colour of his eyes?
A Dark.

Q Did he have a moustache or glasses?
A No.

Q Were there any scars or other marks by which you could readily distinguish him?
A He had been very seriously wounded and one of his legs was a good four inches shorter than the other. I believe he wore a steel covering on it.

Q And I think you told us that the last you heard of him he was commanding the First Panzer Division?
A. The First Division.

Q Now Sturmbannführer KRAUSE. What was his first name?
A BERNARD.

Q From what part of the country did he come?
A I do not know.

Q Was he married or single?
A Unmarried.

Q How old was he?
A About 34.

Q And what would be his height and weight?
A About 1 metre 86 high, and about 90 kilos.

Q Was he a stout man or was he very slim?
A He was a strongly built man.

Q What was the colour of his hair?
A Fair.

Q Did he wear a moustache or glasses?
A No.

Q Were there any scars or other distinguishing features about his appearance?
A No.

Q Had he been wounded?
A He had been wounded four or five times at least.

Q Do you know the nature of his more serious wounds?
A No. They were all wounds on the body.

Q When was he sent back to GERMANY?
A I think at the end of August, but it may have been earlier in the month.

Q What was the last information you have with respect to his last employment?
A Battalion commander.

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Q With what division?
A In my division.

Q So that you do not know what his employment has been since he went back to GERMANY?
A No.

Q SIEBKEN. What was his first name?
A BERNARD.

Q From what part of the country did he come?
A SCHLESWIG HOLSTEIN.

Q Was he married or single?
A Married.

Q How old was he?
A 33.

Q How tall was he?
A 1 metre 84.

Q How much would he weigh?
A Between 80 and 90 kilos.

Q Was he heavily built or slight?
A Slim and athletic.

Q Dark or fair?
A Fair.

Q Did he have a moustache or glasses?
A No.

Q Were there any marks about him by which you could readily distinguish him?
A I do not know of anything, but he had been wounded several times.

Q Do you know the nature of his more serious wounds?
A No, though I believe that one was a stomach wound.

Q What was his employment, the last you knew of him?
A Battalion commander.

Q OLBOETTER. How old was he?
A About 29 or 30 when he was killed.

Q How tall was he?
A 1 metre 78.

Q Was he fair or dark?
A Dark.

Q How much would he weigh?
A About 70 kilos.

Q Now I omitted to ask you about SCAPPINI, who was killed. Would you tell me how old he was?
A 33.

Q How tall was he?
A About 1 metre 78.

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Q And how much would he weigh?
A About 70 or 75 kilos.

Q Did he wear glasses or a moustache?
A No.

Q Were there any things by which you could readily distinguish him?
A No. Do you want to know where he is buried?

Q Was he buried near the place where he was killed?
A He was killed near GALMANCHE, between GALMANCHE and ST CONTEST.

Q And when was that?
A It must have been on the 8th.

Q And will you describe his successor SCHROTT; what was his first name?
A I do not know his christian name.

Q From what part of the country did he come?
A From WESTPHALIA, but I am not sure.

Q How old was he?
A 32.

Q How tall was he?
A 1 metre 86 to 88.

Q What did he weigh?
A About 80 kilos.

Q Was he heavily built or slim?
A No; athletic build.

Q Was he dark or fair?
A Fair, with blue eyes.

Q Did he wear glasses or a moustache?
A No.

Q Were there any scars or marks by which he could be readily recognised?
A He had been wounded several times, but I do not know of any particular marks.

Q And he was killed in BELGIUM, was he?
A Yes.

Q Obersturmbannfuhrer SCHRODER. What was his first name?
A I cannot remember.

Q From what part of the country did he come?
A I think from CENTRAL GERMANY.

Q Was he married or single?
A Married.

Q How old was he?
A He was about 36 to 38.

Q How tall was he?
A 1 metre 76 or 78.

Q How much would he weigh?
A About 70 kilos.

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Q Was he dark or fair?
A Fair.

Q Moustache or glasses?
A No.

Q Any distinguishing marks?
A No.

Q Was he still commanding the artillery regiment the last you heard of him?
A Yes.

Q Now you told us yesterday that HAGEMEISTER, who succeeded BARTLING, had been killed near FALAISE. Would you describe HAGEMEISTER, please?
A It was reported to me that he had been killed near FALAISE.

Q How old was he?
A 28.

Q How tall would he be?
A 1 metre 80.

Q How much did he weigh?
A 80 kilos.

Q What was his build?
A Very slim, but muscular.

Q Would you describe him as of athletic build?
A Yes.

Q Was he dark or fair?
A Fair.

Q And did he have a moustache or glasses?
A No.

Q Were there any distinguishing features about his appearance?
A He had been wounded several times and there was a visible scar on his neck.

Q Sturmbannfuhrer BREMER. What was his first name?
A GERT.

Q And from what part of the country did he come?
A From HANOVER.

Q Was he married or single?
A Married.

Q How old was he?
A About 27.

Q What was his height?
A 1 metre 78 to 1 metre 80.

Q What did he weigh?
A About 75 kilos.

Q Was he dark or fair?
A Fair.

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Q Moustache or glasses?
A No.

Q Any distinguishing features about his appearance?
A No. He also had been wounded several times.

Q Were there any visible scars from these wounds, or any evidence of the wounds?
A I do not know. There was nothing visible in the face, etc.

Q What was his employment when you last heard of him?
A C.O. of the recce unit. I believe he was due to go back to reform and that his unit was already in the AACHEN neighbourhood.

Q Was BREMER a popular battalion commander?
A Yes, he was popular with his men. He lived very closely to his troops.

Q It has been reported that they were very much upset by his being wounded. Did you hear anything about that?
A I have not heard that directly, but I have no doubt that it was true since he was very respected and popular.

Q Have you been able to remember the name of the company commander who took over from him when he was wounded?
A I believe it was another MEYER.

Q Are you referring now to HUBERT MEYER?
A No; someone quite different. He was hauptsturmführer.

Q Did he belong to the battalion or was he just brought in for this particular purpose?
A No, he belonged to the battalion, having been drafted to it in BELGIUM.

Q Can you remember the names of any of the officers in the reconnaissance battalion?
A I believe there was one named WENDT and another named BAUER, or some similar name. I cannot remember any others, though I might remember more if they were read to me.

Lt Col PAGE: Adjutant BUCHHEIM?
A Yes.

Q Ordnance officer MUSFELD?
A Yes.

Q O.C. to No. 1 Company HANSMANN or HOUSEMANN?
A HOUSEMANN was his name. That was the man I meant when I mentioned BAUER, which was wrong.

Q Tactical officer GRUND?
A I cannot remember.

A 092307

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Q Transport officer WILNEKE?
A There was an officer named WIENEKE in the battalion.

Q Medical officer SCHUDOCK?
A I cannot remember.

Q Headquarters company officer KIRCHNER?
A Yes, there was anKIRCHNER.

Q Kradschuetzenzug (motor cycle detachment officer) LETTENBIECHER.
A There was an unter offizier named LETTENBIECHER.

Q O.C. of No. 2 Company HAUCK?
A Yes, there was a HAUCK.

Q O.C. of No. 3 Company KEUE?
A Yes, but I think he was killed.

Q O.C. of No. 4 Company BEIERSDORF?
A Yes; he was killed too.

Q I should like to know what decorations BREMER had?
A BREMER had an Iron Cross, Second and First Class, and the Knight's Cross. I believe he wonthe Oak Leaves in the Battle of the ARDENNES.

Q And could you say what decorations MEYER had, the MEYER who relieved BREMER temporarily?
A Iron Cross, Class One. I cannot say for certain that it was MEYER who took over command. I only know he was the senior company commander. It is possible that MEYER and REICHENSTEIN took over, but REICHENSTEIN was wounded and I am not sure whether he was in the fighting.

Q Do you remember an officer by the name of BECKER, who was captured?
A In the recce unit?

Q Yes?
A No, I do not.

Q Untersturmfuhrer KARL WALTER BECKER?
A No.

Lt Col BORASTON: You appear to know some of the non-commissioned officers in the recce battalion. Do you happen to have heard of one called HUGO WOLF?
A No.

Lt Col PAGE: Do you remember BREMER's driver, whose name was LEOPOLD STUN?
A I seem to remember the name and I can remember BREMER's driver, but I do not know whether his name was STUN.

Lt Col MACDONALD: Will you give us a description of him; how old was the driver?
A In the middle twenties.

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Q How tall was he?
A Between 1 metre 75 and 1 metre 80.

Q What would he weigh?
A He was a powerfully built chap.

Q How much, though, actually would he weigh?
A About 75 kilos.

Q Was he dark or fair?
A Dark.

Q Were there any distinguishing features about his appearance?
A No, I did not notice anything.

Q What was his grade?
A I think he was unter offizier.

Lt Col PAGE: What decorations did the driver have, if any?
A I think he had the Iron Cross.

Lt Col MACDONALD: That would be the Iron Cross Second Class?
A I think he had the First Class.

Q While we are discussing decorations, perhaps you will tell me if any of those we have been discussing have Knights' Crosses?
A BREMER had it. MOHNKE had it. OLBOETTER; PRINZ. I cannot think of any other.

Q WALDMULLER, SCAPPINI, MILIUS?
A No.

Q Did any of them have Oak Leaves?
A According to your papers, BREMER has received it in the West.

Q How old was JACOB HANREICH?
A 33, about.

Q How tall was he?
A 1 metre 80.

Q Was he slim or heavily built?
A Slim. He has either been killed or seriously wounded and captured.

Q Fair or dark?
A Fair.

Q Any distinguishing feature about his appearance?
A No.

Q Sturmbannfuhrer PANDEL. How old was he?
A 30, 31.

Q How tall was he?
A About 1 metre 78.

Q And how much did he weigh?
A About 75 kilos.

Q Fair or dark?
A Fair.

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Q Any distinguishing features?
A No.

Q Sturmbannfuhrer REND?
A 32.

Q How tall was he?
A About 1 metre 75.

Q And was he fair or dark?
A Fair.

Q What was his build?
A Strongly built.

Q Any distinguishing features?
A No.

Q What was his last employment to the best of your knowledge?
A C.O. of the A.A. unit.

Q Sturmbannfuhrer MULLER. What was his first name?
A I cannot think at the moment. He was powerfully built, blond and about 1 metre 80 tall.

Q Any distinguishing features about him?
A No, not particularly.

Q From what part of the country did MULLER come?
A I think he came from SCHLESWIG HOLSTEIN; I am not sure.

Q Was he married or single?
A Married.

Q Who succeeded him in the command of the engineering battalion after he was wounded?
A There was no proper battalion left. Only about 50 men remained and they were under the command of an officer whose name I will tell you in a moment.

Q What was the date when MULLER was wounded?
A It was when his battalion was attacked and destroyed; the capture of CHEUX.

Lt Col PAGE: That would be about the 26th?
A It may have been in the middle of June. He was wounded there, lay for a short time immediately behind his lines until he recovered his strength somewhat and then moved through our lines.

Lt Col MACDONALD: Following the 7th June there was a headquarters, was there not, actually in LE MESNIL PATRY?
A Not when I took the division over.

Q Do you know whether at any time prior to the time you took over the division there was a headquarters established in LE MESNIL PATRY?
A No, I do not know of any. Certainly there was no regimental headquarters there.

Q Well, I do not necessarily mean regimental;

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Q I mean any kind of headquarters?
A No, there was not any.

Q Do you know whether at any time there was a headquarters of any type of unit whatever established at LE MESNIL PATRY?
A No, I do not. I do not think there would have been, for there were no defended localities in front of the place.

(The Court adjourned at 1250 hours)
(The Court re-opened at 1445 hours)

Lt Col MACDONALD: As a regimental and divisional commander in the NORMANDY Campaign have you any complaints whatever to make as to the treatment of German prisoners by Canadian troops?
A No.

Q Have you heard of any complaints from German prisoners, or with respect to the treatment of German prisoners?
A No. Those who returned to us have not made any remarks of that sort.

Q You mean by that, remarks as to improper treatment?
A Yes.

Q Have any cases of improper treatment been reported to you at all?
A I have had a report and have myself seen a case in which a number of German soldiers were shot while one of them was holding a medical packet of field dressings in his hand, and I can show you the places on the map where that occurred. It occurred directly South of the railway bridge at VILLENEUVE, just outside my sector but very close to it. It was the day on which I went round the front with the divisional commander.

Q How many German soldiers had been killed?
A Four or five; I cannot say exactly.

Q Had they been killed while prisoners?
A I could not ascertain that. I could only discover that the bodies were lying with no weapons and that one soldier had had a packet of field dressings in his hand.

Q The place where you saw these bodies was within the German lines, was it?
A The time at which I saw the bodies they were inside the German lines, but when the incident occurred the German lines were further back and they were in front. I imagined they belonged to a reconnaissance detachment, but they were not my troops.

Q Had you any means of discovering when the men had been killed?
A No, I could not establish that. I simply reported that matter to the division.

Q You actually saw the bodies yourself, did you?
A Yes.

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Q How long had they been dead?
A They must have been dead several days when I saw them.

Q In what part of the bodies were the wounds?
A They all had shots in the head.

Q Were the fatal wounds bullet wounds or was there evidence of shrapnel wounds?
A No, they were bullet wounds, though I cannot say whether they were from rifles or pistols.

Q Could you tell from which direction the bullets had been fired?
A No, I did not ascertain that. Further inquiries were conducted by division. I simply reported the matter.

Q Were the bodies examined by a medical officer?
A Yes, I believe they were examined by a doctor and by the divisional judge.

Q And an inquiry was made and a report submitted, presumably, on the basis of that inquiry?
A Yes. I was later informed by Corps that a report had been made to Army and also to the International Red Cross.

Q And what was the nature of the finding of the court?
A I do not know.

Q Were any particular troops blamed for this?
A No.

Q Was the soldier in whose hands you say there was found a bandage, wearing the Geneva cross?
A Yes.

Q That is an armband on the arm?
A Yes, the red and white band.

Q Did you see this band on that soldier's arm yourself?
A Yes.

Lt Col BORSTON: Was that fact included in your report?
A Yes, I reported the matter very much in the terms in which I have described it to you. As the incident did not occur in my area I did not conduct any further inquiry.

Lt Col MACDONALD: How did this first come to your attention if the men killed were not troops in your regiment?
A When I came to the boundary of my front to take over arrangements for contacting the troops on my left the matter was reported to me by my own men, and as the place was so close I went to examine it myself.

Q And this was on June 9th, when you were making your tour with the divisional commander?
A Yes, the divisional commander went back

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towards CAEN by road and I stayed for a little while longer in the place where this incident occurred. My medical officer was with me and he also saw it.

Q What was your medical officer's name?
A Dr GATTERNIK.

Q And with what formation or unit, did he normally serve at that time?
A He had just taken over a medical company.

Q With what formation was he serving?
A With our division.

Q What was the number of the unit to which he belonged?
A Simply "medical company".

Q Simply Medical Company 12th SS Division?
A Yes.

Q With what unit was he serving when you last heard of him?
A In the same medical company.

Q And approximately when was your last information obtained with respect to him?
A Last August.

Q And who reported this incident to you?
A A company commander of the engineers who were in position there. (Their position is marked in red nearest to LA VILLENEUVE on the map, Square 9670). On the other hand, German prisoners of war who returned to our lines reported that they had been well treated and well fed.

Q What was the name of the officer or NCO, however, who reported this incident to you?
A I cannot say. I am afraid that is in the report.

Q Was it an officer or was it a non-commissioned officer?
A It was the company commander, an officer.

Q Who was the company commander?
A I shall think of it if I can reflect.

Q Would you remember the name if you heard it again?
A Yes.

Q PINKERNEL?
A No. He was in a pionier battalion. It was an engineer company of the Panzer Grenadier Regiment.

Lt Col PAGE: Was that 16 Company?
A Yes, the officer in question was killed in a farm near AUTHIE. His name was WERNER.

Lt Col MACDONALD: When was he killed?
A Two days before the capture of CAEN.

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Q Now do you know of any other incidents whatever w here it is suspected that Germans, having been ta ken prisoner, were killed by the British or Canadian troops?
A No such report was made in my sector.

Q Do you know whether as a consequence of the opinion that was formed with regard to the treatment of these prisoners that you referred to, any retaliation was ta ken by any of the German troops in the neighbourhood?
A No. No orders of that sort come down from Army or from Corps, nor were any such orders given by division or regiment.

Q Apart, however, from any orders, do you know whether the troops of their own initiative took any retaliatory action?
A No. There were many cases in w hich prisoners came back and the fact that they came back alive was the best proof that there was no feeling of this sort.

Q Now do you know whether regiments courses were conducted at MUNSTER?
A I do not know of any courses in MUNSTER. MUNSTER in GERMANY?

Q Yes. Do you say that there were no courses conducted there or you do not know of any?
A I say that none took place there. In what period can that have been, There were no regimenta l courses held for my regiment in MUNSTER, nor were there any divisional courses while I had anything to do with the division.

Q I should imagine from the information that we have tha t this would not be a course conducted for regiments as a whole but probably for the officers. The information we have is that you were one of those who were called to give lectures at this course?
A No.

Q You did give lectures, however, on your experiences in the Russian Campaign, did you not?
A No.

Q Do you mean to say seriously that with your reputation and experience that you came back from RUSSIA and were never called upon at any time to give ta lks and lectures to other officers on your experiences?
A The only talks I have given at all have been talks to the elder children in certain schools when I was on sick lea ve in GERMANY. Apart from that, I have never addressed groups of officers on ta ctical or opera tional questions of any sort, nor have I taken part in any courses. This app lies both to RUSSIA and to the West. I did attend one course at the

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Armoured Troops School in 1943, as I said yesterday, but I did not take any part in the giving of the lectures. I would add that I have not been in MUNSTER at all since 1940.

Q Now I understand that one of the first operations your regiment had to carry out after you reached CAEN was to mop up certain paratroopers who landed on D-day, in other words, on June 6th; is that correct?

A No, that is not so. As I have already pointed out, my regiment had a certain solid front to hold. It had no other operational role and its role was to go into action, beginning with the right flank.

Q Now you do know that large numbers of paratroopers were dropped in the vicinity of CAEN on June 6th and 7th, do not you?

A I know that and I know the areas to the North and North-East of CAEN where these parachutists were sent. None of the troops of my regiment or of my division had anything to do with the opposition to these men. My division was placed in the positions which I have marked on the map.

Q Did you have anything to do yourself with the rounding up of these paratroopers?

A No. I did not see a single sniper or parachutist.

Q What troops mopped up those paratroopers?

A I do not know. If you will tell me the area, I can tell you the troops which were probably fighting there.

Q You have already described the area as North and North-East of CAEN?

A The only divisions in the neighbourhood at all were the 21st and the Coastal divisions.

Q The 21st had been in that position prior to June 6th, had it not?

A The 21st Division was already in the area. My division was much further to the South originally and did not come into action at all until the 9th June. May I show you where the division lay first of all and the route by which it advanced? The division lay originally East of FALAISE, between FALAISE and EVREUX, and did not move across until the 6th. On the 7th the move was made to positions South-West of CAEN and it was not until the afternoon of the 7th that we moved up towards the positions I have marked on the map. We first came into contact with the enemy on the 7th and our first real action was on the 8th.

Q Well, you did have a bit of action on the 7th at AUTHIE, did you not?

A Yes; at that time there were other troops in that line, the Air Force, anti-aircraft troops and the coastal divisions as well as the 21st Division. We did nothing to take over that front from them.

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Q Now tell me what troops, then, were in the vicinity of HEROUVILLETTE, CAEN, being down here, and you will see it here (indicating on the map).
A There must have been part of the 21st Division or coast troops coming from East of the mouth of the ORNE Canal.

Q Do you know what coast troops were there?
A No, I do not.

Q Now will you describe the route which your division took from the CAEN sector until it eventually reached the place where it was taken for re-forming.
A The divisional headquarters were at this point, with the troops of the division in a circle to the East of the road. (Divisional Headquarters at SOUMONT, MR 1345, FRANCE 1/250,000 Sheet 3A and 8).

Q That is to the East of the CAEN-FALAISE road?
A Yes. All the divisional troops were moved to the East of the road.

Q Then where did the division move from there?
A The division was then put back into action on a wide front on both sides of the CAEN-FALAISE road with one group in the neighbourhood of VIMONT and on the left another near CLINCHAMPS. After that we were retreated again, but finally left the battle area to the South-East of FALAISE. Before we ceased to operate we were concentrated on a narrower front between the CAEN-FALAISE and CAEN-LISEUX roads, first of all in the neighbourhood of ROUVRES and then immediately North-East of FALAISE. Our final position was South-East of FALAISE on a line running through FOURCHES.

Q When did your division take up this last position that you have mentioned?
A It is hard for me to say without my being able to link it up with any other event. It must have been a very few days before the fall of CAEN.

Q And when was it that you moved from this latter position?
A That was the day of the closing of the FALAISE Pocket.

Q And where did the division then move to?
A It then went for rest to the area of BEAUVAIS.

Lt Col BORGSTON: Where did it cross the SEINE?
A In various places. Most of the troops in the division were not in the Pocket at all but had already reached the BEAUVAIS area, while the remaining troops were still fighting in CAEN.

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Lt Col MACDONALD: Between what places did they cross the SEINE?

A Most of the troops went over the railway bridge at ROUEN. I went over a ferry myself. When I myself came out of the Pocket most of the division was already in the North of FRANCE and there were only 400 to 600 men left in the FALAISE area. I commanded the division, tactically speaking, for the last time when I was wounded just North of FALAISE. I gave orders for the remainder of the troops to be taken out and sent East for a rest.

Q And who commanded the division for the purpose of moving them out?

A I did not hand over the command to anyone. I took about 100 men with me myself and the others found their way through in small groups.

Q Where was the ferry that you crossed the SEINE?

A I think it was between ELBOEUF,(1090) and LOUVIERS (2080). I made my way out of the Pocket North of TRIM, went on foot through the woods for a short distance and found a truck which took me along the road towards BERNAY. I received orders at division to cross the SEINE with information as to where the ferry lay. I crossed accordingly and reported to Army that afternoon in the neighbourhood of ROUEN.

Q Will you give me the route more exactly?

A I picked up the truck near LES CHAMPEAUX (4030) and went through VIMOUTIERS (4060) and ORBEC (6070). It was between these two places that I obtained information regarding the route, and orders to cross the SEINE. We then went through BERNAY (7070), MASSANDRE (8080), NEUBOURG (0080) and across the SEINE somewhere in that neighbourhood.

Q And from there what was your route to BEAUVAIS (9000)?

A I did not go to BEAUVAIS at once, but went to the neighbourhood of ROUEN to get my orders from Army.

Q And where was Army Headquarters?

A In a chateau on a hill in the woods just West of the city of ROUEN. (At MR 1517). We then took the direct road route from ROUEN to BEAUVAIS.

Q Now had most of your troops who escaped from the FALAISE Pocket preceded you or did they follow you?

A Most of them had preceded me. They were not fighting troops, but they were the framework for the new organization of the division and had already been selected for that purpose.

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Q What about such troops as reconnaissance who would normally not be engaged in direct fighting? Would they be among those relieved first?
A Yes, they went off first.

Q Now did they go immediately to BEAUVAIS or did they stop somewhere on the SEINE?
A No, they went direct to the BEAUVAIS area and were stationed on both sides of the road from BEAUVAIS to FROISSY (0020).

Q And how long did they stay in this BEAUVAIS-FROISSY area?
A Two days.

Q Where did they go from there?
A They went further East. I can tell you the names of the places if you like.

Q All right. We will take those down.
A HIRSON. HIRSON was our first rest area but it was then moved via places to the North of NAMUR into the area between LIEGE and AACHEN. After that it was moved further East still, to the East of AACHEN.

Q Now is it correct, then, that your division did no fighting whatever on the SEINE?
A My division did not fight at all on the SEINE but a reinforcement unit intended for me but which I never saw did fight on the SEINE under command of MOHNKE. At that time MOHNKE left me and was transferred to another division.

Q Now where did those troops fight on the SEINE?
A I cannot say. I simply moved through and had no orders to go there at all. The troops were not under my command. As from that time MOHNKE was withdrawn from my command and placed under some other formation.

Q Now would you say the area in which MOHNKE was fighting was South or North, and by that I mean following the line of the river, of ROUEN?
A I am afraid I cannot say.

Q In other words, you cannot say whether it was above or below the city of ROUEN?
A No, I believe it was to the South of ROUEN; I am not certain.

Lt Col BOMASTON: You mean above ROUEN?
A I mean upstream.

Q Did any go across in the neighbourhood of FLEURY?
A I do not know. Do you mean troops led by MOHNKE or those led by my own division?

Q I mean any troops of your division, either before or after your crossing of the river.
A I cannot tell you where the main party went over. I was still in the Pocket at that time and the movement was directed by Corps.

Lt Col MACDONALD: Did BREMER go to BEAUVAIS

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with you or was he attached to the group commanded by MOHNKE?

A BREMER was with MOHNKE, with a detachment. That is to say that the active elements of BREMER's troops were with MOHNKE, though he himself was not with MOHNKE. To be more exact, BREMER's reconnaissance detachment were with MOHNKE.

Q Where was BREMER himself then?

A BREMER himself led the rest of his troops through BEAUVAIS to the rest areas laid down. BREMER caught me up in HIRSON.

Q Was BREMER in command of any other troops than his own in the move out towards BEAUVAIS?

A Not any troops of my division.

Q I mean in view of casualties was it possible that he was in command of a composite detachment of troops in which, say, the 26th or the 25th Regiments might have been represented?

A It is possible, indeed it is probable that he had some men who had lost contact with their units, with his detachment.

Q Now tell me: Was there an Untersturmfuhrer WINICKI who went to BEAUVAIS?

A I do not know.

Q Do you know the man to whom I am referring?

A I did not know him personally but I know there was a WINICKI in the recce unit. The name is familiar to me.

Q If you were not actually in command of the remnants of your division at that time, who would you say was?

A The last people, the fighting people that came out last, do you mean?

Q I mean the troops that went out first?

A My O.I. was in command and took them out to the BEAUVAIS area.

Q Was that HUBERT MEYER?

A No, it was not. He was my IA. It was an officer who was killed later.

Lt Col BOURSTON: Do you know an officer of the name of GUTTEMANN, probably a captain?

A No, I cannot remember such a name. I do not think there was such an officer in the division.

Lt Col MACDONALD: There is evidence that in the course of the retreat and in the crossing of the SEINE at the village of ST MARTIN two men from your division were killed by partisans, and that a punitive expedition was carried out by Sturmbannfuhrer BREMER. Were you consulted and did you give permission for that expedition before it was carried out?

A No, I had no report of that and gave no orders in connection with it. May I look at the map and see where ST MARTIN is?

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(Witness does so). I had no information and no orders about it.

Q Have you ever heard of it before?
A No.

Q Did you ever at any time in your military history authorise or direct the punishment of a village by the shooting of the men and the burning of the buildings?
A No.

Q And does that answer apply as well to the campaign in the East and as to your experiences in RUSSIA and elsewhere?
A Yes. Of course, I except the blowing of bridges which has sometimes been necessary.

Q Did you ever at any time tell anyone that you had been responsible for the destruction of a village in RUSSIA in that manner?
A No.

Q Are you prepared to take an oath to that effect?
A Yes.

Q Now we told you yesterday that evidence had been adduced before this Court to the effect that some 106, at least, Allied prisoners had been shot in 30 separate incidents by the officers and men of your division. In addition to that there have been reports received with respect to the shooting of certain civilians. If it is true that these things occurred in your regiment and in your division during the period of your command have you any suggestions to make as to why you should not be held responsible for them?
A I can only reply that I cannot believe it to be possible that officers of mine would have prisoners shot. It is also incredible to me that young soldiers who go into action for the first time should have shot prisoners. I can say that from my own experience that Canadian officers, having been taken prisoner, were in my car and I spoke to them several times. I have also seen squads of Canadian prisoners being sent back.

Q You will agree that it is your responsibility to see that prisoners do receive the treatment to which they are entitled under the terms of the Geneva Convention?
A Yes, I do and for that reason military police are always responsible for the transport of prisoners. Consequently every operational order contains instructions concerning the treatment of prisoners and appoints collecting places for prisoners.

Q But you also appreciate that if you fail in your duty in this respect that you must take the responsibility?
A I must leave that to your judgment.

Q Now the Court is at present investigating some even more terrible atrocities committed during the recent German counter-attack in the ARDENNES. Your division formed part of the spearhead.

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A I understand my division was completely broken up and can hardly have been put into action.

Q No, that is not correct. We have examined prisoners taken from your division, and your division, incidentally I may tell you, has the reputation among its own members and others, of being "The Murder Division".

A I can only ask you in reply to take the opinion of my superiors Corps and Army Commanders, about myself and my own division.

Q Perhaps your superiors do not know of the atrocities that occurred in your division during the NORMANDY Campaign?

A My superiors were already my superiors in NORMANDY.

Q To go on with what I was saying. Approximately 200 Allied prisoners in 15 or more separate incidents were killed without excuse or provocation, and many of these were clubbed to death with rifle butts or kicked to death after being wounded. Five, while still living, had their eyes gouged out with a knife or bayonet. As far as we can find, all these atrocities, as well as practically every one committed in NORMANDY, was committed by SS troops. Is it correct, therefore, that a different standard of discipline and conduct prevails in the SS than in the Wehrmacht with respect to their observance of the terms of the Geneva Convention?

A No, it is exactly the same.

Q Have you any explanation to offer for the findings we have reached?

A I can only say that it is very shocking to me and in fact I am unable to blieve it. I would ask you again to take the opinion of my superiors about that.

Q I show you these volumes (President indicates 5 bound reports of Court of Inquiry) which contain evidence given by men of your own division, civilians and escaped prisoners who saw these things, evidence of medical experts who have examined the bodies, and there can be no doubt that what we have found actually occurred.

A From my division? In what sector can these things have taken place? I find it impossible to believe.

Q Every one of these volumes contains a record of atrocities which occurred in your division when it was commanded by you, or when you were in command of the 25th regiment of your division.

A I can only say again that I gave no orders in connection with any such thing and have never heard anything of these atrocities, nor has any official report been made to me about them.

Q Is there anything further that you care to say at this time,

A No

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Lt Col BORASTON: Are you suggesting that your senior officers approved and endorsed the conduct of your division in the CAEN area?

A The Army Commander repeatedly stated to me his satisfaction about the discipline and behaviour of my troops; Feldmarshal KLUGE also.

Q That is not an answer to my question.

A If you mean: Did they approve of any atrocities?, certainly not.

Q You appreciate that someone has to be responsible for what we know was done. Either it is the responsibility of some junior officer who, without your knowledge, did these things of his own will without reporting the incident, in which case that is a reflection on your command of your division; or it is done by a junior officer or NCO under order of his superiors, meaning yourself a nd your battalion commanders; or it is done by your division under your orders, under the direct orders of your Corps and Army Commanders. Now where does the responsibility lie? Are you saying that the behaviour of your division was in conformity with the orders of your seniors, or are your saying that these things were done by your junior officers and NCOs without the knowledge of yourself and your regimental and battalion commanders? Now I want a short answer to that question.

A If these things did occur, the senior officers knew nothing about them.

Q You ma y take it that they did occur. Now who were the responsible persons?

A I can only repeat what I said before: The Court must judge itself. I have a clea r conscience.

Q It is difficult to believe that these things could have been done without knowledge coming to you, at any rate after the event?

A I have never heard anything about these things.

Q And you have never taken any disciplinary action in relation to occurrences of this kind?

A I reply, as I said yesterday, that whenever discipline seemed to be lessening I took energetic action. The incident in which I had a man shot for breach of discipline should be an example of tha t.

Q That is one example of a matter of a totally different kind. Can you quote any single example where you took action to restrain any members of your division from the improper treatment of prisoners of war?

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A I have had no experience, have not been and have had no reports of improper treatment of prisoners of war.

Q Have you had any orders from your Corps or Army Commanders regarding the treatment which was to be given to prisoners of war?

A As I said yesterday, in the inquiry from the Red Cross concerning the report of ill treatment of prisoners, reference was made to the Genova Convention and it was stated that the provision of this Convention must be applied in all cases.

Q Then I take it that you have no excuse to offer in the form of an order from your superiors supporting the action of your division?

A I have a clear conscience and I have no need of an excuse in this matter.

(The witness withdraws)

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SECRET EXHIBIT No. 10

RECORD OF THE EVIDENCE

of

Lieutenant D. A. JAMES

Lieutenant D. A. JAMES is called, and having been duly sworn, is examined as follows:-

Lt. Col. BORASTON: What is your full name?
A DONALD ARTHUR JAMES.

Q And your rank?
A Lieutenant, sir.

Q Unit?
A Royal Winnipeg Rifles.

Q Age?
A 32

Q Where are you now serving?
A At the present moment at the Canadian Infantry Training Regiment.

Q Were you serving with the Royal Winnipeg Rifles in the early part of June last. I am more concerned about the date on which you were captured, the 8th of June?
A Yes, sir.

Q Will you tell us by reference to the map in front of you, (Sheet 7F/1 Caen), precisely where you were captured?
A Roughly 901727.

Q At the time that you were captured, you were operating with what Company?
A Baker Company.

Q Prior to your capture you were wounded?
A No sir, not the first time I was captured.

Q When were you wounded?
A I was captured first and escaped with another officer and shot and captured again about two hours later.

Q Where were you at the time that you escaped?
A Within 600 yards of the reference I have given you.

Q And you were re-captured about two hours later?
A Yes, sir.

Q Who was the officer you escaped with?

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A Lieutenant D. GLASGOW. He was also recaptured.

Q What was the nature of your wound?
A Through the right jaw and it came out through the left neck.

Q And as a consequence you were hospitalized by the Germans?
A Yes, sir.

Q And you arrived there when?
A 17th of June.

Q While you were in the hospital did you have a conversation with a number of Other Ranks that were captured at the same time, members of your Unit?
A Yes, sir.

Q Do you remember talking to a Corporal MC LEAN H.C, number H,41725?
A Yes, sir.

Q I see you are referring to some notes, when were those notes made?
A They were made about August 6th or 7th.

Q From whom did you get the information you are now giving?
A Corporal MC LEAN, sir.

Q He gave you this information himself?
A I got some of them from the Hospital records sir.

Q What is his reputation?
A Quite reliable sir.

Q Is his word to be relied upon?
A Yes, sir.

Lt. Col. MAC DONALD: Now how did you happen to talk to Corporal MC LEAN?
A I met him in the Hospital and he was one of the first members of the unit that I had seen. I was trying to get from him information as to what happened to his platoon, and Lt. FERGUSON.

Q What Company did he belong to?
A Charlie Company sir.

Q And the officer to whom you refer?
A Lieutenant FERGUSON.

Q You knew Lt. FERGUSON?
A Yes, sir, since sometime in 1942.

Q He had been with your Unit?

A He had been with the Rifles since 1942, it was originally the 3rd Battalion, and he transferred and came overseas in May 43.

Q What about the period of your own personal acquaintance with him?
A I had seen him in the Regiment sir.

Q For how long?
A One year.

Q Do you know where he is at the present time?
A No, sir.

Q Do you know whether he is alive or dead?
A Dead, sir.

Q Will you tell us all that MC LEAN told you and give the date the conversation occurred? First when were your notes prepared.
A They were made from records around the beginning of August of this year. When we were taken into Allied custody I contacted the Americans, August 4th. Prior to this I was able to get hold of the records of the Canadians who had passed through this estate. Just prior to release when the Allies took over Rennes.

Lt. Col BORASTON: Was the t at the direction of the Germans or Major WM. OXLEY of the R.C.A.M.C. in charge?
A Yes, sir, the Senior who took charge of the Allies who were there.

Lt. Col. MAC DONALD: I was referring to the conversation with MC LEAN when he was released from hospital, it would be around the 20th. of June when he first spoke to you regarding what happened to him?
A Yes, sir.

Q Had he been wounded?
A Yes, sir.

Q What was the nature of his wound?
A Shot through the left side, across the back and also through the right thigh. None of them serious but they crippled him up at the time.

Q Did you have several conversations with him at the time?
A Yes, sir, I saw him several times.

Q Over what period did these conversa-

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tions take?
A 20th of June and 12th of July.

Q What did you do?
A Well, the Germans had a policy of moving patients from there as quickly as possible to get them to Germany and if the doctors thought so he would be moved. Around the 20th of July a large party was moved and MC LEAN was moved out with that lot.

Q What was the conversation?
A He said that he wished to tell me something about what happened, he did not want anyone else to know because he was afraid of the Germans knowing the information he had. He told me tha t after he and FERGUSON and other members of the Platoon had been captured for three hours they were suddenly stopped and told by the ~~and told by the~~ guards to keep close together, and he had the feeling they were going to be shot. He said that he turned and spoke to another member of the platoon, I believe, Rifleman PARKS, and he said, "Let us keep to the rear of this party", I believe on the right hand side, "And should they fire you and I will run across the field." MC LEAN said that we had no sooner got to the rear when the guards opened fire, and he saw the men begin to fall and he ran, and he received this wound through the side, but it did not stop him and he eventually got away and he believed the officer and men were shot and they were picked up by the Germans later. I can say that Lieutenant FERGUSON and Sergeant REID, I do not know his initial, who was a member of Charlie Company, were members of the party that was shot. Since hearing this story I have made enquiries from every other member in the prison or hospital and asked them if they had seen FERGUSON and REID and none of them know anything about them. Corporal MC LEAN asked me not to relate it to any other member in the prison because the Germans would try to keep him quiet, and I have not told anyone over here because he is still a prisoner of war.

Q Do you know precisely where MC LEAN was captured?
A No, sir.

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Q Do you know where his Company was at the time?
A They were in the neighborhood of a bridge, Reference 895721 on the North side of the Bridge.

Q What date was this?
A That would be Thursday the 8th of June.

Q Were you told where the shooting had occurred?
A No, sir.

Q Were you given any indication that would help us?
A I'm afraid not, sir. About three hours after they were captured and as far as I know it was between 1000 and 1200 hours, roughly from the time we were captured.

Q Did you understand that this shooting was while being marched to the rear or when they were halted?
A They were halted and herded together, that is my impression.

Q Did he use any language that would lead you to infer that the group had been doubled into position?
A No, sir.

Q Did he say anything about the place they were shot?
A No, sir.

Q Did he say how many were in the party?
A I believe twenty including himself and PARKES.

Q How many guards did he say there were?
A Three or four.

Q Where were you three hours after you were captured?
A I was taken first of all at about 1300 hours and got away about 1430 I think it was and they picked me up in the afternoon about four thirty or five and took us to a Village in Square 8872 called BRONAY on the south side of the Railway.

Q Where did you meet the other prisoners that were captured at the same time?
A When we were re-taken there were just two of us, and GLASGOW was taken away. I was deposited with German woulded and he was taken away.

Q Where were you the last time you

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saw GLASGOW?

A The last place I saw him was in the neighborhood of the Village of BRONAY, reference 8372 on the South Side of the Railway.

Q Is GLASGOW still a prisoner?
A I received word from his mother that he is still a prisoner.

Q Do you know Rifleman FERRIS?
A Yes, sir.

Q Is there any possibility that you are confused between PARKES and FERRIS?
A Yes, sir there is as they were both in the same Company.

Q Is he still a prisoner?
A Yes, sir.

Q Do you know FERRIS to see him?
A Yes, sir.

Q And you know PARKES?
A Yes, sir.

Q And you saw them both as prisoners?
A Yes, sir.

Q Is Parkes still a prisoner?
A Yes, sir.

Q Did you have any conversation with either PARKES or FERRIS?
A No, sir.

Q Were either of them wounded?
A No, sir.

Q Were the members of your Company captured before or after the members of Charlie Company?
A I would say afterwards.

Q Can you make an estimate when that would be?
A It must have been between 1000 and 1200 hours because it was after 1200 that we were overrun and Charlie Company were not in position after my Company.

Q Did you see FERGUSON as a prisoner?
A No, sir.

Q And other than what MC LEAN has told you, you have no knowledge of what happened to him?
A No, sir.

Q Do you know of anyone who could throw further light on this matter?
A Yes, sir Corporal LE BARR I believe

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he has some knowledge of it because he was with FERGIS. They used to come from stalag at RENNES acting as Stretcher-bearers. He has been with him all the time. I also believe he would see MC LEAN.

Q Will you give me a description of Lt. FERGUSON?
A Approximately 5 feet eight, about thirty four or five years of age, he weighed about 160 lbs, fairly well built and he was medium in colour.

Q Was he wearing a moustache?
A Not the last time I saw him.

Q Any distinguishing marks about him?
A No, I cannot remember the colour of his eyes. He was square jawed.

Q Anything unusual in his dress?
A No, sir.

Q Did you ever hear any confirmation of Corporal MC LEAN's story?
A No, sir, I did not speak to anyone else about it.

(The Witness Withdraws)

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SECRET EXHIBIT No. 11

RECORD OF THE EVIDENCE

of

Rifleman W. R. LEBARR

Rifleman W. R. LEBARR is called, and having been duly sworn, is examined as follows:-

Lt. Col. BORASTON: What is your full name?
A WESLEY REGINALD LEBARR.

Q And your Regiment?
A Royal Winnipeg Rifles, 1st Battalion.

Q Rank?
A Rifleman.

Q How old are you?
A Twenty one.

Q And your Number?
A H.62861

Lt. Col. MACDONALD: Were you serving with your Unit the Royal Winnipeg Rifles on the 7th of June last?
A Yes, sir.

Q Who were your Company Commanders?
A Lt. MOUGLOVE and Capt. F. E. HODGES.

Q I believe that your Platoon was in a defensive position on 7th of June can you place it be reference to the Map in front of your? (Sheet 7F/1 Caen).
A No, sir, I cannot.

Q Can you tell us what village it was near?
A About 3½ or 4 miles from BRETTEVILLE.

Q It was near BRETTEVILLE?
A Yes, sir.

Q To the East or West?
A I am not sure, sir, nea r a bridge we were to hold the bridge.

Q I point out to you a certain number of Bridges on this Map and working from Right to Left, I presume, they would not be the two bridges due South of VILLENEUVE. Now working West along the Railway track the first bridge is at 910717 and that appears to be at a position where there is a road running through it and approaching the bridge from the North West, crossing the track and then pro-

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ceeding in a South Easterly direction. The next bridge is just outside PUTOT-EN-BESSIN. The third Bridge is to the West of PUTOT-EN-BESSIN in a position of 895721 and would be part way between PUTOT-EN-BESSIN and BRONAY. There is a fourth bridge in the Village of BRONAY at 888724. Now of these four bridges, if you can tell, which would you think it was that your Platoon was holding?

A. The witness pointed at the two bridges on either side of PUTOT-EN-BESSIN, 895721 and 905718.

Q How long did you occupy that position?
A About 32 hours.

Q So that a good portion of that would be during the hours of daylight?
A Yes, sir.

Q What was the object?
A To hold the right hand side of the Bridge.

Q In which direction?
A My Section was on the East side of the Bridge.

Q To cover two bridges?
A No, sir.

Q Were you looking in a South Easterly direction?
A Yes, sir.

Q And where was the village nearest to you?
A There were some of the houses about 300 or 350 yards away.

Q Were you on the North or South side of the Railway Bridge?
A South Side.

Q And the houses were on the other side of the Railway?
A Yes, sir, and the houses would be on my right, we were on the Bridge. Our position was right on the bridge and the houses were almost directly ahead of us.

Q Were you in that position when you were captured?
A No, sir, it was 300 or 350 yards behind that position, we had to withdraw.

Q Was it in open country?
A It was a small village, there was a large farm or estate

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where I was.

Q Do you remember anything that you could see, either from the defence position or the place you were captured that would enable us to find the spot?
A No, sir.

Q Could you find the spot again?
A Yes, sir, I could find the spot alright if we had a beach map.

Q About what time was it that you were captured?
A In the morning, sir, I am not sure, it was rather late in the morning.

Q The Company had withdrawn from the bridge?
A Yes, sir.

Q And they withdrew about how far?
A 300 yards.

Q Did you take any other position?
A We took "B" and "C" position.

Q Where did they go?
A I do not know, sir.

Q How long were you there before you were captured?
A About one and a half hours.

Q From which direction did they attack?
A Right across in front of us.

Q How many were captured?
A Three of us in the same position.

Q Who were the others?
A Rifleman LADGIMODIRE and an Acting Sergeant I do not know his name.

Q Were you the only three captured?
A No, sir, there were several further away.

Q Were you moved back to the rear?
A Through the German lines.

Q How many were in the party?
A Only the three of us.

Q How many others were taken with you to be interrogated?
A I was taken by myself, sir.

Q What kind of Guard?
A I had two German Guards with Flashes on the Collar.

Q You are referring to the Blitz

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S.S. Badges?
A Yes, sir.

Q Now will you tell us your own story?
A Well, we were taken back by two German troops to an Orchard under some trees and during the time I was sitting there they gave me a cigarette and tried to speak English and there were some troops in a field and we were sat in a corner and two of these troops tried to make a break for it, and they broke through the hedge to escape and the German troops started to fire on them and make a lot of noise and then they took me down to the Village to interrogate me. I do not know how many were in the bunch, about seventeen or twenty.

Q Were you wounded?
A I got a bayonet through my arm, they found a Luger clip in my pocket. One of them said something in German and shoved a bayonet at me and I dodged to one side and he put it through my arm.

Q Were you armed at that time?
A No, sir.

Q Were you alone?
A No, two of us.

Q Who was the other?
A Ladgimodiro.

Q This was after your capture?
A Yes, sir.

Q Did you have a Luger pistol?
A I had before that, but I left it in my kit.

Q Did the wound hurt you?
A Not much sir.

Q Cut the flesh?
A Yes, sir.

Q Have you a scar from it?
A A small one, sir.

Q There was nothing more done about it?
A No, sir.

Q How many prisoner or war were around when you were interrogated?
A Only two of us, sir.

Q I want to point out to you an inconsistency. You said in your statement there were 40 prisoners

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of war and they picked out four of them'?

A The Captain who interrogated me asked me how many prisoners were arriving, and I said I did not know and he asked me how many I had seen and I said four.

Q How many yards had you gone before you came to the first bridge?

A Three or four hundred.

Q Were you able to see the bridge from where you were captured?

A I cannot say, sir, now.

Q Were there buildings around where you were captured?

A Yes, sir, a large building I spoke of.

Q Was this large building a portion of the farm house?

A It was the farm house.

Q And you were in the orchard on the right of the Farmhouse?

A Yes.

Q Is there anything that you saw between where you were captured and the Farmhouse?

A No, we just went down the road through an open field across this bridge.

Q What did you do when you came to this bridge?

A We went through under Allied fire.

Q Was this a Railway Bridge?

A It was a road across the Railway Track.

Q Where did you go from there?

A We went down to this orchard where we had a rest.

Q How far from the Railway?

A Four hundred yards.

Q And on which side of the Railway tracks were you in the orchard?

A On the German side of the Railway Track.

Q On the South Side?

A Yes, sir.

Q If you cross the Railway Track going over the Bridge you would then be on the South side?

A Yes, sir.

Q To trace this thing back, you were occupying a defence position on

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the Bridge on the Railway track?
A Yes, sir.

Q And you were on the South Side?
A I imagine where we were would be on the North Side, sir.

Q I am going back to the time you were in a defensive position for thirty six hours?
A Yes, we were on the North Side we had not crossed the Railway Track.

Q How far from the track?
A Right on the Beach side, sir.

Q And when the Germans attacked, you moved 300 yards North?
A Yes, sir.

Q And that is where you were captured?
A Yes, sir.

Q Then you moved 400 yards to the Bridge?
A Yes, sir.

Q Was this bridge to the East or West of the line you occupied?
A On the East Side, the Bridge referred to was on the right hand side.

Q And you crossed the bridge this time and went into the orchard?
A Yes, sir, a lot of trees around. Between three and four hundred yards from the railway.

Q In other words south of the Railway?
A Yes, sir.

Q And you stopped there?
A Yes, sir.

Q What did you do?
A I sat down and one of them gave me a cigarette and talked.

Q Were there any others with you at the time?
A No, sir.

Q How many guards?
A Two.

Q By yourself and these two guards?
A Yes, sir.

Q Can you describe this place with reference to anything you were able to see?
A No, it was more or less a field.

Q Was it a high field or low?

A Level.

Q Was it a big orchard?
A Yes, sir.

Q Were you in the middle or a corner?
A A Corner.

Q And as you moved down the road was the orchard on the right or the left?
A Left, sir.

Q Was it enclosed all around?
A No, sir not on the side I was on.

Q How long was the side of the orchard?
A I cannot be sure, sir.

Q Would it be twenty-five yards?
A It would be between one hundred and one hundred and fifty yards, sir.

Q You have run a hundred yard dash.
A Yes, sir.

Q Then it would be a little more than that?
A Yes, sir.

Lt. Col. MAC DONALD: From this position then did you have a fairly good view of the country?
A No, sir, you could look across the field and there was a copse. (Witness draws sketch (which is entered as Exhibit "E") showing Copse and points out position (Marked "X") from which point he observed certain certain things and halted and had a cigarette.)

Q I have written on Exhibit "E" the word "Copse" the place which you have described as a copse. How far was this copse from the corner of the orchard?
A The Copse was 375 yards or slightly more from the point of observation.

Q And this dotted line on the sketch represents a hedge?
A Yes, sir.

Q Were there any other troops there?
A Yes, sir, there was a gate here (indicating on sketch) and some troops were doubled in the gate.

Q To the right you have indicated a gate and you say that troops that you saw brought in were doubled in entered the gate marked "Y"?
A Yes, sir.

Q How many altogether were in this

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party?
A As far as I can tell 17 or 20.

Q Did you count them?
A No, sir.

Q How could you tell?
A Well, I could tell by a platoon, I could tell they were lined up in threes.

Q Do you know how many guards there were?
A Four with Schmeissers and two machine guns.

Q And you can be sure from 300 yards?
A I could tell the weapons.

Q And were these personnel running with their hands above their heads?
A Some had their hands behind their heads like this. (Indicating).

Q Do you know to what unit they belonged?
A No, sir. After they came in and stopped there seemed to be a German N.C.O. started to speak German, waving his hands and when he stopped speaking the two men broke through the copse.

Q This "1" will represent the position of the German N.C.O. Now you say that the two that broke away were on the left hand side as they faced the German N.C.O.?
A Yes, sir, here witness marked on Sketch "Prisoner No. 1" and "Prisoner No. 2").

Q Did they break away before the shooting started after the German spoke?
A Just about the time it started.

Q Had you been watching this procedure at the time they entered the gate?
A Yes, sir.

Q Were you sitting?
A Yes, sir.

Q Was the field cultivated?
A It was an oat field, sir.

Q How high were the oats?
A About two feet.

Q Did you stand up or could you see it from a sitting position.
A From a sitting position, sir.

Q And you could clearly observe all

that you have told us?
A Yes, sir.

Q And the prisoners No. 1 and 2 dashed through the hedge and through the copse?
A As far as I could see, yes, sir. They went through the oats. They must have gone through the copse.

Q What happened to the other prisoners?
A As soon as the two withthe Schmeissers opened up the two with Machine Guns opened up.

Q What happened to them?
A They just collapsed, you could hear them screaming.

Q Was the shooting in bursts?
A One continual shooting.

Q Was there any further shooting?
A I was moved, it all happened in a second or two and a German grabbed me and took me out.

Q Are you quite sure that this firing was hitting the prisoners or only the two prisoners that escaped?
A It was full firing, sir. They opened up with Machine Guns on the main body.

Q Did the German Guard say anything about this?
A No, sir.

Q Did they know that you saw this?
A Yes, sir.

Q Where did they take you?
A They took me down the orchard, (indicated by arrow on sketch).

Q And you went down how far?
A We went through a wood some distance.

Q Where was the wood, I will draw an outline of what you say is the wood, is that right?
A Yes, sir.

Q What is the next place you arrived at?
A We arrived at a road where they had Canadian prisoners and they put me with the bunch.

Q Was that in the woods or on the road?
A Inside the wood.

Q How many other prisoners?
A Between fifty and sixty.

Q Did you recognize any of them?

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A Yes, but I was changed so many times.

Q See if you can remember any of their names?
A Rifleman LECLARE, (BEM) HUBERT A.R. LADGIMODIRE.

Q Any officers?
A I remember an officer there, sir, but I am not sure whether he was with the bunch or not. I would not like to say there were officers.

Q Where are the three men that you have mentioned, now?
A LADGIMODIRE is dead, he died in hospital, LECLARE is here in England and Hubert is in France with the Maquis.

Q What time did this shooting occur?
A Around three o'clock.

Q Now, I ask you very clearly if there was anyone with you at the time?
A No, sir, just me and the guard.

Q Your statement says four of you?
A It must be wrong, there was only myself and the guard.

Q Did you read the statement carefully?
A No, sir, I did not.

Q Were you eventually interrogated?
A Yes, sir.

Q Where?
A In the Village.

Q Before or after the shooting?
A After, sir.

Q After that you were with the party?
A Yes, sir.

Q So what happened?
A Well, this officer spoke English, and he spoke to an Artillery Sergeant. He took him one way and they took me another for interrogation.

Q Were you a Lance Corporal or a Corporal?
A Corporal, but was wearing one stripe, what was left of it.

Q Were you wearing it?
A Yes, sir, but very small, it was cut right down as small as possible.

Q Were you specifically interrogated?
A No, sir, just one of the party.

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Q. Did they ask you anything about this shooting?
A No, sir.

Q Before you went down to the other prisoners did you stop anywhere?
A I think we stopped at a house.

Q How long were you there?
A I cannot remember, sir. There was no one in the house if I remember correctly.

Q Where was it in this sketch?
A (Marked by a Square on the Sketch)

Q Were you guarded throughout by S.S. troops?
A I was guarded by S.S. troops until I joined the group.

Q Were there any other guards-- Feldgendarmerie?
A I cannot say, sir.

Q Do you remember Rifleman VERNETTE in that Group?
A Yes, sir.

Q And Captain CAUER?
A Yes, sir, "B" Company Commander, he was in one of the Groups.

Q In your statement you say you were being marched towards BRETTEVILLE?
A When we went through the village there was a Headquarters of some kind, the first large village, it was a sign board on the road-- BRETTEVILLE and a name after it.

Q Where were you eventually taken when you were joined with this group?
A To this place BRETTEVILLE, we got there early in the evening.

Q You saw this shooting about 1500 hours, how much later after you saw this did you start marching?
A At once.

Q Did you march continuously until you reached the place you speak of?
A We stopped for one of our own wounded, he came off the lorry and we carried him by hand.

Q And you reached this sign about what time?
A About one and a half or two hours later.

Q And were you moving all this time away from the Beach or towards it?
A Moving South East.

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Q That would be to BRETTEVILLE-SUR-ODON?
A Yes, sir.

Q Were you able to see the spires of the Church in CAEN as you were moving along?
A I am not sure, sir, I do not remember.

Q Do you remember where this Headquarters was at BRETTEVILLE?
A As we marched we went up a hill at the bottom of the town and there was a School house and we went to the top of the hill and here was the Headquarters.

Q And where were you interrogated?
A At the School house. We slept there all night in the yard.

Q Do you remember anything about lavatories there?
A We did not use them, sir.

Q Was there a fence around it?
A A wall fence, a pump in the yard and the lavatories were outside beside the wall.

Q I believe on your way back you were marched through CAEN?
A Yes, sir.

Q In the direction of FALAISE?
A Yes, sir.

Q And eventually got to RENNES?
A Yes, sir.

Q Were you straffed on the road?
A Yes, sir, there were three planes, and a lot of men hurt by that, ten killed and thirty wounded.

Q And when you got to RENNES what happened?
A That was Stalag 221 or 331 and they gave us phoney route cards.

Q Was anyone there who spoke to you about this?
A Yes, sir, FERRIS.

Q What did he have to say?
A He told me about the shooting of the fellows and to a man named RICHMAN in my platoon.

Q Will you tell us what he said to you?
A I cannot tell you all he said, sir, he told me that he had been with the bunch and Corporal MC LEAN was there and when Jerry started shooting they beat it through the hedge

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and through the Woods, he was rambling on.....

Q Did you know FERRIS before this?
A Slightly.

Q Do you know Rifleman PARKES?
A Yes, sir.

Q You are not confused between them?
A No, sir.

Q And he said that he was one that escaped with MC LEAN?
A Yes, sir.

Q Had he been wounded?
A No, sir.

Q Had MC LEAN?
A Yes, sir.

Q Did you talk to MC LEAN?
A Yes, sir, in the hospital, he said that he was one that got away.

Q Did he say why he wanted to get away?
A Because he did not want to be shot.

Q Did he tell you he thought they were going to be shot?
A Yes, sir.

Q Did he tell you where they had been interrogated before this shooting?
A No, sir.

Q Did he tell you whether any officer had ordered the shooting or led him to believe they were going to be shot?
A No, sir.

Q Did he give any explanation as to why this shooting occurred?
A No, sir, he said that most of the men were wounded, walking cases.

Q You said they were doubled into the field, did you see them running in threes?
A Yes, sir.

Q Do you think they could have been very badly wounded, if you could make out that they were moving in a column of threes?
A No, sir.

Q Did he tell you any of the names of these men?
A No, sir.

Q Did FERRIS?

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A He mentioned RICHMAN.

Q Did you know RICHMAN?
A He was in my platoon.

Q Do you know his initial?
A F., sir.

Q How old was he?
A Twenty-eight.

Q How tall?
A Five feet eight inches.

Q Dark or fair?
A Fair, slight, very light blonde hair.

Q Moustache?
A No, sir.

Q Anthing about him that would distinguish him?
A Red face complexion.

Q Had he been wounded?
A I do not know, sir.

Q Had he been wounded to your knowledge?
A Not to my knowledge, sir.

Q Did you hea r of him at all afterwards?
A No, sir.

Q What did FERRIS tell you he thought had happened?
A FERRIS said that he was in some brush.

Q Was he under the impression that the party had been killed?
A Yes sir.

Q Did MC LEAN say whether he had seen any of the party later?
A No, sir.

Q He escaped?
A Yes, sir, as far as I know they were taken to Germany, we got in the truck on 22nd, of July and got with the Maquis in September.

Q Did FERRIS escape?
A I do not know, sir.

Q When did you come back to England?
A 12th of September.

Q LE BARR, you appreciate the seriousness of this Inquiry?
A Yes, sir.

Q We are endeavouring to obtain all the facts and in order to do that we have to rely on what you tell

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us, it is the truth now?
A Well, I have not thought much about it, sir, but as far as the story now is concerned it is true to the best of my recollection.

Q In regard to the three bridges, were they all the same, were they roads over the Railway tracks?
A Yes, sir.

Q Have you anything to distinguish these bridges outside of the location, was one the biggest for instance?
A I could indentify them from the scenery around sir.

Q Were they ~~block~~ brick or stone? Were they all the same?
A There was one, sir, the first one, there was a sort of Block House.

Q On the near side of the Building?
A Yes, sir.

Lt. Col. BORASTON: Did it look as if it had been built by the Germans?
A No, sir.

Q Built before the war?
A Yes, sir.

Q You said that before the shooting you had seen one of the German Guards shouting?
A Yes, sir.

Q Did either MC LEAN or FERRIS say anything about an occurrence of that nature?
A No, sir, they were more interested in how they escaped.

Q They did not mention this N.C.O.?
A No, sir.

Q Did they say why they decided to beat it?
A Because, I suppose they were going to be shot, I told them what I had seen.

(The Witness Withdraws)

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SECRET EXHIBIT No. 11A

STATEMENT BY: H.62861 Cpl LeBar
Wesley R. R Winnipeg R.

1. I was a section leader of No. 4 Section, No. 8 Platoon, "A" Coy R Winnipeg R. Major Hodge was my Coy Commander and Lt R.S. Moglave was my Platoon Commander.

2. On the 7 Jun my platoon was holding a bridge along the railway approximately 3 miles west of BRETTEVILLE (Map ref A 8 T 96). It was somewhere between LOUCELLE and BROUA. We were supposed to stop the enemy from crossing this bridge. The time that we went into our position was about 1300 hrs on 7 Jun. We dug ourselves in and remained there until 0100 hrs on 8 Jun. German Armd columns tried to cross the bridge. There were 3 Tiger tanks and a number of light armoured cars. They attacked us three times, the last time about 0900 hrs in the morning, on the 8th when they pushed us out of our position.

3. The Germans who attacked us were camouflaged uniforms, but their vehicles had a SS sign in the front and in the back. I was unable to recognize the troops in any other way.

4. On my left was "C" Coy and on my right was "B" Coy. On that last third attack "A" Coy was pushed back into the position of "B" Coy. Colonel Meldrum gave orders to retire. During the retirement myself and about six others gave covering fire as best we could from the ditch on the right side of the Bn HQ. The time was approximately 1200 hrs on 8 Jun.

5. The Germans surrounded us and we were taken PW. I was trying to identify some of the Germans but was unable to do so as they still wore camouflaged uniforms.

6. The Officer who took us prisoner treated us fairly decently. He spoke a little bit of English. We were marched about 300 yds and searched very hurriedly. With me were 4 men of "B" Coy. Two of "C" Coy had been killed before. I do not know the names of those 4 who were with me. They took away everything we had, with the exception of our Pay Book. The actual searching was done by an OR, however an Officer was still present.

7. I had been in possession of a German pistol which I, however, left back in the ditch where we were captured, as I was afraid they would punish me if they found it. In my pocket, however, I still had a clip which I had forgotten about and it was found when I was searched. The Officer looked at it, with an OR pointing a bayonet at me, and said "Ah! Luger". When the OR tried to bayonet me I saw it coming and dodged quickly and only got it through the arm. The time had advanced then to approximately 1400 to 1500 hrs.

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EXHIBIT No. 11A

8. By that time there were approximately 40 PW gathered around. They picked 4 of us out possibly for interrogation and marched us about 400 yds in the direction of BRETTEVILLE along the Railroad track. We had to stop on account of our own shell fire and rested near a grain field in the corner of a hedge, under an apple tree. The three other PW who were with me I did not know as they were from another Coy and just new reinforcements. All the time we had to march with our hands over our heads. Two guards were with us.

9. We had rested about five minutes when I saw some prisoners doubled out into the grain field about 300 to 400 yds away from me. There must have been about 17 to 20 of them. With them there were four guards with rifles, two with Schmeizer's and two others had an MG 43. The time was shortly after 1500 hrs.

10. One of the guards with a rifle was waving his hands as if he would be talking to the prisoners. I was unable to hear what he said. The whole group was standing in a corner of the hedge surrounding the field. After the guards stopped talking, two of the boys started to make a break for it, possibly because they all had been threatened they would be shot. The guards at once opened fire with the MG.43 on the PW. One of the other guards with a Schmeizer opened up on the man who tried to get away from the hedge. One was hit, he fell down but got up again and disappeared into the bush.

11. I saw this instance very clearly from about 300 to 400 yds away. There was a lot of excitement and a lot of shrieks from some of the PW who had been mortally wounded.

12. My guards moved us away at once when this happened and I could not see what was done with the wounded prisoners. I always felt that the SS troops were acting in a very queer inhuman way and certainly in battle like madmen, not shirking to advance into direct fire. I thought many times that they may have been doped as their eyes were always dilated.

13. The four of us and the guards moved to a little farmyard about 300 yds away towards BRETTEVILLE. The time was about 1530 to 1630 hrs. There we stopped for about five minutes and then we marched through a small woods on to the roadway where we joined another column of prisoners. Our guards left us there and the new guards were not SS troops but members of the German Feld Gendarmerie. There were about 60 to 70 PW, amongst them I recognized Rfn N. Vermett, Rfn Hubert, A.R. and Capt Gauer, OC of "B" Coy.

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14. The guard was dressed in ordinary German field gray uniform with a eagle on the right breast. Around their neck they had a large chain on which there was a round silver plate hanging over their chest. On it was written Feld Gendarmerie. On both sleeves they had, just above the cuffs, a black patch on which there was written in silver letters "Feld Gendarmerie."

15. We were marched towards BRETTEVILLE where we arrived about 1700 hrs on the same afternoon. We met up with some more PW and by that time we were about 200 altogether. We did not receive any food at all.

16. On the 9 Jun we were marched approximately 40 kilometers through CAEN in the direction of FLERS, where we arrived on 11 Jun. During the whole two days trip we had not received any food with so far only a small quantity of water. The guards marched with so far only a small quantity of water. The guards marched with us but they had a small vehicle with them in which they rode alternately. They had plenty of food which they took from French farms along the way - hams, eggs, etc., which they ate in front of our eyes with great delight, knowing very well that we were very hungry. Just outside of FLERS we received a small tin of condensed soup which was the only food we had received so far. We marched all the way to RENNES where we arrived on 17 Jun. Between FLERS and RENNES American P.51's strafed us killing 10 and wounding 37. The wounded ones were taken care of and sent to the Hospital. In RENNES we were put into a Frontier Stalag 331 (a number which I got from a Red Cross card which we had to fill out).

16. On 17 Jun I met Rfn Ferres of "B" of "C" Coy. I was talking to him in one of the PW compounds. I told him that I saw the shooting and he said that he was one of those who escaped, together with Cpl MacLean who was from the same Coy as Ferres. MacLean was wounded three times by Schmeizer bullets. Both were recaptured three days later after they had escaped. He too told me that Rfn Richman, a mortarman of my own platoon, was one of those who had been killed in the shooting. This is all the information which I received from him.

17. On the 22nd of July I escaped from the train which was taking us to Germany, by breaking the rear partition of our box car. Ferres was in the same box car as myself but I do not know if he had got away.

18. I spent until 7 Sep with different groups of the Maquis, during which time I was decorated with the Medal Militaire. I contacted the US Army at TOURS and was returned to UK on the 12th Sep.

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EXHIBIT No. 11A

/s/ H-62861
/s/ Cpl Le Bar W R

/t/ H.62861 Cpl LeBar, Wesley R,
Royal Winnipeg R.

This statement was taken under Oath.

Witness:

/s/ K.G. Surbeck A/Capt
(K.G.Surbeck)

M.I. 9
12 Sep ,44.

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EXHIBIT No. 12

RECORD OF THE EVIDENCE

of

Rifleman LLOYD W. LEE

Rifleman LLOYD W. LEE is called, and having been duly sworn, is examined as follows:-

Lt. Col. BORDSTON: What is your full name?
A LLOYD WINTER LEE.

Q And your number?
A H. 102670.

Q Unit?
A Regina Rifles, sir.

Q With what unit are you now serving?
A No. 1. C.I.T.R. Holding Unit.

Q How old are you?
A Twenty-three.

Q You were serving with the Regina Rifles in June last?
A Yes, sir.

Q I believe you were captured?
A Yes, sir.

Q What date?
A 9th of June, sir.

Q Where were you at that time?
A As far as I can say, near BRETTEVILLE.

Q Where did you find out that was the name of it?
A I talked to one of my Corporals in my Company.

Q Later?
A Yes, sir, when I was in hospital.

Q What Company were you with?
A Baker Company, sir.

Q And what was your job?
A We were out there to see if the enemy made any attack, and one of us was to report.

Q Who was with you?
A Rifleman GILBERT.

Q How old would he be?
A About thirty-nine.

Q How tall?
A About five feet nine.

Q Fair or dark?

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A 092650

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A Medium.

Q Moustache?
A No.

Q Was he stout?
A No, he was not stout.

Q Was there anything by which you could readily distinguish him?
A No, I cannot say there is. I could tell him if I saw him, he was wearing a gold wrist watch. I was not with him long.

Q And you think it was in the vicinity of BRETTEVILLE L'ORGUEILLEUSE?
A Yes, sir, it was near the Railway track not far from a bridge.

Q Was there anyting about the Bridge that you could identify it by?
A If I was in the place I could identify it.

Q Can you describe its appearence?
A I was not close to the Bridge, sir.

Q How far away?
A Three or four hundred yards.

Q The North side of the Bridge was the Beach side?
A Yes, sir, I never did keep track of the direction, sir.

Q How did you come to be captured?
A Well, we went out to relieve two other chaps and we were late getting out there and they opened up on us. We had been out the day before and there was only a couple of snipers and the next morning "C" Company were to take over again.....

Q And what time did you go out there?
A Six thirty in the morning.

Q Did you relieve the two men?
A No, sir, we were late, it took us one hour to get there. We were supposed to get in under cover of darkness. We had another job on the wire and we were late.

Q Through no fault of your own you were late, but eventually got there?
A Yes, sir.

Q And what happened?
A We were fired on and after looking around we spied 23 tanks on the left and we had to report that

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and GILBERT said he would go and I said "O.K."....

Q You had no means of communication?
A No, sir.

Q You had to go on foot?
A Yes, sir, he started to go and decided it was too hot, it was a bad spot. The Corporal put us there, and we should have been under cover. I would say it was partly my own fault we should have made more of a try to report back.

Q We want to know how you were captured and by whom? How soon after you went out was it?
A About eleven thirty.

Q By whom?
A S.S.
Q Infantry?
A No, tanks, they made an attack and snipers were firing and an old Frenchman led in a group of troops from behind they must have come up the track.

Q How did the Frenchman get in?
A By the Station on the track about 500 yards beyond the bridge.

Q Where precisely were you captured and by whom?
A It was some piece away from the Company, half a mile.

Q About 300 yards from the Railway bridge?
A Yes, sir.

Q That is where you would be?
A Yes, sir.

Q You were captured by Tanks?
A Yes, sir.

Q And what did they do?
A They doubled us back along there, kicking us about 500 yards. GILBERT was behind me about four rods, I was with another group. There were two groups one about 4 rods ahead of other. After about 500 yards they stopped us and used us quite rough, and what I though was an officer, I would say a Tank Commander was with the Group and talking in German and from where I was, it was a matter of minutes the officer seemed to get into a rage and he hollered and yelled and grabbed his Schmeisser, I thought it was and turned on these other chaps and I hea rd

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GILBERT say "Oh hell" and he grabbed his stomach. They had me with my back towards them, I was looking over my should and they swung me round in front of him.

Q Who?
A This officer who shot this other chap, he had medals across his chest, but he never said anything to me, he just shot him. I could see the weapon in his hand and one of the slugs hit me and I went out like a light. I must have been out only a few minutes or so because they were still there when I came round. They were talking in German, they fired two rounds at me when I was lying on the ground, I think they were firing at me, the dirt was flying all around me and I was thinking of playing dead. He fired again and it went through my Water Bottle. Well, then our own Artillery opened up and Jerry got out of there as fast as he could go. Artillery shells bounced me around the ground and tanks roared by. I think I was believed to be dead, but my leg, right up was numb. As soon as everything quieted down I thought I would get the blazes out of it and got to the Railway bank and let myslef down and then I ripped out my First Field Dressing and ripped it open with my teeth.

Q Did you then get back?
A Yes, sir.

Q Had you been wounded?
A Yes, sir.

Q Where?
A Through the right leg.

Q And the other shots missed you except for the Water Bottle?
A Yes, sir, that is what I cannot understand.

Q Did you see GILBERT when he was hit?
A I did not look at him, sir.

Q Was he motionless?
A Yes, sir, I think he was stone dead.

Q Did someone else pick him up?
A Yes, sir, three weeks later by Corporal WOODS, he was riddled and wounded in the head.

Q What did WOODS say about the con-

dition of the body?
A Everything was intact, he was wearing the wrist watch, he said he had two in the head and some through the body.

Q Do you know where it was found?
A In the same place as where I was shot.

Q Can you show me on the map?
A No, I cannot show you on this Map, sir.

Q When you got away you got over the railway bank and tumbled down?
A Yes, sir.

Q Can you tell me how far the Railway Bridge was from the place where you were shot?
A Three rods.

Q You speak of the man who did the shooting as an officer by reason of the fact that he had a row of medals, are you sure they were medals?
A Yes, sir.

Q Did you see a rank badge on his shoulder?
A No, sir.

Q Was he carrying out an interrogationof GILBERT?
A Yes, sir, he said a few words in German.

Q How soon was it after he started talking to Gilbert that he started shooting?
A Only a second or two, it all happened so fast.

Q Were there other troops there?
A Yes, sir.

Q Do you know whether this officer was S.S. or not?
A I do not know what they were, sir, I was told it was S.S. who attacked us.

Q But you do not know?
A No, sir.

Q Was this officer in a weapon slit?
A No, sir.

Q Where was he?
A Standing upright, sir.

Q Tank or Infantry?
A Must have been Tank, sir, but I cannot say.

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EXHIBIT No. 12

Q Were there any changes in the characteristics of the troops that captured you and the troops that brought you to this officer?
A No, sir.

Q Were they troops that got out of the tanks?
A Some of them, and this Frenchman brought up some German troops behind us.

Q Was this Frenchman a Station Official, did you see him there yourself?
A Yes, sir.

Q A civilian?
A Yes, sir. In the morning he tried to give us something to eat, but we did not want to give our position away and waved him away. He had an old cow chained up out there.

Q Do you think he was collaborating with the Germans?
A I would not say he was, we had gotten water from him before.

Q But at the time you saw him later he was leading German Troops?
A Yes, sir.

Q And you are not certain whether they were tanks or infantry?
A I think they were tanks, the Infantry behind them.

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Q Where is Corporal WOODS?
A No. 1. C.I.T.R.

Lt Col BORGSTON: What did you mean by two groups?
A We were separated into two groups.

Q What did the group consist of?
A Twelve Jerrys' and two of us, and they just pushed us out of there. They.....

Q That would be about two dozen Germans?
A Yes, sir.

Q You started to say something else?
A Yes, they acted like a bunch of lunatics, hollering and yelling and some of the boys in hospital said they caught three with drugs on them.

Q Who said they had caught three with drugs on them?
A I cannot say now, sir.

Q In a German Hospital?
A No, over here, if you get hold of

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EXHIBIT No. 12

some of the men of the Unit they could tell you the follows who took the Jerry prisoners.

Lt. Col. CUTTING: When you were doubled up the Railway track and they were yelling and so on had they the appearance of being drugged?
A Yes, sir.

Q Did the officer also?
A Yes, sir.

Q Had he the appearance of authority over the others?
A Yes, sir.

(The Witness Withdraws)

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EXHIBIT No. 12A

STATEMENT BY H-102670 RFN LEE, L.W., REGINA RIFLES TO CAPT B.W. HOWARD, ADJA, CDN SEC SEC GHQ 1 ECH 21 A GP AT NO. 20 CDN GEN HOSP RCAMC

I was serving in Normandy with my regt, and on Friday June 9th, 1944, I together with a chap known to me as "Ernie", a re-inforcement who had only been with my unit two days, were detailed as a patrol on the right flank of my coy. We took up our position shortly after daylight about 0600 hrs under sniper fire. About 1130 hrs the Germans came up in considerable force - about six tanks; they came within about two rods of the position that we were occupying and the crews descended and surrounded the position that we were occupying, apparently under the impression that there were a considerable number of us. It was impossible for us to make any defence against these numbers, and we accordingly surrendered. The tank crew took our weapons away from us, kicked us about, and then took us back some 500 yards through the Infantry. We were taken before what I believe to have been a German officer, judging by the number of ribbons on his chest. "Ernie" was taken before him first and some remarks were addressed to him in German which he did not understand. The officer appeared to be annoyed and was yelling. He then siezed an automatic weapon from a soldier who was standing nearby and fired a burst, starting at the legs and going up the body. "Ernie" collapsed on the ground, and in my opinion he was dead. I was only about 4 rods away and I was swung around facing the same officer. I had my hands up and the German soldiers were pushing me forward towards this officer. As I got close to him I lowered my hands and he then fired one round at me hitting me in the thigh. I collapsed on the ground. He fired another round hitting the ground in front of my face. I instinctively put my hand up to shield myself. Then he fired another round at me. From that time on I relaxed and endeavoured to give the appearance that I was dead. All of the Germans, including the officer, seemed very excited, were making a great deal of noise, and as I have thought it over since, it seems to me that they might have been under the influence of drugs. About this time our tanks came up and drove the Germans off. I attended to my wound as well as I could with my first field dressing and with great difficulty managed to work my way back to my own unit. It took me approximately a day and a half to work my way about a mile back as I was afraid to move during the daytime as the ground was open and exposed.

My coy was B Coy. I have no idea of the location or of the area occupied by my unit.

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EXHIBIT No. 12A

11 Jul 44

/s/ L W Lee
(H-102670 Rfn Lee, L.W.)
Regina Rifles

/s/ B.W. Howard (?), Capt
Witness

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EXHIBIT No. 13

TOPSEC

45/TREATMENT/1

Statement by L.12739 - Pte Pattison, David C, R. Winnipeg R.

1. I was a section leader, No. 3 Section "B" Coy, under the command of Capt Grauer. On 8 Jun we were fighting about 15 miles northwest of CAEN.

2. I landed on 6 Jun as first line reinforcement and therefore was not acquainted very well with the names of the different places we were moving around. I, too, was now with the R Winnipeg R as I used to be with the South Saskatchewan Regiment, from which unit I went to the hospital on the 23 Mar and then was sent to an Inf holding unit in Aldershot. From there I was sent to France to join the R Winnipeg R.

3. On 8th Jun, between 1000 and 1100 hrs the Germans started to make a counter-attack. They consisted of SS troops and were in camouflaged uniforms and carrying automatic weapons. As far as I know they belonged to the 12 SS Div. At that time we had no support by mortar nor by our tanks, as they had left us about 1100 hours. The Germans were advancing with Tiger Tanks. We were over-run and then taken prisoners of war. My Platoon Commander, Lt Gridley, was beside me at that time, but was shot after killing approximately 5 Germans with a German rifle. Nearly all of "B" Coy that was left was captured.

4. We were marched, approximately 100 of us, to a small village about 8 to 10 kilometres to the northwest of CAEN, along the main road. I cannot remember the name of that village. We arrived here at 2130 hours on the night 8 Jun.

5. In the afternoon at approximately 1500 hrs on the 8 Jun, before we were marched off to the rear, we were lined up on the road near our place of capture in marching order with our hands above our heads. We had been searched beforehand and only were waiting there to be marched off. They made us take our helmets off, empty our pockets and took away all our rations. Most of our personal belongings were taken away too.

6. I had a card picture of my wife which I tried to keep; however, one of the SS Guards took a knife and cut it to pieces in front of my eyes while two other guards pointed Schmeizer automatic pistols at me.

7. While I was standing on the road being searched, I heard some shooting approximately 500 yds away behind some bushes, and that time I did not know what it was all about.

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EXHIBIT No. 13

8. We were then marched off with our hands above our heads for about 1 mile when we were permitted to fold them on our chest. Just before we reached a little village about 8 or 10 kilometers back, we were stopped and rings and watches were taken away from us by the guards. One of the guards who spoke English very well said he was educated in Regina, Saskatchewan.

9. We were marched then until 13 Jun when we arrived at Dulag 132 (?) in Rennes. During that march some of them who tried to escape had their shoes taken away from them and we had to march in bare feet, at times for the duration of a whole full day. Then we were permitted to put our shoes back on for several hours. The food was not sufficient and we arrived in Rennes in a very weakened condition.

10. We remained in Rennes until the 5 Jul when we were moved to Chalons-sur-Marne by train. The train consisted of 17 box cars, each contained about 40 to 50 PW. We received only a small loaf of bread per man for 4 days.

11. The trip took 23 days, during which time we stopped for 10 days in a little village La Ville, aux Dames, near Tours. We were not permitted to leave the box cars during the whole trip. In La Ville aux Dames the local population brought us some cooked grain.

12. On 28 Jul we arrived in Chalons-sur-Marne and stayed there until the night of 16 Aug.

13. While in one of the compounds of the PW camp I was talking to another PW in another compound, through the fence. He was a member of "B" Coy of R Winnipeg R, whose name, however, I do not know, as I was new in the Regt (see report Cpl LeBar, R Winnipeg R. Must have been Pte Ferres). He was captured at the same time and same place as I was on the morning of the 8th.

14. He told me that the Platoon in which he was was doubled out into a grain field after the capture therefore they were bunched together and surrounded by the SS guards. One of the guards who spoke English called out "Now you die!" When the boys heard this they tried to make a break for it but were shot down by the SS guards.

15. The soldier, a private, who told me this story said that only 2 got away but were recaptured later on (see report LeBar. These two soldiers must have been Pte Ferres and Cpl MacLean).

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EXHIBIT No. 13

16. This I think was the shooting I heard on the 8 Jun at approximately 1500 hrs while being searched 500 yds away on the road.

17. During the time that I was in the hands of the SS Grenadiers I felt that they acted very inhuman and like insane people.

/s/ Pte Pattison, David C.
L-12-739
(Signed) Pte Pattison, David C.

This statement was taken under Oath.

Witness

/s/ K.G. Surbeck
A/Capt K.G.Surbeck

M.I.9
12 Sept 44

A 092361

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EXHIBIT No. 14

PWIS(H)/LF/275 SECRET.

Report one the Interrogation of

PW Kp 22243 Pz Gren STANGENBERG, Withold

Regt HQ Coy Pz Gren Regt 26, 12 Pz Div

captured near CAEN, 28 June 44.

16. ATROCITIES:- On 14 June 44 at approximately 1700 hrs at Xroads 907710 (sheet 7F/1 (CAEN)) PW witnessed the following:-

Two Cols (Uffz) of the Feldgendarmerie brought three ENGLISH or CANADIAN PW to Battle HQ - Gefechtsstand -(Xroads 907710 - sheet 7F/1 (CAEN) -) of Pz Gren Regt 26 for interrogation. Two of them were between 20 and 25 years of age and one was between 25 and 30. The Regt Comd Standartenfuehrer MOHNKE conducted the interrogation in the presence of Hauptsturmfuehrer KAISER (Adj and Coy Comd HQ Coy) and other SS officers whom PW did not know. PW watched proceedings from a distance of about 80-100 yrds. The interrogation lasted about 15-20 minutes. During that time MOHNKE shouted and gesticulated all the time. Then the BRITISH PW were searched and everything including their indentity discs, was taken from them. Then the two Cpls of the 'Feldgendarmerie' took them about 500-600 yards away towrds the British lines to a meadow - 905714 (sheet 7F/1 - CAEN-) - were one of the Corporals shot them in the back with his MP. MOHNKE and KAISER were watching the shooting. The corporal emptied a whole magazine into the three British PW and then both Cpls ran back to MOHNKE. The bodies were not buried and the Regt retreated the following day.

The shooting was also witnessed by:-

Pz Gren STUTUFF, Erich - Zugtrupp 1 pl HQ Coy,
Pz Gren SCHULZ, Helmut - 1 sec 1 pl HQ Coy,
Pz Gren ROESNER, Helmut - Zugtrupp 1 pl HQ Coy,
Unterscharfus SCHITZICK, Herbert - Zugtrupp 1 pl Hq Coy,
all of Pz Gren Regt 26.

STUTUFF and SCHUZ were disgusted with the shooting and said so to the others. ROESNER and SCHITZICK thought it was a very good thing and should be done more often.

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EXHIBIT No. 14A

PWIS(H)/LP/275 SECRET

This incident is being dealt with in a separate and more detailed report.

LINGFIELD,
10 Jul 44. (signature illegible)
Major.
SIO Lingfield Cage.

POPB/WAHN.

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EXHIBIT No. 14B

SECRET

SUPREME HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE

AG 000.5-2 GAP-AGM

APO 757 (Main)
9 October 1944

SUBJECT: Prisoner of War STANGENBERG, WITHOLD

TO : Commanding General, European Theater of Operations, U.S. Army

1. Reference is made to letter this headquarters, file AG 000.5-2 GAP-AGM, dated 20 August 1944, appointing a Supreme Headquarters, AEF, Court of Inquiry for the purpose of investigation and report in cases of alleged breach of Geneva Conventions of 1929 by the German Armed Forces.

2. Reference is also made to PWIS (H)/LF/275, dated 10 July 1944, a report by S.I.O. Lingfield Cage on the interrogation of Prisoner of War KP22243 Panzer Grenadier STANGENBERG, WITHOLD, Regt. Hq. Co., SS Panzer Grenadier Regiment 26, 12th SS Panzer Division (Hitler Jugend) captured near CAEN, Calvados, Normandy 28 June 1944.

3. Paragraph 16 of the report mentioned in paragraph 2 above is as follows:

"Two Cpls (Uffz) of the Feldgendarmerie brought three ENGLISH or CANADIAN PW to Battle HQ - Gefechtsstand - (X roads 907710 - sheet 7F/1 (CAEN) -) of Pz Gren Regt 26 for interrogation. Two of them were between 20 and 25 years of age and one was between 25 and 30. The Regt Comd Standartenfuehrer MOHNKE conducted the interrogation in the presence of Hauptsturmfuehrer KAISER (adj and Coy Comd HQ Coy) and other SS officers whom PW did not know. PW watched proceedings from a distance of about 80-100 yards. The interrogation lasted about 15-20 minutes. During that time MOHNKE shouted and gesticulated all the time. When the BRITISH PW were searched and everything, including their identity discs, was taken from them. Then the two Cpls of the 'Feldgendarmerie' took them about 500-600 yards away towards the British lines to a meadow 905714(sheet 7F/1 - CAEN) where one of the Corporals shot them in the back with his MP. MOHNKE and KAISER were watching the shooting. The corporal emptied a whole magazine into the three British PW and then both Cpls ran back to MOHNKE. The bodies were not buried and the Regt retreated the following day."

4. A copy of the more detailed report referred to is attached.

5. It is desired that STANGENBERG be ex-

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amined on oath concerning the incident referred to and that a verbatim report of the proceedings and examination, signed by the prisoner of war, be forwarded to the Supreme Headquarters, AEF Court of Inquiry as soon as possible.

6. Without limiting in any way the discretion of the interrogating officer, it is particularly desired that the prisoner of war be closely questioned regarding the following matters:

a. Names of the unit and station of the 2 Felgendarmerie who brought the three English or Canadian Prisoners of War to his battle headquarters.

b. The rank and units marks, if any, of the 3 Prisoners of War.

c. Whether any of the 3 Prisoners of War were already wounded when brought in, and if so, how.

d. How long Battle headquarters had been established at the location given.

e. The previous location of regimental headquarters.

f. The location of divisional headquarters at the time and any earlier location, if moved.

g. The time of day when the three Prisoners of War were interrogated.

h. The direction from which they were brought in.

i. By what unit they were taken prisoner before being handed over to the Feldgendarmerie.

j. Where they were taken prisoner and at what time.

k. What fighting was going on in the vicinity at or immediately prior to the time the 3 Prisoners of War were brought in, and the precise direction of the fighting.

l. Whether witness was able to hear any of the questions by MOHNKE or others to the 3 Prisoners of War. If so, what those questions were and any answers heard.

m. Whether the interrogation was in German or English.

n. Whether any weapons were found on the 3 Prisoners of War as a result of the search made.

o. Whether witness followed the three Prisoners of War when the Feldgendarmerie took them away and how far distant he was when the shooting took place.

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EXHIBIT No. 14B

p. Whether MOHNKE and KAISER and any other officers followed, and how far distant they were from the shooting.

q. Whether the 3 Prisoners of War had their hands up or not.

r. Whether they offered resistance or tried to escape, or otherwise did anything that might be pleaded as an excuse for the shooting.

s. Where in the body the 3 Prisoners of War were shot, indicating individually in what parts of the head or body they were shot and how many bullets were fired into each.

t. Whether any of them were killed immediately as a result of the shooting, or whether any were wounded only.

u. Whether witness was certain that all were dead, and if so, why.

v. How far distant from the British line was the meadow at the time of the shooting?

w. Whether the meadow or its vicinity was under fire at the time.

x. Whether witness is sure that only one of the two corporals fired; if so, can he describe the one and what were the others doing at the time.

y. Whether the two corporals marched the 3 Prisoners of War in front of them, or how otherwise did they take them to the meadow.

z. Can witness explain why the two corporals "rank" back to MOHNKE?

aa. Did anything in particular take place when they reached MOHNKE? Did they or MOHNKE or any other officer say anything and if so, what?

bb. What happened to their things, particularly the identity discs, taken from the 3 Prisoners of War at the search?

cc. Does he know the British or Canadian units with which his unit was engaged on this day? Or on the previous day or days?

dd. Does he know whether STUTUFF, SCHULZ, ROESNER and SCHITZICK are still alive or where they now are? Where were they when he last saw them?

7. A 1/50,000 map of the area in question is attached in case it might be of assistance when STANGENBERG is examined.

8. An interim report by radio would be appreciated, in the event there is unavoidable delay in carrying out this request.

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EXHIBIT No. 14B

For the Supreme Commander:

E. C. BOEHNKE
Colonel, A.G.D.
Adjutant General

2 Incls:
Incl 1 - Statement by PW KP 22243 Panzergrenadier STANGENBERG, Withold.
Incl 2 - Map

Copies to:
G-1 Division
AG Records

SECRET

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TRANSLATION EXHIBIT No. 140

RECORD OF EVIDENCE

THAT has been given by WITHOLD STANGENBERG, a Prisoner of War, concerning the shooting of British Prisoners of War by German troops in France on 14 June 1944:-

1. I, SS Panzergrenadier Withold STANGENBERG, until I was captured on the 28th June 1944, was in HQ Coy of 26 SS Panzergrenadier Regiment, belonging to the 12th SS Panzer Division (Hitler Youth).

2. On the 14th June 1944, about half-past four in the afternoon, I was in the neighbourhood of the battle HQ of my regiment, 26 SS Panzergrenadier Regt, when a soldier from battle HQ came up to me and told me, that three English or Canadian prisoners had been brought in. Thereupon I went to battle HQ - X roads 907710 G.S.G.S. 4250 Sheet 7F/1 Caen, where the three prisoners were being interrogated by the Regt Commander, Col. MOHNKE, in the presence of the Adjutant, Captain KAISER. There were also several other officers present, but I did not know them.

3. It was a sunny day, with good visibility and the time of the interrogation was about 4.30 p.m.

4. As the prisoners were already at battle HQ, I could not ascertain, from what direction they had come. I was too far away to be sure what badges of rank and unit signs the prisoners were wearing. Also, I do not know, who took them prisoners and where they were captured. Neither of the prisoners was wounded.

5. Behind the prisoners stood two members of the Feldgendarmerie (Field Police), who were unknown to me. I believe, however, that they both belonged to a section of the Feldgendarmerie, which was permanently attached to 26 Panzergrenadier Regiment.

6. The Battle HQ of the regiment had been in the place mentioned by me above in Para 2, since approx 10 p.m. on 11 June 1944 I don't remember the exact spot, where the regt. battle HQ was before this date.

7. I had never been to the divisional battle HQ, but I heard the orders, which were issued to a D.R. who was to drive to the Div Battle HQ. The Div Battle HQ, on 14 June 44, was about 18 Km. south-east of the regt battle HQ.

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EXHIBIT No. 140

8. Behind me stood four more of my collegues, who also wished to be present at the interrogation. Their names were:-

STUTUFF, Erich, Panzergrenadier, Pl. HQ No. 1 Platoon, HQ Coy

SCHULTZ, Helmut, Panzergrenadier, No.1 Section, No.1 Platoon, HQ Coy

ROESNER, Helmut, Panzergrenadier, Pl. HQ, No. 1 Platoon, HQ Coy

SCHITZICK, Herbert, Unterscharfuehrer, Pl. HQ, No. 1 Platoon, HQ Coy

all from 26 SS Panzergrenadier Div.

9. When the officers saw us, they sent us away. However, we hid and watched the proceedings from a distance of about 100 yards.

10. The interrogation lasted about 15 - 20 minutes, and MOHNKE shouted and gesticulated the whole time. We were too far away to understand the exact words uttered by MOHNKE or the prisoners. Likewise we could not ascertain, whether the interrogation was conducted in English or in German. On the conclusion of the interrogation, the two members of the Feldgendarmerie led the prisoners about 30 yards away from the battle HQ, and searched them thoroughly. They took everything from them, including the identity discs, which the prisoners wore round their necks. The Field police threw all papers and other objects which they had taken from the prisoners, into the nearby bushes. I believe that the identity discs were also there. No weapons of any description were found on the prisoners.

11. The prisoners were led away about 200 - 300 yards by the two members of the Field Police, in the direction of the English front line. The prisoners did not offer any resistance and made no attempt to escape. The Field police allowed the prisoners to march in front of them; during the march, the prisoners had not raised their hands. All this took place on a level meadow, and we could therefore see what was going on. The officers at battle HQ were also spectators, but neither they nor we moved from our positions. When the Field Police came with the prisoners to a large bomb crater, one of the two suddenly shot the three prisoners in the back with his automatic rifle. He fired off a salvo of about 20 - 25 rounds. The other member of the Field Police had a rifle, but he did not use it. I am quite sure, that only the member of the Field Police who carried the automatic rifle, fired.

12. One of the two Field Police was tall and the other small. The tall one, who fired the shots, was a sergeant. I could see the collar patch and the single star on the left shoulder strap of his great coat.

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He was about 6 ft tall (1.80 metres), slim, with a narrow face and carried a cyclist's raincoat. I can't give a more accurate description, as I was too far away. The small man had no badges of rank on his shoulder strap, and as I could not see his right arm, I cannot tell you his rank. He wore only field grey uniform.

13. The place where this incident took place, was about 400 - 500 yards away from us - 905714 G.S.G.S. 4250, Sheet 7F/1 CAEN - The prisoners, hit by the shots, fell headlong. None of them got up again or attempted to get up, and, from the number of shots fired by the sergeant into their backs, we had to take it that they were dead. Neither of us went to the place of the incident, and I am therefore not in a position, to give an accurate statement regarding their wounds. The meadow, where the shooting took place, was about 2 Km north-east from the main defensive line.

14. At the time of the shooting, no enemy fire was encountered on the meadow or on the regt battle HQ, and, as far as I know, no actions of a hostile nature took place in this region on the previous day, nor on the following one.

15. After the prisoners were shot, the members of the Field Police turned and ran back to the battle HQ. I don't know why tthey wished to hurry so much.

16. I don't know what happened after that, as I left the area of battle HQ with my colleague. No-one appeared to make arrangements for burying the prisoners. In the evening, too, I heard nothing more about the prisoners.

17. When I returned, with my 4 comrades, the witnesses of the deed, to our fox-holes, Panzergrenadiers STUTUFF and SCHULTZ expressed terror at the shooting, and they were frightened that the same thing might happen to them if they were captured by the English. Panzergrenadiers ROESNER and Unterscharfuehrer SCHITZICK, on the other hand, were pleased at the shooting and ROESNER said:-

"The Tommies are done for, anyway."

18. On the following day, the 15 June 44, our regiment retreated, and the battle HQ was set up again.

19. I do not know, what British or Canadian units opposed us during the days preceding and after this event.

20. When I was taken prisoner by the British, on 28 June 44, I was not in the company of STUTUFF, SCHULTZ, ROESNER, or SCHITZICK. I saw them for the last time on June 27, 1944, when we were together in the same trench.

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(Signed) STANGENBERG, WITHOLD

The above evidence was taken by me, Lieutenant FLORIAN OSCAR PAUL BRANN in the presence of Major ARTHUR VICTOR MAGNUS, both officers being members of His Majesty's Army, at LINGFIELD on 7 November 1944.

(Sgd) F.O.P. Brann Lt.

(Sgd) A.V. Magnus Major

NOTE:- The map references given in the above record of evidence were inserted after PW had pinpointed the places on map G.S.G.S. 4250, Sheet 7F/1, CAEN.

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SECRET EXHIBIT No. 15

Report No.: PWIS(H)LDC/305.

Report on interrogation of PW
KP 53311 SS.U'Stufue.Wilhelm STREMME

Unit: 4/SS.Pi Bn 12 (HITLER JUGEND Div)
Captured: 21 Aug 44. South of TRUN.
Year Class: 1911.

This report should be read in connection with Report No.:PWIS(H)/LDC/232.

I. PREAMBLE :

This PW was interrogated with reference to the shooting of 7 Canadian prisoners at MOUEN on 17 Jun 44.
PW was cmdr of MMG Pl of 4 Coy. He states that 4 Coy moved into posn SOUTH-EAST of NORREY-en-BESSIN on 11 Jun 44, and was put under cmd of O'Stufue. KURET, O.C. 2 Coy. 4 Coy remained in NORREY sector until approx 24 Jun.

II. CAPTURE OF CANADIAN PRISONERS:

PW states that on 12 Jun 4 (or 5) Canadian prisoners were taken by outposts of 4 Coy. One of the prisoners was a Cpl. The prisoners were delivered by PW personally to Sturmfuehrer MUELLER, Bn C.O., at Bn battle HQ, EAST of LE MESNIL-PATRY (MR.:GSGS 4250, France 1:50 000, Sheet 7 F/1, pt 906699).
PW was ordered by MUELLER to return to his Coy posn immediately. PW did not know where the prisoners were later taken, nor did he hear of what became of them.

III. 4 COY TROSS :

PW states that 4 Coy Tross was in MOUEN and was designated MU 4.
Personalities of 4 Coy Tross:

1.)	SS U'Scharfue.	BOEKER	(as Stabscharfue.)
2.)	SS U' "	MOEBIUS	(as Schirrmeister)
3.)	SS Sturmmann	WEFER	(as 1.Schreiber)
4.)	SS "	FEIGE	(as Rechnungsfuehrer)
5.)	SS O'Schuetze	BUSSE	(as 1.Koch)
6.)	SS-Mann	BOELLERT	(as Hilfskoch)
7.)	SS- "	SCHMIDT	(as ")
8.)	SS Sturmmann	SCHWERT-FEGER	(as Schirrmeistergehilfe)
9.)	SS-Mann	KICK	(as Fahrer LKW)
10.)	SS- "	FRANZ	(as " PKW 1.Zugfuehrer)
11.)	SS- "	LENKEN-HOFF	(as Fahrer LKW ?)
12.)	SS- "	WILLMANN	(as Fahrer LKW)
13.)	SS- "	-	-
14.)	SS Sturmmann	KRUVINIUS	(as Waffenwart)
15.)	SS-Mann	FUCHS	(as Kradfahrer)
16.)	SS- "	BEIERLEIN	(as PKW-Fahrer Chef)
17.)	SS- "	MEIER	(as Fahrer LKW)
18.)	SS- "	SCHOLZ	(as " LKW)

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EXHIBIT No. 15

IV. 3 COY TROSS :

PW states that Hauptscharfue. TERWORT was in charge of 3 Coy Tross. Description : Short (1.72 m), thick-set, dark, round face, 29-30 years old, married.

/s/ H.K. Kettler, Capt
H.K. Kettler, Capt.

London District Cage
30 Aug 44.

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P/IS(H)/LDC/232/D

EXHIBIT NO. 16

The statement given below was made in the presence of the following British Officers:

Capt. G.C.Sinclair, I.C. 134536 Capt.H.K. Kettler, I.C. 226770

I, the undersigned, Obersturmfuehrer und Oberleutnant (Lieutenant) of the Waffen SS

Paul K U R T T

2 Coy., 12th SS Armoured Engineer Bn ("Hitler Jugend" Division) make the following voluntary statement concerning the seven Canadian Prisoners of War designated as below :)

Body 27 B 49476 Tpr PERRY, C.J.

Body 28 B 43258 Sgt McLAUGHLIN, T. (Q.O.R.)

Body 29 Rflm.CAMPBELL, J.B. (Q.O.R.,O.D.)

Body 30 Unknown (Q.O.R.) Fuehrerschein of WILLETT, C.L. (B 138240)

Body 31 B 138483 Rflm.CRAWFIELD, E. (Q.O.R.)

Body 32 B 144191 Cpl. CORK, E. (Q.O.R.)

Body 33 B 43053 Rflm.BULLOCK, P. (Q.O.R.)

at MOUEN, on 17 Jun 1944.

I. I reported at 1700 hrs on 8 Jun 44 at Bn HQ., which was situated approximately 4 - 5 kms south of MOUEN.

II. I was present at Battalion officers' conference on 9 Jun at 1700 hrs. At that time I had neither held nor seen my position. The battalion had at that time not been in touch with the enemy.

III. The following officers were present at this conference:-

1. Bn Comd : Sturmbannfuehrer (Major) MUELLER, Siegfried

2. OC Bn HQ : Hauptsturmfuehrer (Capt) PINKERNEL

3. OC, 1 Coy : Oberleutnant (Lieutenant) TOLL

4. OC, 2 Coy : Myself

5. OC, 3 Coy : Hauptsturmfuehrer (Capt) TIETTKE

6. OC, 4 Coy : Obersturmfuehrer (Lieutenant) BISCHOFF

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EXHIBIT NO. 16

IV. During the conference the following points were mentioned by the Bn Comd, Sturmbannfuehrer MUELLER:

A. It was stated that in this sector the enemy would take, or was taking, no prisoners.

B. I cannot remember the other details.

C. Further to these instructions the Battalion Commanders said nothing.

D. I passed the Battalion Commander's statement personally on to my Platoon Leaders, namely:-

1.Pl - Untersturmfuehrer (2/Lieut) BAUER

2.Pl - Hauptscharfuehrer (R.S.M.) KILIAN.

3.Pl - Oberscharfuehrer (C.S.M.) GERHARDS

V. During the evening of 10 Jun I was shown into my position by my Major.

VI. I personally took over the position at dusk on 10 Jun, and did not leave my Company sector till my capture on 26 Jun.

VII. I take cognisance of the fact that the English Intelligence officers have pointed out:

A. That I am in ordinary officer's service dress and not in camouflaged SS battle dress.

B. That during the engagement I removed my "Adolf Hitler" armband.

VIII. I was connected by telephone with my Bn HQ.

IX. My transport was at, or in the immediate neighborhood of, MOUEN. I never visited the transport.

X. I presume that the transport of the following units was at MOUEN:

1. Coy
2. Coy
3. Coy
4. Coy

I presume that my transport was designated in the village by a shield with "Mu Z2". Battalion transport was probably designated by "Mu / P ". (Muller (P)).

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EXHIBIT NO. 16

XI. My Company Sergeant-Major, C.S.M. DEMUTH, was in charge of my Company transport. He had under him 30 men, none of whose names I remember.

XII. The following officers were not in my battalion :-

Hauptsturmfuehrer (Capt) VOEGTER

Hauptsturmfuehrer (Capt) DALTZE

There was an officer called RICHTER and one called EICHLER.

XIII. During the 16 days I spent in this sector I had no opportunity of taking prisoners, as there was no hand-to-hand fighting. I do not know the units which were opposite me during this time.

XIV During the first days in the fighting line I noticed that in the sector held by 3. Coy, which was on my left, 2 or 3 prisoners of war were being led in the direction of Bn HQ. Bn HQ was at MR., FRANCE 1:50 000, Sheet 7F/1, 906668.

XV. As regards the shooting of the 7 Canadian prisoners, as well as the rape of a French girl at MOUEN, and the death of the soldier Albert FRIEDRICH of 3. Coy, I heard nothing of all this until my interrogation here. The Company Sergeant-Major paid me a visit every day. During these 16 days the Battalion Commander visited me only once. I spoke several times each day on the telephone to the Battalion Commander
I confirm that I have been warned by British Intelligence Officers that this my statement may, if necessary, be used in a Court of Law.

4. August 1944.

Signed

PAUL MURET

Obersturmfuehrer (O'Lt)
der Waffen SS

NOTE:

1. The list of names of the British PsW who were shot in MOUEN was brought into this statement in order to show that the German PW was fully informed of the matter being investigated.

2. Page 2, where reference is made to the Bn conference, PW stated that the Bn Commander gave the information that no PsW would be made by the enemy as an indication but not as an order.

3. PW's failure to state other matters mentioned by Bn Comdr was the result of security-mindedness.

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EXHIBIT NO. 16.

PWIS(H)/LDC/232/E

STATEMENT OF PW LD 14
Ostuf Paul KURET,
O.C. 2 Coy 12 SS Pz Pi Bn,
12 SS Pz Div "HITLER JUGEND".

My Capture.

The posn of my coy was 1.5 km SW of NORREY. In the coy sector, there were, moreover, about 12 men of the bridging col and 18 - 20 men of 4 Coy. The posn was in open terrain, 3 Coy was on my left and a Cpl and approx 3- men of 1 Coy were on my right. From the posn nothing could be seen except the village of NORREY and LE-MESNIL-PATRIE.
The posn itself consisted of weapon pits containing, at most, 2 men. The interval between weapon pits was ca 15 - 20 paces. About 600 m behind my posn there was a small stream-bed. In the early morning of 26 Jun 44 the enemy laid very heavy arty fire upon our posn. Observation was impossible as everyone had to take cover. My telephonic communication to the Bn was destroyed. I had no W/T. It was impossible to employ runners. After about 3 Hrs the barrage moved to our rear and enemy tanks appeared before our lines and covered us with fire. Inf and tanks attacked our posn in strength and overran it. It was about 08-- hrs. My coy battle HQ, located in a small hollow was protected by men from the posns on right and left. The enemy drove past us in order to get to our rear, we were encircled. I encouraged my men in the hope that a counter-attack would very soon be forthcoming. The men defended themselves faultlessly, but the number of wounded kept increasing. The (enemy) infantry came up, recognized us in our hollow and immediately began to attack. Resistance seemed hopeless, we were only about 8 men strong. I gave my Cpl the order that everyone who could still walk was to lay down his arms and surrender. This order was carried out. The remainder of the coy surrendered with raised hands. Names I can recall are Hauptsturmführer KILLIAN and SS Mann SANTJAHR. I myself intended to pretend to be severely wounded until darkness would give me an opportunity of making my way back to the Bn. Hence I laid down unarmed among my severely wounded comrades. I lay there for some time, then my left arm was raised and my pulse taken. Shortly afterwards I was dealt a blow on the forehead with a MP or rifle butt. Nevertheless I lay still. The blow was repeated after a short time and I then stood up. I was examined, my papers were taken from me and I was brought back to the PW collecting point. It was about 0900 hrs. I was immediately interrogated and then brought further back.

--

(See Exhibit "F")

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Report No.: PWIS(H)/IDC/232/A EXHIBIT NO. 17
S E C R E T

PW LD 24 Soldat Gerhard RINKE

Unit: Br Col "B" att 3/SS Pi Bn (12 SS Pz Div "H.J.")

Captured: early morning 28 Jun 44 West of CAEN

Year class: 1926

I. PERSONALITIES:

Comd SS Pi Bn 12	Stubaf MUELLER
Br Col "B"	Ustuf RICHTER
1 (Ass Boat) Pl, Br Col "B"	Uschaf HEMKEN
1(Ass Boat) Pl, Br Col "B"	Uschaf ERRATE (Sec Leader)
2(Pontoon) Pl, Br Col "B"	Uschaf PISSAREK
2(Pontoon) Pl. Br Col "B"	Uschaf ECKERT (Sec Leader) later Sec leader 3 Coy
3(Pontoon) Pl, Br Col "B"	Uschaf GERSTENHAUER
Trans, Br Col "B"	Uschaf BOECKER (Spioss)
3 Coy SS Pi Bn 12	Hptstuf TIEDKE
2 (?) Pf 3 Coy SS Pi Bn 12	Oschaf HEIDECKE
2 Pl 3 Coy SS Pi Bn 12	Uschaf ECKERT (Sec Leader, formerly sec leader Br Col "B")

II. MOVEMENTS:

10 Jun 44 Br Col "B" and "K" were stationed in the vicinity of COCHERELLE. (PW is not sure of the name nor could he identify it on the map, although his unit was there for at least 6 weeks.)

14 Jun 44 Br Col "B" left by vehicle for the CAEN front. In the evening the col was attacked by aircraft. All vehicles were destroyed except 5 half-track tractors belonging to the Assault Boat Pl and a couple of a lorries. The Ass Boat Pl completed the march by night and was detailed as inf reinforcement to 3 Coy west of CAEN. 2 and 3 Pl of Br Col "B" retired to Br Col "K" posn nr COCHERELLE.

approx.
16 Jun 44 On the way to the CAEN area PW saw 3 Canadian PW in the back of an open lorry. They were smoking. Escort consisted of one German soldier in the back, a driver and a NCO in the front. PW is not sure of Place, date or time when he saw these prisoners.

20 Jun 44 Arrival of 1 (Ass Boat) Pl to front posn west of CAEN

21 Jun 44 In the lines PW got the following information from 3 Coy personnel. He believes that Cmd 3 Coy Hptstuf TIEDKE had given 3 Coy the information at a coy parade before they took up their posn:
1. French civilians are unfriendly, numerous cases of treachery.

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EXHIBIT NO. 17

21 Jun 44 2. Canadians occupy the lines opposite.
3. Canadians are said to take no prisoners.
4. If the enemy take no prisoners, neither will we (the Germans).

21/22 Jun SS Mann SCHNEIDER (Troop Br Col "B" att 3 Coy) brought food up to PW's posn at midnight. SCHNEIDER related to PW that 3 prisoners had been captured while on patrol during the night from 14 to 15 Jun. They were captured in 3 Coy area and evacuated by 3 Coy Troops.

26 Jun 44 British troops broke through 3 Coy's posns in the morning. PW's sec withdrew through a wheatfield to a gully where they hid. There he saw 2 British PW, both Red Cross personnel, NCOs or ORs. The British advanced again and most of 3 Coy personnel surrendered. PW escaped in the evening to another wheatfield about 2 km east where he hid the following day and night.

28 Jun 44 Captured early in the morning.

PW states that the u/m 4 PW from camp No 6 can furnish details re atrocity reported in report No.: PWIS(H)/LF/275:

PW Heinz SCHMIDT)
PW Knut OETTLER) Unit:
PW ALEX PROESSL) SS PZ Gren Regt 26
PW Werner KRAEPLIN 12 SS Pz Div "HITLER JUGEND"

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EXHIBIT NO. 18

Report No.: PWIS(H)/LDC/232/B
SECRET

Report on interrogation of PW
LD 28 SS-Mann Walter HILBERTROH

Unit: 2 Pl, 2 Coy, Pi Bn 12(12 SS Pz Div)

Captured:26 Jun 44 nr NORREY-EN-BESSIN

Year Class: 1926

I. Night 9-10 Jun:

At 0030 hrs, Coy Cmdr, O'Sturmfuehrer KUKET, called Coy parade and made following points:

1. HITLER's appeal to the troops.

2. The English and Americans are said to be taking no prisoners. Germans must therefore be very careful not to be captured.

3. They (the Germans) were to take Allied prisoners according to orders from above.

4. Asked for questions and told any who were not willing to take part in the attack to fall out and report to him.

Attack on Allied posn on railway North of NORREY followed. The men discussed among themselves the matter of taking prisoners. Some believed that the Allies would take no prisoners and thought that they, likewise, should not take any. They would shoot themselves rather than be captured. Others believed that, if they took prisoners the Allies would do likewise. The attack was repulsed and the Germans lost 10-15 men (dead), including U'Sturmfuehrer BAUER, O.C. 1 Pl, 2 Coy.

II. Night 10-11 Jun:

Germans dug in S.E. of NORREY. PW remained in Coy posn until captured on 26 Jun, except for one trip back to Trose for rations for his sec around night 14-15 Jun.

Bn dispositions were:

NORREY:	3 Coy	Pl or 4/hy/Coy
	2 Coy	1 Coy ?

III. 11 Jun:

3 or 4 Coy took 3 Allied prisoners (unwounded). They were brought back by an U'sturmfuehrer of 4 Coy to Bn Battle H.Q. where they were interrogated by Bn Cmdr Sturmbannfuehrer MULLER and an interpreter. PW learned of this through a 2 Coy runner, SS-Mann POPELKA. He did not know where the 3 Allied prisoners were taken after interrogation.

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EXHIBIT No. 18

IV. Around night 14-15 Jun:

PW was sent back to Tross to fetch rations for his sec. PW left Coy lines around midnight, walked straight SOUTH to highway, turned left and proceeded approx 2 kms along highway, then right 3-4 kms along a side road to first village. March to Tross took about 1 hour. He reported to U'Scharfuehrer NOLTENSMEIER at 2 Coy field-kitchen, 2nd or 3rd house on left past entrance to village, and returned to Coy lines around 0230 hrs. PW does not know name of village but states that a comrade had told him that their Tross was in DOMVILLE. It was later withdrawn further back, 15-20 kms. from Coy posn at NORREY.

V. 26 Jun:

0300 - 0500 hrs, entire 2 Pl of 2 Coy laid minefield directly East of NORREY, 200 m in front of Coy posn. Extent:- 160 mines in area 200 m x 15 m. Shortly after 0600 hrs U'Sturmfuehrer BANDLOW ordered PW to fetch water for his sec from a well approx 200 - 300 m behind the section posn. At approx 0630 hrs, when PW was on the point of leaving the well to return to his section, heavy Allied Arty fire opened up on 2 Pl posns and rear area. PW took cover in a hollow approx 50 m from the well. At about 0700 hrs the area came under Allied MG and Rifle fire and at about 0800 hrs Allied tanks moved past PW, followed at about 0900 hrs by Allied Inf and carriers. PW intended to remain in cover until darkness, and then attempt to return to his unit through the Allied lines. Between 1600 and 1700 hrs several Allied tanks halted near PW and he was detected by the tank crew and made prisoner. PW was without arms.

VI. 2 COY PERSONNEL:

Sturmmann	HOERMANN	KP 12426	Captured.
SS-Mann	GRIMS	KP 12381	"
"	HELLER, Josef	KP 12399	"
	KAEHLER	KP 12439	"
	ROTHWANGE, Karl	KP 12599	"
	SANTJER	KP 12603	"
	WEBER, Gunther	KP 12695	"
	WEHNSEN	KP 12697	"
	WIESNER, Karl	KP 12703	"
	BRUDER, Richard	KP 12303	"

2 Coy Tross:

St.Scharfu. DEMUTH
O'Scharfuo. WINKOVSKY
O'Scharfuo. KEGEL
U'Scharfuo. NOLTENSMEIER
Rot.Fuo. ARNOLD
SS-Mann MUNN
" KNAUF
" STEINMETZ
" CINSER
" MARLOW

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EXHIBIT NO. 18

SS-Mann	SCHMARZINSKI
"	STEPHAN
"	MEUSER
"	HEGER

2 Coy D.R.Soc.

SS-Mann	POPELKA
"	KOEHLER
"	DOLT
"	GUTJAHR
"	STIEGLER

London District Cage
12 Aug 44.

P.W.I.S. (H).

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EXHIBIT No. 19

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PWIS(H)/LDC/232/C

London Cage. 9.August 1944.

Declaration on Oath.

made at the London Cage on 9 Aug 44 by SS-Mann Alfred MATTHEI of the 2.Engineer Training Battalion, Identity Disc No.20.209.

I, the undersigned SS-Mann Alfred MATTHEI hereby expressly avow that I voluntarily make known the undermentioned facts in the following written declaration.

I give my personalia as follows:- SS-Mann Alfred MATTHEI, a German subject, born on 7 July 1926 at BERLIN-CHARLOTTENBURG, unmarried, Roman Catholic, by profession a toolmaker, domiciled at 140, Kolonie Bismarckruh, BERLIN-CHARLOTTENBURG IX.

My parents :

Father : Arthur MATTHEI, 42 years of age, by profession a caprenter, but now owner of a flower business at CHARLOTTENBURG, living at 140 Kolonie Bismarckruh.

Mother : Martha, nee PAULOWSKI, 41 years of age.

Brothers and Sisters: Bernhard MATTHEI, 21 years of age, serving in the Wehrmacht.

Arthur MATTHEI, 20 years of age, killed as SS-Mann.

Rudi MATTHEI, 18,(Twin), serving in the Hermann Goering Division in HOLLAND.

Christl Irene MATTHEI, 9 years of age.

Schooling : 8 years of primary school. Left in 1939.

Knowledge of languages: German, Oral and written.

Documents: Identity Disc No.20209 SS-Pi.-A.Btl.2.

I was called up on 21 Oct 43, to the 2.SS Engineer Training Battalion, at PRAHA - BIKOWITZ. I had volunteered for the SS. Shortly before Christmas 1943 the whole Battalion was moved to HERENTALS, in BELGIUM.

I was posted to Bridging Column B for training. The Company Commander was Untersturmfuehrer RICHTER. I belonged to the 1st Platoon. Platoon Leader was Hauptscharfuehrer HAASE.

In the middle of May I was moved, with the whole Battalion, to France, where we remained

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in the village of EURE, till going into action in the neighbourhood of CHAMBRE.

We left the village on the 8 or 9 Jun 44, to go into the fighting-line on the invasion front. On the march towards the front we were attacked from the air by low-flying American planes, and all our transport, with our equipment, was destroyed. Out of my Company, which was about 120 strong, only some 30 or 40 men had any weapons left after this attack. We then drove back to Bridging Column K for new equipment.

Three or four days later we drove back to the front, south-west of CAEN. On 15 or 16 Jun 44, we arrived at a village near CAEN (18 kms S.W. of CAEN). There we were posted to the 2 SS Engineer Bn. I was posted with 12 - 15 men to 3. Coy.

We were taken by a corporal (whose name I do not know) about 7 or 8 o'clock at night to the Battalion positions. We waited behind the positions till dark and were then posted to platoons.

I was sent with SS-Mann KETSCHER to 1. Platoon. The Company Commander was Hauptsturmfuehrer THIEDKE. I do not know the name of the Platoon Leader - a Corporal -, but he was with us in Camp 16 and left this Camp 3 or 4 weeks ago in a convoy.

The others and myself were told where to dig in. This above-mentioned Platoon leader and a Lance-Corporal went down along the position during the night and told us to take care that the British did not break through.

We lay in those holes till 26 Jun 44 without firing a shot. We saw nothing of the enemy, but were continuously under artillery-fire, and were attacked from the air. I saw the Coy Commander, Hauptsturmfuehrer THIEDKE for the first time when I was posted to his Coy in the village, and for the second time about 6 days later, when I went to Platoon H.Q. to fetch some T-Mines, which we laid in front of our positions by night.

On 26 Jun 44, between 5 and 6 o'clock in the morning heavy English artillery-fire started. Then at 6 an English tank attack began on our left. The tanks broke through our positions and advanced behind us. At 10 or 11 o'clock our Platoon Leader told us to withdraw at once to a hollow, about 2½ m wide, which lay behind us and stretched as far as, and partly the 2 Coy' position.

We were also heavily shelled in this hollow, which stretched away to the right of our position. On our left there was no hollow. Between 2 and 4 o'clock in the afternoon, two SS-Privates or Lance-Corporals from the Coy on our left brought four English Ps/W past me and two steps be-

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hind the hollow, and took these English P/W to my Platoon Leader, the Corporal. I myself saw these four Ps/W. One of these four English Ps/W had a Red Cross brassard on his arm.

I will again describe the situation. We were in position as follows:- On our (3.Coy) right was our 2. Coy. On our left was the 7. Coy of the 26th Regt. About 40 m behind our Coy position was a hollow about 2½ m wide, which stretched from the left wing of our position to about a third of the distance to the position of 2. Coy. Our Platoon Leader (Corporal) lay approximately in the right third of the hollow which formed our position. I was in the left third of the hollow. Our Platoon Leader also was captured, with a wound in the arm. In about the middle of our position in the hollow a square pit had been dug, about 2 m square and about breast deep. Later I noticed that these four British Ps/W were sent away by the Platoon Leader and taken to the square pit. There were also some wounded men of our Company in this pit.

The English Artillery fire lasted all day. Towards 3 o'clock in the afternoon we were fired on by machine-guns from the left and from behind. At this time the four English Ps/W were already in the square pit. I still remember that one of these 4 Englishmen was wounded. I noticed that blood was running from his chest, as his blouse was getting stained dark.

A short time later, English tanks drove up, surrounded us and opened fire with their guns from the front and the rear. The shells came straight into the hollow. We moved to the right, but were again fired on, so we moved back to the left.

We lay close together in the hollow and tried all the time to get out of the way of the shells. Then our Platoon Leader said it would be best to surrender to the English. One party contradicted him and declared they would fight to the last man, but another party was for surrender. Then all agreed and decided that we ought to send two of the English Ps/W out of the hollow with white clothes, so that they could tell the attacking Englishmen that we wanted to surrender. We made ourselves understood to the Englishmen by means of signs, gave them two white cloths and indicated to them that they should wave these. The Englishmen, or at least the two Englishmen left the hollow and waved to the English tanks. Shortly after this the tanks ceased fire. The fire from the rear and the left continued, however. We surrendered to the tanks in front of us.

While doing this I came past the square pit and saw the two remaining Englishmen lying dead among our wounded in the square pit. I saw them lying in a heap with our wounded and dead. All the dead, including the two Englishmen were bleeding.

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We were then led away by the English.

While in captivity in Camp 16 I was talking to various comrades belonging to my Engineer Bn., and they told me that these two remaining Englishmen in the pit were shot by our Corporal ECKERT. The names of these comrades who told me this in Camp 16 are :-

SS-Mann KOESTER, Walter. P/W No. 12462
SS-Mann MICHALSIK, Willi. P/W No. 12513
SS-Mann ROSSEL, Rudolf P/W No. 12597

Continued on 10 Aug 44.

Corporal ECKERT is about 22 years old, has dark hair, combed back, is about 1 m 74 cm tall, broadly built, has a pointed nose and belonged to Bridging Column B of Panzer Engineer Bn. 2 . I do not know what happened to Eckert, but some of my comrades maintain that ECKERT is a P/W, while others say that he was killed.

I have been shown this evidence and have carefully ready my declaration. I request that the following corrections be made:-

One Page 2, I amplify para 2 thus: that 4 tractors and 3 lorries remained undamaged after the air-attack.

Page 2 para 6: The Corporal who was my Platoon Leader, and whose name I do not know, was wounded and evacuated to hospital. I do not know where he is now.

The position of our Battalion, also the hollow and the square pit in which the two English Ps/W were murdered by Corporal ECKERT are shown in the accompanying sketch.

I expressly declare that I am a believing Catholic, and that I am making this statement of my own free will, in order to relieve my conscience. I declare further that I have spoken nothing but the absolute truth, and that I have nothing to add to my statement.

I am also prepared to swear in the presence of witnesses to the full truth of this my statement.

I testify to the truth of this my declaration on oath by my own signature in the presence of two British Officers as witnesses.

Read and signed:
London, 10th August 1944.

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EXHIBIT No. 19

Witnesses : Capt. G. C. Sinclair, I.O.
134536

Capt. R. D. Jeune , I.O.
46205

A 092387

H3056-0246

EXHIBIT No. 20

Report No.: PWIS(H)/LDC/232/F SECRET

Report on interrogation of PW
SS Sturmmann Heinz SCHMIDT .

Unit: HQ Coy Erkundigungszug
SS Pz Gren Reg 26 (12
SS Pz Div "HITLER JUGEND")

Captured: 27 Jun 44 E.of TILLY.

Year class: 1926

MOVEMENTS:

6 Jun 44 HQ Coy, togother with Regt left GROTH (approx 70 km SW of Paris) via ST ANDREA for posn in TILLY Sector. They proceeded on motor transport.

8 Jun 44 Regt arr in TILLY Sector. Pw was at Regtl Battle H.Q., 3 km east of TILLY. PW was DR for Recce pl but was attached as reserve M/Gunner to the Regtl Battle HQ.

26 Jun 44 The Recce Pl leader ordered his Pl of about 30 men to advance 1 km forward, where they hurriedly dug rifle pits. 9 and 12 Coy were retreating in disorder on tanks and the idea was that those elements were to re-form a little to the rear and then relieve PW's Pl. At 2130 hrs PW saw a British tank by-pass their posn and then return to its own line. During the night everything remained quiet but at daybreak Pw found the posn entirely surrounded by British tanks. PW and a comrade remained the whole day hidden in their rifle pit.

27 Jun 44 Towards 2000 hrs they were discovered and captured by 2 English ORs. Pw cannot say what happened to the rest of the Pl, whether they were captured or had retreated. Although rifle pits were but 30 m apart, PW was unable to communicate with adjacent rifle pits as, so he claims, enemy tanks were continuously weaving around and they did not disclose their presence.

INTERROGATION OF PW:

PW claims, that after "D" day he frequently saw British PW brought to regtl battle HQ in trucks. Once he saw a column of approx 150 PW marched in. Special PW were picked out of each batch and interrogated. Obsturmbannfuehrer

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EXHIBIT No. 20

MOHNKE (O.C. Regt), promoted STANDANRTERFUEHRER on 21 Jun 44) interrogated with the assistance of an interpreter (name unknown, an NCO.) The interrogation was done in the open, usually nr a M.T.W. (half-tracked troop carrier). No troops were allowed near but the PW were visible to all.

REF REPORT NO PWIS(H) /LF/275 SHOOTING OF ALLIED PW: (Stangenberg statement)

PW confirms the atrocity narrated in the a/m report, which he heard from Sturmmann Wilhelm SCHEPPERS. PW knows the cpls of the Feldgendarmerie by sight but not by name and gives their description as follows:

a) Hauptschrfuehrer of Feldgendarmerie:

Age:	approx 35 years
Height:	1.80 m
Hair:	black, shot with grey
Colour of Eyes:	unknown
Remarks:	no moustache or spec identifications. Abrupt manners.

b) Sturmmann of Feldgendarmerie:

Age:	19 - 20 years
Height:	1.80
Hair:	fair
Colour of eyes:	unknown
Remarks:	no moustache

Both men were wounded by arty fire and sent to rear. PW could identify them.

London District Cage
10 Aug 44

G. C. Sinclair, Capt.,
P.W.I.S. (H)

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EXHIBIT No. 21

Report No: PWIS(H)/LDC/299 SECRET

Report on interrogation of PW
KP 49359 Sturmbannfue.Jacob HANREICH

Unit: 12 SS A/Tk Bn (SS.Div. H.J.).

Captured: 19 Aug 44 S. of FALAISE.

Year Class: 1911.

I. PREAMBLE :

PW is an Austrian who, in 1929, joined the S.A., rising to the rank of Scharfuehrer, and has been in the Allgemeine SS & Bayrische Hilfspolozei. A tough type.

II. HISTORY Dates approx) :

10 May 1933	Posted to LEIBSTANDARTE ADOLF HITLER-BERLIN.
1935	Pl leader in 6 Coy as U'Sturmfuehrer
1937	Transferred to 14 Coy (A/Tk Coy)
1938	A/Tk course DOEBERITZ
Sep 1939	L.A.H. Regt, went through French, Polish, Greek campaigns.
mid May 1941	Unit to BRUENN - to Russia.
Mar 1942	PW to SENNELAGER forming A/Tk Bn.
end Jun 1942	A/Tk Bn to Russia. Unit ordered to France (W. of PARIS)
Feb 1943	Unit returned to Russia (near KHARKOV)
25 Jun 1943	Unit to Italy (PO Valley)
23 Aug 1943	PW on leave. L.A.H. in the meantime became known as a Div.
19 Sep 1943	Regtl Staff & A/Tk Bn in MILAN.
Oct 1943	To area North of GENOA.
end Oct 1943	Div to Russia (Southern Sector). PW went on assault-gun course at MAGDEBURG.
Dec 1943	PW returned to Russia:O.C. "B" Echelon.
end Mar 1944	Unit to France:PW Condr of present unit.
Aug 1944	PW with Bn proceeded to the front.

III. ORGANISATION & ARMAMENT : (12 SS A/Tk Bn) :

It was proposed to form the Bn with 4 Coys, but owing to the lack of arms and equipment the formation only had 2 Coys and a few details of a third supply Coy (Versorgungs Coy). Each Coy had 3 Pls, each Pl having three self-propelled 7.5 cm A/Tk guns on Mark IV chassis, with an extra gun for protection of Coy HQs. Each Coy also had an unspecified number of LMGs.

a) Strength & Personnel:

Each Coy was about 80 strong, all German volunteers with a sprinkling of Austrian nationals.

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b) Supply Coy :

This Coy had only 90 all ranks, and there were hardly any vehicles worth speaking about.

IV. PERSONALITIES :

Cmdr 12 SS A/Tk Bn Sturmbannfue. HANREICH (PW)
" 1 Coy 12 SS A/Tk Bn O'Sturmfue. HURDELBRINK
" 2 " " " " " O' " WACHTER
" ? Pl " " " " U' " RABE
" Supply Coy 12 SS A/Tk Bn Hpt " SIEGERT

V. GENERAL :

PW states that up to the beginning of Jul 44 the unit was without guns. They eventually arrived from Germany, all new guns.

VI. SOME ATROCITIES COMMITTED BY MEMBERS OF THE LEIBSTANDARTE IN THE COURSE OF THE WAR :

A. Poland :

Between 20 and 25 Sep 39, at least 50 Jews were murdered by the Music Pl of the L.S. in the area BURZEUM, about 3 kms west of WARSAW. The order for this atrocity was given by the then Obermusikmeister of the Music Pl, MUELLER-JOHN. Those to be murdered had to dig their graves first, were then put in front of it and shot.
MUELLER-JOHN was to be brought before a military court, but evidently he was not punished, for he appeared shortly afterwards again at the Coy.
Today MUELLER-JOHN is leader of the Musikzug at the I Pz Korps Leibstandarte.

B. Russia :

During the time PW had first been in action in Russia, in Nov 41, he was told by the then Comd of III Bn, L.S.A.H., H.Stufue. Albert FREY, that thousands of Jews had been murdered S of MARIUPOL and in TAGANROG by the SD Einsatzkommando. They were brought out of the towns by being told that they were to be transferred, but were brought in front of some A/Tk ditches. There they had to undress, descend into the ditch and were then shot. The A/Tk ditches were afterwards covered with earth.
PW stated that, as far as he knew, members of the LSAH were not concerned in this crime. The SD Einsatzkdo was led by an Obersturmbannfuehrer, whose name was kept secret and whom PW has never seen.

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EXHIBIT No. 21

On 10 Feb 43, PW was transferred to ACHTYRKA, 60-70 kms West of KHARKOV. He joined the Div only on the 13 or 14 Feb in the area MEREFA.
At that time there existed an oral order that, in case of retreat of the Regt, all villages are to be evacuated and burnt. As the Russians advanced too quickly, this order could, in most cases, not be complied with. But PW knows of 2 cases, where the order was executed.

(i) STANITSCHNOJE was burnt by the last party of the retreating LSAH, led by the then Standartenfuehrer WITT.

(ii) STAROVEROVKA was burnt by members of the 2 Regt, led by the then Standartenfuehrer WISCH (now Brig Fuehrer LSAH). The civil population was evacuated earlier by the Feldgendarmerie to KRASNOGRAD.

The Recce Bn of the LSAH made an advance, at the end of Feb, towards the East and reached the village of JEFREMOVKA (?). There they were surrounded by Russian forces. POL and ammo run out and they were supplied by air until they were ordered to try and break through towards the West.
Before trying to do so, the entire civil population was shot and the village burnt to the ground.
The Recce Bn was at that time led by Obersturmbannfuehrer Kurt MEYER.
After the death of Brig.Fuehrer WITT, MEYER became G.O.C. of the H.J. Div.
II/2 Regt was particularly eager to execute the order to burn villages.
The Bn accomplished the burning down by means of soldering lamps, and called itself the SOLDERING LAMP Bn.
It was led by Stu.Bannfue. PEIPER, who was later promoted C.O. of Pz Regt LSAH.

C. Italy :

As the Brenner-railway was somewhat overburdened, it was impossible to assemble the Div in Italy and it was therefore assembled in INNSBRUCK and was slowly led into the area of Upper Italy in Aug 43.
PW only arrived 18 or 19 Aug in the area REGGIO D'EMILIA. The units were encamped in the open and, together with Italian tps guarded bridges and roads.

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EXHIBIT NO. 2

Towards end of Aug PW was on leave. He only returned to Italy at the end of Sep and heard that, particularly in MILAN, many incidents had happened in which his Regt had figured prominently. These incidents consisted mainly of looting, raping and stealing at the point of the pistol. In these pastimes the 1 Regt ISAH excelled in particular. This time, however, the Div Kdo made short work and 2 death sentences were promulgated and carried out, and several other men were sentenced to many years of hard labour. In each case the men sentenced were Ptes or NCOs. The C.O. of the Regt was Hpt.Sturmbannfue.FREY. G.O.C. Div was WISCH. Hpt.Sturmbannfue. FREY was seriously wounded in Normandy at the end of Jul 44 by a bullet-wound in his face.

In Oct 43, S. of TURIN, III/2 Regt burnt a village. The Bn C.O. was Sturmbannfue. PEIPER. The inhabitants of the village had captured 2 members of the Bn.

London District Cage
29 Aug 44.

H.K. Kettler, Capt.
P.W.I.S.(H).

A 092393

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EXHIBIT No. 22 2997-PS 248

Report No.: PWIS(H)/LDC/329 SECRET

Report on interrogation of PW
KP 60966 O'Faehnr Carl Eduard CONRADS

Unit: Propaganda Coy 698 (5 Pz Army)

Captured: Awaited Allies in ROUEN
Hotel 30 Aug 44

Year class: 1908

PREAMBLE: PW, a 36 old war-correspondent is of independent means and anti-Nazi.

VIII) ATROCITIES:

a) Whilst PW was in hospital on 2 Jul 44 in the ECOLE MILITAIRE, PARIS (Haus 15) he claims there were three youths in his room, aged 17, 18 and 19 years respectively. These men belonged to the SS Pz Div 12 "Hitler Jugend"; 17 SS Pz Gren Div "Goetz von Berlichingen" and 9 SS Pz Div "Hohenstauffen".
They all confirmed, that their officers, under the pain of death, ordered them to shoot allied PW after interrogation and even wounded PW whom they could not take away.

London District Cage,
12 Sep 44

H.K. Kettler, Capt.
P.W.I.S. (H)

A 092394

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EXHIBIT No. 23

PWIS(H)/LF/563.

Report on the interrogation of
PW KP 44859 Schtz OTTO PREINING
of Px Jag Kp 271 (271 Inf Div)
captured S of CAEN on 12 Aug 44

3. ATROCITIES:

On 20 July, PREINING met a member of the H.J. Div (12 SS Pz Div) in the village of ST VICTOR DE CRETIENVILLE who informed him that his unit had shot five or six unarmed Canadian prisoners of war. The Canadians had apparently asked the Nazis not to shoot, but as PREINING's informant jocularly remarked "a machine pistol fired by accident".
PREINING states that he and members of his unit, mainly Austrian and Bavarian anti-Nazis, wanted to deal summarily with this Nazi, but desisted in view of the number of SS in the vicinity.

A.V. NAPIER,
Major.
SIO Lingfield Cage.

Lingfield
20 Aug 44
VCH/WP

A 092395

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EXHIBIT NO. 24

The Court of Inquiry, Lt. Col. Boraston and Lt Col. MacDonald, being present on the 17th day of October, 1944 examined on oath the Rev. E. Bonnett Rees, C. F. attached to Hq. RA 53 (W) Division at their field Hq. near Nijmegen, Holland, who made the following statement:

"In the course of our occupation of the Moenil Patry area early in the month of July 1944, I found three bodies of men of the Royal Winnipeg Rifles in a cornfield which I think was approximately M.R. 896687 on the right hand side or east of a track running north. I buried them there and erected signs with their names and numbers burned on them. I also sent their pay books and a report to 2 Echelon British Army, Canadian Records and appropriate British Graves Unit. These bodies all bore signs of having been shot in the back or torso. They were very decomposed. They were within 20 or 30 yards of each other. Two were close together and the other some distance further away.

By reference to my notes I find that their names were H 40785 - Cpl Brown, H 100792 - Pte Parisian and L 100681 - Pte Rykman, F. The map reference shown is 895-419 but this is obviously the wrong reference."

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EXHIBIT NO. 25

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CANADIAN MILITARY HEADQUARTERS,
2, Cockspur Street,
Trafalgar Square,
London, S.W. 1.

SECRET 20 Sep 44

F. P.O.
SHAEF - G-1
Court of Enquiry,
C/O B.L.A.

Lo Mesnil-Patry Incident - 11 Jun 44

1. Reference your SCI-A-15, dated 9 Sep 44, and our reply (REC/34/CAS/15), dated 14 Sep 44.

2. Our reply stated that the Historical Section, CMHQ, would be advising you direct as to the location of the units mentioned on the dates 7-11 Jun 44.

3. Attached hereto as Appendices "A", "B", "C", and "D" are the location states of the units concerned. The sources of information contained in Appendices "A", "B" and "C" are the War Diaries for June 1944 of the respective units. In the case of Appendix "D", the information is based upon documentary materials in possession of Historical Section, CMHQ.

4. It is hoped that this information is what you require, and in the meantime if there is any further information we can give you do not hesitate to ask us.

W.H.S.Macklin Signed
(W.H.S.Macklin) Brigadier,
D.C.G.S.
CANADIAN MILITARY HEADQUARTERS.

VIR

A 092397

H3056-0256

H3056-0257

2997-PS
25?

EXHIBIT NO. 25

APPENDIX "A"

J U N E, 1944

7 C.I.B. - 1st Bn. The Royal Winnipeg Rifles

7 Wed

0615 On the move to secure our objective on line OAK at PUTOT-EN-BESSIN with C Coy in adv gd under comd Maj J M D Jones and a flank gd composed of No 7 Pl from A coy, two sees carriers and one sec 6 pdrs under comd Capt D. B. Robertson.

1600 By this hour the Bn was consolidating. Our position was occupied with A Coy right, responsible for the bridge at the rly and rd crossing in PUTOT, C Coy north of the rly in center and C Coy left with B in res.
The flank gd became our liaison force with the 7 Green Howards at BROMMY and had an active time for the next three days.

D plus 1

Established coy defensive posn at 898719 with 14 pl right forward and 15 pl left fwd and 13 pl reserve. The two forward positions were overrun and the order was given for as many as possible to get through the enemy positions to the rear and RV in the area of the cross roads at 908720. A small party managed to reach this RV and make their way to L'Hotel Fortune cross roads.
After the Bn had reorganized at 908725 a night move was made to SECQUEVILLE and the coy took up a defensive posn on the north side of the village. At 1900 the coy moved to a new position at 911736.

Putot-en Bessin 8 Thu. The whole Bn area was subjected to enemy arty and mortar fire during this attack. This attack was repulsed by fire from A Coy assisted by one pl of MMGs, Cameron Highlanders of Ottawa, which were covering the rly br.
At 1200 hrs more enemy had infiltrated into the town around our posns. At 1330 hrs, A, B and C Coys were completely surrounded by the enemy. The majority of their automatic weapons had been knocked out by the previous bombardment and they had no ammn. An attempt was made to withdraw the survivors of these coys under cover of smoke, but only a few got back to BnHq at 908725.
The Bn was withdrawn at 2300 hrs to La Borgerie Farm.

Secquiville En Bessin 9 Fri At 0500 hrs in the morning the Bn moved to Secquiville En Bessin. At 2000 hrs the Bn moved to La Borgerie Farm 913732. Coys were bothered by well concealed

A 092398

Secquivillo En Bossin	9 Fri	snipers on the route up. BnHq took up their posn in the fm buildings and the coys were deployed for all around protection as res Bn in the Bde area.
LaBergerie Farm	10 Sat	At 0400 hrs, one enemy aircraft bombed the Bn area with small AP bombs and two men of the carrier pl were killed. The armourer wksp was brought up and the day was spent in repairing weapons, replacing eqpt and recording casualties. Coys sent in one pl at a time to the farm to get the men washed at the well. Patrols were sent out at night.
	11 Sun	Reorganizing continued. The "I" Sec established an OP at 914724 from where they were able to observe the enemy on the South side of the rly. At 1930 hrs the flank protection partly commanded by D.B.Robertson with Lt J.W.F. Battershill returned from Bruney.

7 C.I.B. — 1st Bn. The Regina Rifle Regiment.

LE FRESNE-CAMILLY sq 9477 Sheet CAEN 7 F/4	7	1200. At 1200 hrs. Regina Rifle Regiment moved into BRETTEVILLE L'ORGEULLEUSE which was clear of the enemy and the civilian population gave the troops a very friendly reception. The Bn took a defensive position with A Coy at 926718, B Coy at 934705, C Coy at 923703, and D Coy at 948703. Bn HQ set up at 927718. The Bn dug in and things remained quiet during the afternoon. R Wpg Rif took up a position on our right at approximately 1330 hrs. Thus the Regina Rif were out in front with no protection on our left flank, a position which we refused to vacate until relieved 11 days later by the QOR.
BRETTEVILLE L'ORGEULLEUSE	11	Still in this locality.

1st Bn. The Canadian Scottish Regiment.

PIERREPONT	7	1250. Reached new area with Bn H.Q. at large farm at SECQUEVILLE-EN-BESSIN (923745).

A 092399

H3056-0258

2997-PS
254

EXHIBIT NO. 25

APPENDIX "A"

1st Bn. The Canadian Scottish Regiment (Cont'd)

PIERREPONT 8 attacked PUTOT-EN-BESSIN and penetrated across BAYEUX-CAEN railroad from where they later retired.

PUTOT-EN BESSIN 10 Companies have retired from positions occupied after the attack to better defensive positions around the town of PUTOT-EN-BESSIN. Company positions are "A" Coy 903723 "B" 904724, "C" Coy 902727, "D" Coy 902724.
0930. "D" Company patroled to the bridge over the Railroad at 895721 and found no enemy there but came under heavy MG fire from 982719. A patrol consisting of one section of bren carriers and two sections of MG carriers reached the area of the bridge, dismounted and fired at suspected enemy MG positions. The fire was returned by four or five MGs which they could not pin-point.

11. Still in area of Putot-en-Bessin.

A-092400

H3056-0259

EXHIBIT NO. 25

APPENDIX "B"

JUNE 1944

8 C. I. B.	1st Bn. The Queen's Own Rifles of Canada.
7 Jun.	ANGUERY, France 014775. 1400 hrs. Alt B HQ Berniores Sur Mer.
8 "	ANGUERY, France 014775. 0300 hrs. D Coy posn at ANISY 0175. 1200 " B Ech - BASLY 9979 where they were later joined by Alt B HQ.
9 "	ANGUERY, France 014775. 1700 hrs Bn finally set up in posn at BRAY 9493. A Ech at 945739. B Ech at 945761 - Alt B. HQ established with "B" Ech.
10 "	BRAY, France 9 4737. 1500 hrs. Bn moves to posn area NEUF MER, 945742.
11 "	1100. Word received that the Bn will attack and seize the high ground south of CHEUX MR 9066. This is to be done by D coy passing through the Regina Rifles at NORREY IN BESSIN 9270 and seizing C MESNIL PATRY MR 8970. The balance of the Bn will then swing through them and by pass CHEUX seizing the high ground at C HUT de BOSQ MR 9066. For this operation the Bn will be under comd of the 6 Armd Regt. 1300 Coys pull out on board their tanks and proceed to their F U P disembarking on NORREY on BESSIN and forming up at 919704. The word is given and they proceed along with the tanks across the field toward their objective.

Le Regiment de la Chaudiere.

7 Jun	Columby-sur-Thaon area.
11 "	Le Hamel, 947728.

North Shore (NB) Regiment.

7 Jun	Tailleville.
8 "	Posn North of Anquerny. Remained in this area until 1900 hrs. 9 Jun.

H3056-0260

A 092401

2197-85
256

EXHIBIT NO. 25

APPENDIX "B"

North Shore (NB) Regiment, (cont'd)

9 Jun — At 1900 hrs the bn moved to the SOUTH of ANGUERNY to occupy positions vacated by the QOR of C. This necessitated leaving B Coy behind to cover the rear of our position.

11 " — 0730 hrs Bn moved off to take up position at CAIRON.

APPENDIX "C"

J U N E 1944

9 C. I. B. — The Highland Light Infantry of Canada

6 June 44 — It was in Bony-sur-Mer that our unit had its first real contact with the enemy. We were continuously mortared as we stopped in the village. There were no casualties but some dropped uncomfortably close. Just as we were ready to move on, at approximately 2145 hrs, the order came to stay where we were for the night. It was fast getting dark and we hurriedly dug in our defensive positions around the village.

7 " " — At approximately 1100 hrs we had only reached Colomby-sur-Thaon-about five miles from Bony-sur-Mer.

At 1600 hrs when the enemy armour withdrew it was decided to stay the attack and withdraw the remnants of the NNS and the 27 CAR into the "Fortress" formed by the SD&G and HLI in area Villons-les-Buissons south to les Buissons and here to make a stand against a new enemy counter attack.

An enemy attack broke on the SD&G front but was drawn back. The 27CAR drew back through the NNS and tied up with the NNS. At 2130 they attacked Buron but weren't strong enough to hold. they counter attacked again and again but couldn't stay there. Finally around 2200 hrs they and the CH of O (MG) withdrew inside the SD&G area and remained inside the "Fortress" for the night.

8 " " — C & D Coys were ordered to put out standing patrols in front of their position while the other Coys put on protective patrols to guard against further infiltration.

A 092402

H3056-0261

H3056-0262

9 June 44 — Once again a plan was laid on for the HLI to break out of the Fortress and attack Buron and then push on to our final objective. An "O" gp was held, a plan made and then we were told to hold. It was felt to be too great a risk to advance further until the 3 Brit Div on our left straightened up the line.

A plan is all prepared for the HLI to break out through the SD&G position. A Coy is to attack Gruchy with B & D Coy taking on Buron, C. Coy is in reserve. It has been ready to put into effect at a moments notice, but each time it is called for, it is soon after cancelled.

10 " " — C Coy was to go out to Buron on a Fighting patrol to determine how strongly held the place was. A Civilian had told us there were no troops in the village as he passed through earlier that day. An RCE officer on a recce for water had driven through Buron and Vieux Cairon the day before without seeing any signs of enemy. In order to get a little rest and a clean up and make preparations C Coy was relieved by the NNS and withdrew in the early afternoon to a woods in the rear of the church at Villons les Buissons.

11 " " — A strong fighting patrol from C Coy under the leadership of Major R.D. Hodgins and of 100 strength, including 12 sappers, left for Buron at 1023 hrs.

Bn HQ set up in a cabbage patch in a large farm at 995743.

Stormont, Dundas & Glengarry Highlanders

BENY-SUR MER June 6 — Enemy mortar fire and resistance becomes stronger and we are ordered to stay where we are, in the vicinity of the church at BENY-SUR-MER.

VILLONS-LES BUISSONS June 7 — We are consolidating at reference 998742. NNS are told again to withdraw into our perimeter; to what is left of them this does not seem necessary now. The 27th is taking up some ammo. to them and to the C.H.O. fO. MG pl which is supporting them. Much of the C.H.O. f O. has withdrawn now to this area to tie in defence.

June 10 — 1220 C.H. of O. advise us that they are now in support and not under command. C.O's "O" Gp finished and we prepare to move to LES BUISSONS.

1445 We proceed to establish ourselves in

4 092403

H3056-0263

Stormont, Dundas & Glengarry Highlanders (cont'd)

June 10

our new area. We are now using the 19th Fd Regt FOO. Communications are working very well and much praise is due to Sigs Officer, Lt.Hugh Hall.

June 11

1100. C.O. holds "O" Gp and lays on the attack on VIEUX CAIRON.
1324. "Success" signal now.
1620. The situation in VIEUX CAIRON is now satisfactory.
1640. BHQ moves up into the Unit "Hedgehog."
We all dig in and camouflage furiously.

North Nova Scotia Highlanders

6 June 1944 Tuesday

The Comd officer decided to close up the battalion and consolidate astride the ANISY-LES-BUISSONS-CAEN cross roads. The van guard, being astride the main CAEN road, dug in and sent out patrols to ANISY and VILLONS-LES-BUISSONS. "B" Company on "B" squadron arrived one half hour later and dug in on left flank astride the road running towards ANISY.

7 June 1944

At 0045 hours "A" and "D" companies on "A" and "C" squadrons arrived in from COLOMBY-SUR-THAON, "A" company digging in behind and on the right flank of "C" company and "D" company astride the road behind "A" and "B" companies, with Battalion Headquarters in the centre. A patrol of carriers from the van guard to ANISY, map reference 015759.

At 0740 hours the Battalion again moved off in the same order, changing our axis of advance through VILLONS-LES-BUISSONS along the main road to CARPIQUET. At 0745 hours several enemy gliders were sighted landing at approximately 9978.

By 0930 hours the village of LES BUISSONS was cleared and the command post moved up to that point. As the vanguard moved on to BURON.

Being pressed for time the vanguard advanced quickly through BURON on AUTHIE, map reference 985713, leaving the mopping up to "D" company coming behind. "A" and "B" companies bypassing the town.

It was too late for the vanguard to withdraw to the battalion position so they decided to fight it out in front of AUTHIE. Captain F.C.Fraser, who was with the leading elements, took command of the situation and hastily organized the defence, taking the Brownings from three knocked

A 092404

North Nova Scotia Highlanders (Cont'd)

7 June 1944 — out tanks and a machine gun from the platoon commander's carrier of the Cameron Highlanders of Ottawa, who had become a casualty.

At 1630 hours it was found that it was impossible for the battalion to push forward to AUTHIE and Major Learmont was ordered by the Commanding Officer to bring the forward troops back and form a fortress just on the outskirts SOUTH OF BURON. Battalion Headquarters moved back to the woods at LES BUISSONS, map reference 995741.

Permission was asked of the Brigadier to withdraw to the high ground in the woods at LES BUISSONS with the Stormont Dundas and Glengarry Highlanders and the remainder of the 27 Canadian Armoured Regiment. Permission was granted and the remnants of "D" "A", "B", "C", and Support Companies were withdrawn into the fortress.

Les Buissons Map Reference 995745
8 June 1944 — During the evening it was apparent that the enemy were tooing up an attack on our position and at 2200 hours at last light a counter-attack developed but was repulsed by heavy fire by our artillery, mortars, tanks and infrantry. No enemy reached our position.

9 June 1944 — They came across the open field within about 1000 yards and the machine gun platoon opened fire, causing everyone else to fire, and causing the enemy to withdraw.

10 June 1944 — Patrol back from VIEUX CAIRON 977738, they were pinned down by fire from enemy and did not get any information. Stormont, Dundas and Glengarry Highlanders patrol found enemy at BURON 995725.

11 June — Battalion spent day getting reorganized and drawing the equipment that was lost.

A 092405

H3056-0264

EXHIBIT NO. 25

APPENDIX "D"

24/A /1/2 (Hist 4)
14 Sep 44.

6 CDN ARMD REGT (1H): LOCATIONS, 6-11 Jun 44.

SOURCES: 1/O/2 Cdn Armd Bde Main, 5 Jul 44: Sequence of Events, 6-11 Jun 44.

HQ 2 Cdn Corps: "Sitreps", 6-11 Jun 44.

HQ 2 Cdn Corps: "Ops Logs", 6-11 Jun 44.

MAP REFS: FRANCE, 1:50,000 CREULLY, Sheet 7E/5
FRANCE, 1:50,000 CAEN Sheet 7F/1

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6 Jun 44 6 Cdn Armd Regt landed on MIKE (RED & GREEN) and NAN GREEN beaches between LA RIVIERE (9386) and COURSEULLES (9785) between 0735 and 0820 hrs. Once the beach exits were complete, the tks moved inland to rally at GRAYE-SUR-MER (9584). As the inf were beginning to run into opposition, all available tks were immediately sent to sp the various bns. B Sqn on the EAST Bank of the R SEULLES supported Regina Rif in clearing COURSEULLES. During the day tks penetrated to CULLY (9176) and two tps (probably from C Sqn) to BRETTEVILLE L'ORGUEILLEUSE (9271). The latter were forced to withdraw. During the night of 6-7 Jun, RHQ and A Sqn (reconstituted from A and B Sqns) harboured at PIERREPONT (9379), with C Sqn between PIERREPONT and ST GABRIEL (8879).

7 Jun 44 A Sqn supported R Wpg R in the capture of PUTOT-EN-BESSIN (9072) while C Sqn supported Regina Rif in the capture of BRETTEVILLE (9271). During the afternoon RHQ, the Recce Tp, and a number of recovered tks moved from PIERREPONT (9379) to the C Scot R Area in LE BOUT CACHARD (9275) to join C Sqn, which rallied there after the attack on BRETTEVILLE.

8 Jun 44 A Sqn assisted in beating off an enemy counter-attack on BRETTEVILLE and PUTOT-EN-BESSIN. Three tks were also in action against snipers in the 1 C Scot R area at SEQUEVILLE-EN-BESSIN, (9274). In the afternoon C Sqn and one coy of the C Scot R moved to area JILL to close a gap in the flanks. Evidence from the Bde account suggests that this pos was the high ground between LESSON (9674) and CAIRON (9675).

A 092496

H3056-0265

EXHIBIT NO. 25

2997-PS
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APPENDIX "D"

6 CDN ARMD REGT (1H): LOCATIONS, 6-11 Jun 44(cont'd)

9 Jun 44 All available tks, incl RHQ tks, were thrown in against enemy counter-attacks which had succeeded in over-running the R Wpg R posn in PUTOT-EN-BESSIN and had penetrated between the bn posns. C Sqn, ordered from JILL to meet these counter-attacks, ran into enemy armour before reaching BRETTEVILLE. The regt less C Sqn took part in an attack that evening which restored the situation in PUTOT and relieved the R Wpg R and the C Scot R, remaining out on the RIGHT flank of the posn until dark. When relieved, the regt then moved back to LE BOUT CACHARD and leaguered in the open.

10 Jun 44 During the morning, 6 Cdn Armd Regt moved from LE BOUT CACHARD (9275) to harbour near CAIRON (9675), and in the late afternoon, having received a warning order, from CAIRON TO BRAY (9473). The receipt of 20 new tks that evening enabled the regt to be reorganized on a three Sqn basis.

11 Jun 44 At 1420 hrs 6 Cdn Armd Regt with under cond the QOR of C (less two coys) crossed the SL to attack around the RIGHT flank of CHEUX (9167) and to capture the high ground at GRAINVILLE-SUR-ODON (9064). B Sqn with one Coy of the inf were to seize the initial objective (LE MESNIL PATRY, 9070), while C Sqn deployed on the high ground on the RIGHT flank in sp. Minefds forced the units to move through NORREY-EN-BESSIN(9270) before deploying. RHQ and A Sqn were moving through NORREY when B Sqn reported their fwd tps at the initial objective with tks beyond. Suddenly both B and C. Sqns reported that enemy A.Tk guns and tks were firing on them from concealed posns on the LEFT flank. Later the enemy began to outflank the posn and commenced shelling and mortaring NORREY-EN-BESSIN very heavily. In these circumstances the regt withdrew through NORREY to its original SL, i.e. the line of railway (BAYEUX-CAEN) in front of BRETTEVILLE, A Sqn covering from high ground EAST of BRETTEVILLE. the regt then moved into harbour at BRAY (9473) and after 1800 hrs was ordered to concentrate in the area just north of LE FRESNE CAMILLY (9477) in Bde res.

A 092407

H3056-0266

H3056-0267

EXHIBIT No. 27

2997-PS
262

K3

4 Coy Tross

1.	U	SchF	BOCKER(as Stabscharfue)
2.	"	"	MOEBIUS (as Schirmeister)
3.	"	"Sturmann	WEFER (as 1 Schreiber)
4.	"	"	FEIZE (as Rechmungsfuehrer)
5.	"	O/Schue-tze	BUSSE (as 1 Koch)
6.	"	Mann	BOELLERT (as Hilfskoch)
7.	"	"	SCHMIDT (" ")
8.	"	Sturmann	SCHWERTFEGER (as Schermeistergehilfe)
9.	"	Mann	KIEK (as Fuhrer LKW)
10.	"	Mann	FRANZ (as " PKW 1 Zugfuehrer)
11.	"	"	LENKENHOFF (as Fuhrer LKW ?)
12.	"	"	WILLMANN (as Fuhrer LKW)
13.	"	"	-------
14.	"	Sturmann	KRUVINIUS (as Waffenwart)
15.	"	Mann	FUCKS (as Kradfuhrer)
16.	"	"	BEIERLEIN (as PKW-Fuhrer Chef)
17.	"	"	MEIER (as Fuhrer LKW)
18.	"	"	SCHOLZ (" " ")

A 092408

H3056-0268

EXHIBIT No. 27

2997-P
263

L1

12 SS Pz Reconnaissance Bn

C.O. - SBF BREMER, GERHARDT (GERT)

Adjt - USF BUCHEIM (BUCHDEIN)

Coy Comds & other officers	VON REICHENSTEIN
	HAUTZMANN
	HAUCK
	TIEDT
	HANSMANN
	KEUE (Killed?)
	BISCHOFF
	BIENSDORF (Killed?)
	TOLL (Killed ?)
	MAIER
	O/Lt PALM (Attached)
	WENDT
	GRUND
	WIENEKE
	SCHUDOCK (MO)
	KIRCHNER
Sigs Pl -	U/Lt SCHENK
	O/Feldwebel RASMUSSEN

A 092409

H3056-0269

EXHIBIT No. 27

2997-PS
264

M.

12 SS Signals Battalion

C.O. - SBF PANDEL (Killed Aug)

12 SS Anti Aircraft Battalion (Flak Bn)

C.O. - SBF FENDT

Tp Comds - Hpt RITZEL (1)
" RIEDEL (2)
USF MEURER (2)
Hpt WEIGAND (3) (WEYGAND)
OSF RITZCHAR (4)
OSF THOMA (Hq.Tp)

A 092410

EXHIBIT No. 27 2997-PS 265

DETAILED PHYSICAL DESCRIPTIONS

BREMER GERHARDT (GERT)

HANOVER
Married. 27 1:78-80 m. 75 kilos
Fair
Wounded several times (In foot in June 1944)
Former C.O. 12 SS Recce Bn
Iron Cross 1st & 2nd Class.
Knights Cross with Oak Leaves

FEND

32. 1:75m.
Fair. Strongly built.
Former C.O. 12 SS AA Bn.
Sturmbannfuhrer.

HAGEMEISTER

28. 1:80m. 80 kilos.
Very slim but muscular
(Athletic build)
Fair. Wounded several times,
scar on neck.
Former C.O. III/12 SS Arty Regt.
Sturmbannfuhrer.

HANREICH, JACOB

33. 1:80m. Slim.
Killed or seriously wounded and captured.
Fair
Former C.O. 12 SS A Tk Bn.
Sturmbannfuhrer.

KRAUSE, BERNARD

Unmarried.
34. 1:86m. 90 kilos.
Strongly built.
Fair. Wounded 4 or 5 times.
Former C.O. II (?)/26 SS Pz Gren Regt.
Sturmbannfuhrer.

MILIUS) KARL HEINZ
) HANS GEORG
Home, POMERANIA.
Married, 2 or 3 children.
34 or 35. 1:78m, 80 kilos.
Muscular, fair.
Blue eyes, wounded in West.
Former Comd 25 SS Pz Gren Regt,
and III Battalion of that Regt.
Obersturmbannfuhrer.
Later employed as instructor in
GERMANY.

H3056-0270

A 092411

EXHIBIT No. 27

MOHNKE, WILHELM (WILLI)

LUEBECK
Married
34 1:80 - 82 m 80 kilos
Slender
Dark. Dark eyes.
One leg 4in shorter than the other.
Former Comd 26 SS Pz Gren Regt.
Last heard as GOC 1 Panzer Div.
Standartenfuhrer. Knights Cross.

MUELLER (MULLER)

1·80m. Powerfully built, blond.
Married
Wounded in attack in CHEUX when battalion virtually destroyed.
Sturmbannfuhrer.
Former C.O. 12 SS Pionier (Engineering Battalion).

OIBOETTER, (ERICH)

29 or 30. 1:78m. 70 kilos.
Dark
Former C.O. III(?)/26 SS Pz Gren Regt
Killed end Aug.
Sturmbannfuhrer. Knights Cross.

PANDEL

30 or 31. 1:78. 75 kilos.
Fair.
Sturmbannfuhrer.
Former C.O. 12 SS Signal Bn.

SCAPPINI, HANZ

33. 1:78m 70-75 kilos.
Former C.O. II/25 SS Pz Gren Regt.
Killed 8-9 June near GAMACHE.
Sturmbannfuhrer.

SCHROEDER

Central Germany.
Married 36-38.
1:76-78m. 70 kilos.
Fair
Former C.O. 12 SS Arty Regt.
Obersturmbannfuhrer.

SCHROTT

WESTPHALIA
32 1:86-88m. 90 kilos.
Athletic build.
Fair blue eyes.
Wounded several times
Killed in BELGIUM.
Former C.O. II/25 SS Pz Gren Regt.
Sturmbannfuhrer.

A092412

H3056-0271

EXHIBIT No. 27

2997-27

SIEBKEN, BERNARD

SCHLESWIG HOLSTEIN.
Married
33 1:84m. 80-90 kilos.
Slim and athletic.
Fair. Wounded several times.
Former C.O. I(?)/26 SS Pz Gren Regt.
Sturmbannfuhrer.

STEEGER

BAVARIA
Married
31 or 32
70 kilos
Dark
Blue eyes
Horn rimmed glasses
C.O. III/25 SS Pz Gren Regt.
Hauptsturmfuhrer.

WALDMULLER, HANS

BAVARIA
Married
33 1:72 or 1:73m. 70 kilos.
Dark. Dark eyes.
Wounded 3 or 4 times
C.O. I/25 SS Pz Gren Regt.
Sturmbannfuhrer.

PERSONALITIES

(1) C.O. Aufkl.Abt.12 SS Pz Div. HITLER JUGEND.
- Stubafue. BREMER

Age	:	Approx 30 years
Height	:	" 1.85m.
Hair	:	Dark-brown
Eyes	:	Blue-grey
Face	:	Full
Complexion	:	Sallow
Remarks	:	Has 'Ritterkreuz'

(2) Acting C.O. of above unit -
Hpt.Stufue. von REITZENSTEIN

Age	:	Approx 30 years
Height	:	" 1.80m
Hair	:	Fair
Eyes	:	Blue
Face	:	Oval
Complexion	:	Normal
Remarks	:	Also O.C. 5 Coy. Wears German Cross in Gold.

(3) Adjutant: O'Stufue BUCHHEIM

Age	:	Approx 26-28 years
Height	:	1.86m.
Build	:	Slim
Hair	:	Dark
Eyes	:	Brown(?). No spectacles
Face	:	Long
Complexion	:	Clean-shaven
Remarks	:	Has Iron Cross II Class. Student in civilian life.

H3056-0272

092413

(4) Ordnance Officer : U'stufue MUSFELD

Age	:	Approx 26 years
Height	:	180 - 182 cm
Build	:	Slim
Hair	:	Dark
Eyes	:	Grey-brown. No spectacles.
Complexion	:	Pale. Clean-shaven
Face	:	Oval
Remarks	:	Speaks some English and Japanese. Had been in Japan for some time. Usually questioned PW. Has Iron Cross II Class. Hitler-Youth Leader. Hails from BERLIN.

(5) O.C. 1 Coy O'Stufue. HANSMANN (Photo in possession of PWIS(H))

Age	:	?
Height	:	1.75 m
Build	:	Slim
Hair	:	Fair
Eyes	:	Blue. No spectacles.
Complexion	:	Pale. Clean-shaven.
Face	:	Oval.
Remarks	:	PW saw this man last on 9 Jun 44. HANSMANN left for EVREUX at the beginning of Jul 44. He always wore 'black uniform' and is decorated with the Iron Cross I Class and Silver Close-Combat-Clasp. Regular soldier.

(6) Ordnance Officer : U'Stufue. HAUER

Age	:	Approx 22 years
Height	:	" 1.75 m
Hair	:	Very fair
Eyes	:	Blue
Face	:	Oval
Complexion	:	Normal
Build	:	Rather thin.

(7) Technical officer (Armourer & Ammo) - U'Stufue GRUND

Age	:	Approx 24/25 years
Height	:	" 1.75 m.
Hair	:	Dark
Eyes	:	?
Face	:	Longish
Complexion	:	Tanned
Build	:	Small
Remarks	:	A regular SS-man.

(8) Technical officer (M.T.) U'stufue. WIENEKE

No description available.

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EXHIBIT No. 27

(9) Bn M.C. : Oberarzt Dr. SCHUDOCK

Age	:	Approx 30 years
Height	:	" 1.70 m
Hair	:	Dark brown
Eyes	:	Blue
Face	:	Oval
Complexion	:	Normal
Build	:	Slim
Remarks	:	A doctor in civilian life - hails from BRESLAU

(10) Versorgungs Kp : O'Stufue. MOELLER

Age	:	Approx 28-29 years
Height	:	1.70 - 1.72 m
Hair	:	Dark brown
Eyes	:	Blue
Face	:	Small
Complexion	:	Ivory white
Build	:	Slim
Remarks	:	Regular soldier. Hails from FRANKFURT on Main.

(11) Leader of H.Q. Coy : U'Stufue KIRCHNER

Age		Approx 35 years
Height	:	" 1.70 m
Hair	:	Reddish brown
Eyes	:	Grey
Face	:	Round
Complexion	:	Slightly freckled
Build	:	Powerful
Remarks	:	Manager in an electrical firm in FRANKFURT on Main.

(12) Signals Officer : U'Stufue SCHENK

Age	:	Approx 20-21 years
Height	:	" 1.78-1.80 m
Hair	:	Wavy fair
Eyes	:	Blue
Face	:	Normal
Complexion	:	"
Build	:	Stocky
Remarks	:	Scholar in civilian life.

(13) Attached Army Officer (z.b.V.) O'Lt. PALM

Age	:	Approx 20-21 years
Height	:	" 1.73 m
Hair	:	Dark brown
Eyes	:	Blue
Face	:	Longish
Complexion	:	Brown
Build	:	Slim

(14) O.C. Kradschuetzenstaffel : U'Scharfue. LETTEN-BIECHER

Age	:	Approx 24 years
Height	:	" 1.82 m
Hair	:	Dark
Eyes	:	?
Face	:	Longish
Complexion	:	Brown
Build	:	Rather thin.

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EXHIBIT No. 27

(15) O.C. 2 Coy : O'Sturue. HAUCK

Age	:	Approx 26 years
Height	:	" 1.78 - 1.80 m
Hair	:	Dark-brown
Eyes	:	Grey-blue
Face	:	Long. Pointed nose
Complexion	:	Normal
Build	:	Slim
Remarks	:	Regular soldier. Hails from DUSSELDORF.

(16) O.C. 3 Coy : O'Stufue. KEUE

Age	:	Approx 24-25 years
Height	:	" 1.80 m
Hair	:	Fair
Eyes	:	Blue
Face	:	Long
Complexion	:	Normal
Remarks	:	Powerful build. Bullet-wound in left forehead. Hails from BRANDENBURG

(17) O.C. 4 Coy : O'Stufue. BEIERSDORF

Killed end of Jun 44.

(18) O'Scharfue. Leopold STUN

Age	:	21-22 years
Height	:	1.75 m
Build	:	Stocky
Hair	:	Blond, parted, slightly wavy
Eyes	:	Blue
Remarks	:	Has E.K.I. Employed z.b.V. at HQ, Aufkl.Abt.12 SS Pz.Div., as personal driver to C.O., Stubafue. BREMER.

(19) Pl.Cmdr. HQ Coy : U'Stufue. WIENECKE

Age	:	Approx 22 years.
Height	:	1.78 m.
Hair	:	Very fair
Eyes	:	Light blue
Face	:	Round
Complexion	:	Pale
Build	:	Powerful

(20) Pl.Cmdr. 1 Coy : U'Stufue. FLANDERKA

Age	:	Approx 22 years
Height	:	" 1.75 m
Hair	:	Black
Eyes	:	Brown
Face	:	Long
Complexion	:	Tanned
Build	:	Slim
Remarks	:	A scholar from KULMBACH.

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EXHIBIT No. 27

(21) Pl.Cmdr. 1 Coy : U'Stufue GAUCH

Age	:	Approx 22-23 years
Height	:	" 1.80-1.82 m
Hair	:	Dark brown
Eyes	:	Light blue
Face	:	Smallish
Complexion	:	Pale
Build	:	Thin
Remarks	:	A scholar from FRANKFURT on Main.

(22) Pl.Cmdr. in 2 Coy : U'Stufue. ALF

Age	:	Approx 24 years
Height	:	" 1.78 m
Hair	:	Thin fair
Eyes	:	Blue
Face	:	Full
Complexion	:	Normal
Build	:	Powerful
Remarks	:	Was at HQ as Ordn. Offr. Connected with 'Hitler Youth' and hails from DORTMUND.

(23) Pl.Cmdr. in 2 Coy : U'Stufue. BIRKENDAHL

Age	:	Approx 23 years
Height	:	" 1.74 m
Hair	:	Dark brown
Eyes	:	Blue
Face	:	Oval
Complexion	:	Normal
Build	:	Slim
Remarks	:	Was severely wounded. 'Hitler-Youth' leader from DORTMUND.

(24) Pl.Cmdr. in 3 Coy : U'Stufue. LIEBIG

Age	:	Approx 24 years
Height	:	" 1.72 m
Hair	:	Dark
Eyes	:	Blue
Face	:	Round
Complexion	:	Yellowish
Build	:	Lumpy

(25) Pl.Cmdr. in 3 Coy : U'Stufue. HILDERBRAND

Age	:	Approx 24 years
Height	:	" 1.80 - 1.82 m
Hair	:	Fair
Eyes	:	Light blue
Face	:	Round. High cheek bones.
Complexion	:	Yellowish
Build	:	Slim

(26) Pl.Cmdr in 4 Coy : U'Stufue. DEUSCHLE

Age	:	Approx 24 years
Height	:	" 1.75 m
Hair	:	Dark brown
Eyes	:	Blue
Face	:	Round
Complexion	:	Normal
Build	:	Powerful.

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(27) I. c. (INT) Div. 'HITLER JUGEND' : O'stufue. DoLDI

No details available.

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SUPREME HEADQUARTERS

ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE

G-1 DIVISION--MAIN

6 April 1945.

Lt. Col. John P. PAGE,
A.A.G.,
Special Inquiries Branch,
G-1 Division, Attention-Lt.Col. MACDONALD
SHAEF-MAIN

Re:-12 SS Panzer Division-St-Sulpice

Sir:-

Acting on your instructions of this date, I proceeded to St-Sulpice, Orne, in order to ascertain the identity of the German Unit stationed at the Chateau St-Sulpice in May 1944. The information secured is as follows.

1. Upon arrival at St-Sulpice, Orne, I conta cted Mr. Paul BOHIN, of the Mairie De St-Sulpice-Sur-Risle, and questioned him regarding the identity of the German Unit occupying his Chateau in May 1944. He produced a receipt dated 8 June 1944, which is signed by the "SS UNTERSTURMFUHRER un KOMPANIEFUHRER i.V.," Officer Commanding the SS Unit stationed at the Chateau, on which appears the F.P.O. number, and given to Mr. BOHIN when they requisitioned his truck. Mr. BOHIN stated that the SS Unit stationed in his Chateau at that time was one of the REMER SS Panzer Divisions, and he gives the following description of weight, 75 kilos-complexion, pale-Right eye almost closed and caused by a wound sustained on the Russian front. Also right thumb badly mutilated. He further stated that a Frenchman named Andre GUILMET, and an Alsatian known as Corporal PACEL, were members of this SS Unit and believes that both were present when the American aviator was murdered. Their particulars are as follows:

SS.Andre GUILMET	SS.PACEL	
Rank-Soldaten	Rank-Corporal	(Em-
Age-17	Age-22	ployed
Eight-1.65	Eight-1.65	as
Weight-60 kilos	Weight-70 kilos	inter-
Hair-Blond	Hair-Brown	preter)
Thin face	Complexion-Med.	

Mr. BOHIN informed the writer that he would be at his other

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domicile 106 Avenue du Roule, Neuilly-Sur-Seine, on Saturday 14 April 1945, and requested that I contact him again as he might find several other documents which may enlighten this case. The document produced by Mr. BOHIN being a requisition for his truck is herewith attached marked appendix (a).

2. Messrs. Marius LEVEAU and Georges COPPIN, employees of Mr. BOHIN, produced documents bearing signature, rank and F.P.O. number of SS Units stationed at St-Sulpice and L'Aigle, in June 1944, said documents being permits to travel from place to place and are herewith attached marked as appendices (b) (c) respectively.

3. The writer then contacted Mrs. Juliette TOUZELIN, of St-Sulpice-Sur-Risle, and from her obtained two letters left by SS soldiers who were living in her home during the time their Unit was stationed in St-Sulpice. These two letters are herewith attached and marked appendices (d) (e).

4. Passed for your information and any action you may deem necessary, please.

Encl:-5
Document produced by Mr. BOHIN (Requisition paper)(a)
Documents produced by Messrs. LEVEAU and COPPIN (Permits to travel. (b)(c)
Letters produced by Mrs. Juliette TOUZELIN (d)(e)

/s/ J.R.BARRE
/t/ J.R.BARRE
Lt. Cdn. Pro. C.,
Special Inquiries Branch,
G-1 Division, SHAEF-MAIN

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Translation of

VOLUNTARY DECLARATION

I, the undersigned Untersturmfuehrer of the Waffen - SS

Karl - Walter BECKER

of 2 Coy, Recce Bn, 12.SS Pz Div 'HITLER JUGEND'

herewith make the following VOLUNTARY DECLARATION under Oath in the presence of the undermentioned British Officers :

H. K. KETTLER, Capt 226770 — A. M. FOX, Lt. Can.Army.

On the 7 Jun 44, the early evening, I left EVREUX in a FIAT-PKW, accompanied by O'Scharfue. HAUPT (Hpt.Feldw. of the Lehrgang), and the driver, Sturmmann STEINEMANN. At the request of the O'Scharfue. we drove in the direction of JURY-la-BATAILLE, in order to locate his Bn Staff and to drop him there. We arrived at about 2200 hrs. Shortly before reaching the railway-crossing we had a puncture in our right front wheel, which was repaired by a local mechanic. At the same time the O'Scharfue. learned that the Hq had left for the front early in the morning.
We spent the night in a hotel where there was a garage for the car. At about 0700 hrs or 0800 hrs in the morning of 8 Jun 44, we started off in the direction of the front, and drove via VERNEUIL-L'AIGLE to the Bn's strongpoint in the area of RUGLES-BOURTH, where I made enquiries as to the whereabouts of the Bn and Div. I had decided, at first, to drive out to the Bn with the supply-vehicles. This, however, took too long and I decided, therefore, to travel alone in the late afternoon in the direction of CAEN. At about midnight I arrived at the Div. Battle-HQ at VENOISE, and had the Bn's position explained to me. From there I was directed to the Battle-HQ of Regt MOHNKE, which had contact with the Recce Bn. I arrived at the Regt's position in the area of JUVIGNY between 0200 and 0300 hrs. The Regt Comd. had just returned from the front-line where, he said, the position was unfavourable, as some of our troops had to be withdrawn. The Recce Bn was supposed to be in the area of CRISTOT. I left the O'Scharfue behind, as his Bn belonged to this Regt. I then

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drove about 800-1000 m to an orchard, in order to wait there for daybreak, as it was impossible to find one's way at night.

At about 0700 hrs I drove off to look for my Bn. I intended to pass through TILLEY-sur-SEULLES and branch off from there to the East, in order to reach my objective. Outside the village I met a Pz. Spaeh-Trupp of the Pz Lehr Div, which was repairing the tyres of 2 scout-cars, and I asked them about my Bn. However, they could give me no information. I saw a M/C side-car and I took it to drive on and look for my Bn. Before I left I was warned that the hill opposite was occupied by the enemy. Shortly before we reached the last houses, enemy Art-Fire opened up and we had to take cover. Men of the Pz Lehr Div brought along 2 casualties, one of whom was slightly wounded and the other seriously wounded. I dressed the wounds of the latter and had him laid on a door which I had fixed on the side-car, whilst the slightly wounded man had to hold the other man's dressing in place.

As it was impossible to drive through to the Bn from there, we returned to my PKW through the continuing enemy-fire. After the injured had been taken to the main dressing-station, I changed vehicles and drove back to the road-intersection at JUVIGNY where I met M/C DRs of the Regt MOHNKE.

On arriving at FONTENAY, I met a DR of 5 Coy, Recce Bn, who directed me to the Bn Battle-HQ. At about 1100 hrs I reported to Hpt. Stufue v. REITZENSTEIN who had taken over command of the Bn on the preceding day, as the Bn commander, Stubafue BREMER had been injured.
The Hpt. Stufue wore a camouflage-jacket and was in a slit-trench (see sketch). He ordered me to take command of 2 Coy, as its Comd had been missing since the previous day. I met the following officers also in slit-trenches :

O'Stufue BUCHHEIM
U'Stufue MUSFELD
O'Lt PALM
O'Arzt Dr.SCHUDOCK

Later I also met U'Stufue SCHENK.

I went over to the Oberarzt, who was a friend of mine. He looked pale and dirty. After I had got him

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some bread, for which he had asked me, he told me that I had not witnessed the worst and that I still looked very clean and neat. I asked him what he meant by that and he told me that on the preceeding day, during an artillery bombardment on the Battle-Hq, which was situated in the castle, the comd, among others, had been hit. It was generally assumed that the position must have been betrayed as, otherwise, the artillery-fire could not have been so accurate.

During this conversation O'Lt PALM joined us. He told us that on the previous day --- after the comd. had been evacuated to hospital together with other casualties --- Hpt. Stufue. v Reitzenstein, who was then commanding the Bn had given the order to shoot prisoners as a reprisal. These prisoners could not have been evacuated to the rear on account of the heavy fire to which we were exposed. Moreover, there was no desire (on the part of the Germans) to do so. It was gnerally said that the enemy was taking no prisoners either.

In Russia, as a rule, only such prisoners as appeared to be of some value were transported to the rear and the remainder were usually murdered.

I asked PALM who had committed this act and I was told that it had been O'Scharfue. STUN and men of the M/C DR section. STUN had been particularly eager to distinguish himself by committing this atrocity.

Assuming that civilians, who were still living in the area, might have betrayed the position of the Battle-HQ, it had been decided to shoot some of them. However, this was not carried out.

I had to give my word of honour not to tell anyone of what I had just heard, as no one, apart from the officers present and the shooting-squad, knew of it.

Then I went to take over 2 Coy. I was shown around by O'Scharfue KLEGLEIN-SOHN and U'Scharfue ROHDE, and we discussed recce-patrols which were to go out and casualties the Coy had suffered.

At about noon on the following day, 10 Jun 44, U'Stufue HILDEBRAND arrived. He was commanding a Pl in 3 Coy which held the Bn's right wing before

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CRISTOT in the direction of AUDRIEU. I met him in a slit-trench near the Bn Battle-HQ, where I intended to hand in my daily report. As the Artillery-fire still continued, we talked about the fighting of the previous day and in the course of the conversation came to speak of the prisoners shot on 8 Jun. He knew no particulars, however, as his information as only hearsay. He had been engaged with his Pl in the front-line. We did not discuss the matter any further.

On my way to the front I heard from some of the drivers of the supply-vehicles who were just returning from the battle-field, that enemy paratroops were dealt with quickly (kurzer Prozess). As an example Regt 25 was mentioned. Under the then Regt Comd, Standfue. MEYER, Regt 25 had completely annihilated an enemy-paratroop-unit on D-Day.

In the morning of the following day, 11 Jun 44, the Div Comd, Brigfue WITT, arrived at the Bn together with Stubafue BREMER, who had not yet recovered from his injuries. The Bn had not yet been moved, with the exception of a few vehicles. The Div Comd handed out decorations for bravery to succesful anti-tank troops.
During the afternoon the enemy launched a tank attack. All available personnel were armed with close-combat anti-tank weapons and took up positions alongside the row of trees (see sketch). I was lying in a weapon-pit about 5-6 m from the Comd's dug-out. During the fighting 3 prisoners were brought up. They were the crew of a tank because they were black berets. I heard O'Scharfue STUN ask the Comd if he could take the prisoners away, to which the Comd replied with a laugh : ' Oh no, old chap, out of the question, for I know your method' (' Nee, mein Lieber, kommt nicht in Frage, denn ich kenne Deine Methode ').- This caused me to ask my neighbours for the meaning of these words, and I as told that this STUN already had 'several' on his conscience'.

I do not know when these prisoners were taken away, as I was ordered out to the left soon afterwards, where our own tanks were attacking.

These 3 prisoners were the first enemy-troops I saw.

In the late afternoon of 9 Jun 44, an assault-troop commanded

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by the Adjt. O'Stufue BUCHHEIM, made its way toward the castle in order to bring back some undamaged vehicles which had been left behind by unconscientious drivers. I heard that such expeditions were repeated twice in the following nights but without success.

(signed) BECKER
U'Stufue Karl-Walter BECKER
2/ Aufkl.Abt.12 SS Pz Div H.J.

Signatures of witnesses :
sgd:
H.K. Kettler, Capt.
226770

A. M. Fox, Lieut.
Can. Army.

A 092425

000.5-2(25)

EXHIBIT 29 B

FREIWILLIGE ERKLAERUNG .

(3 pages)

Ich, der Endesgefertigte Untersturmfuehrer der Waffen-SS ,

Karl - Walter BECKER

2. Kompanie, Aufklaerungs Abteilung, 12 SS Panzer Division, "Hitler-Jugen d" , mache hiermit die folgende FREWILLIGE ERKLAERUNG, im Beisein der nachstehenden Englischen Offiziere ; und bekraeftige diese Aussage durch meinen Eid.

H. K. KETTLER, Capt.
226770

A. M. FOX , Lt.
Can. Army

Am 7.6.1944 fuhr ich gegen Abend von EVREUX mit einem Fiat-PKW, in welchem ausser mir noch der Oberscharfuehrer HAUPT (Hauptfeldwebel des Lehrgangs), und der Fahrer des Wagens, Sturmmann STEINMANN, sassen. Auf Bitten des Oberscharfuehrers fuhren wir nach JURY-LA-BATAILLE, um dort den Stab seines Batl. aufzusuchen und ihn hier abzusetzen. Gegen 22 00 Uhr kamen wir dort an und kurz vor dem Bahnuebergang erhielten wir vorn rechts eine Reifenpanne, welche von einem Monteur aus dem Ort behoben wurde. Gleichzeitig stellte der Oberscharfuehrer fest, dass seit den fruehen Morgenstunden der Stab zur Front abgefahren sei.- Die Nacht ueber verbrachten wir im Hotel, wo auch eine Garage fuer den Wagen war. - Am Morgen des 8.6. gegen 7 oder 8 00 starteten wir Richtung Front und fuhren ueber VERNEUIL-LAIGLE nach dem Stuetzpunkt der Abteilung im Raume RUGLES-BOURTH, wo ich mich nach dem Verbleib der Abteilung und der Division erkundigte. Zuerst wollte ich in der Dunkelheit mit Nachschubfahrzeugen zur Abteilung fahren, was mir aber zu lange dauerte und ich entschloss mich dann, am Spaetnachmittag allein Richtung CAEN zu fahren. Gegen Mitternacht traf ich bei dem Div.-Gef. Stand in VENOISE ein und liess mir die Lage der Abteilung erklaeren. Hier verwies man mich zum Gef.Stand des Regiments MOHNKE, welcher Verbindung mit der Aufkl.Abt.hatte. Um 2 00 oder 3 00 Uhr morgens kam ich dort an und zwar im Raume von JUVIGNY. Ich hatte Glueck, denn zur selben Zeit kehrte der Regiments-Kommandeur MOHNKE von der vordersten Linie zurueck und er sprach davon, dass es vorne sehr stinke, weil eigene Teile sich absetzen mussten. Die Aufkl.Abt. sollte im Raume von CRISTOT sein. - Den Oberscharfuehrer setzte ich hier ab, denn sein Batl. gehoerte zu diesem Regiment. Anschliessend fuhr ich etwa noch 800 - 1000 m auf eine Obstwiese, um dort den Morgen abzuwarten, weil bei Nacht kein Zurechtfinden moeglich war.-

So um 7 00 Uhr fuhr ich los, um die Abteilung zu suchen. Ich wollte von TILLY-sur-SEULLES nach Osten abbiegen, um so zum Ziel zu gelangen. Am Ortseingang traf ich auf einen Pz.Spaehtrupp der Pz.Lehr Div., welcher 2 Spaehwagen flickte und fragte nach meiner Abt. Sie konnten aber diesbezueglich keine Auskunft geben. Ein B-Krad, welches ebenfalls dort war, nahm ich, um erst einmal vorzufahren und zu suchen. Bevor ich anfuhr, sagte man mir, dass die gegenueberliegende Hoehe vom Feinde einzusehen sei. - Kurz vor Erreichen der letzten Haeuser setzte feindliches Artillerie Feuer ein und wir mussten in Deckung gehen, als Angehoerige der Pz.Lehr Div. 1 schwer- und 1 leicht-Verwundeten anbrachten. Ich verband den Schwerverwundeten und liess ihn auf eine herangeschaffte Tuer auf den Beiwagen legen, waehrend der Leichtverwundete den Verband des anderen halten musste.

Da ein Durchkommen zur Abteilung von [illegible] moeglich war, fuhren wir durch das anhaltende feindliche Feuer [illegible] PKW, in welchen ich umstieg, nachdem die Verwundeten sofort zum [illegible]platz geschafft wurden.

...../ 2

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Dann fuhr ich zurueck zum Strassenkreuz bei JUVIGNY und traf hier auf Kradmelder des Regiments MOHNKE.-
Nachdem ich bei FONTENAY ankam, stiess ich auf einen Kradmelder der 5.Kp. Aufkl.Abt., welcher mich zum Abt.Gef.Std. einwies.- Ich meldete mich etwa gegen 11 00 Uhr bei dem Hauptsturmfuehrer von REITZENSTEIN, welcher seit dem Vortage die Abteilung fuehrte, denn der Kdr., Sturmbannfuehrer BREMER, war verwundet worden. Der Hauptsturmfuehrer hatte eine Tarnjacke an und befand sich in einem Erdloch laut Skizze. Er befahl mich zur 2.Kp.- weil der Fuehrer derselben seit dem Vortage vermisst sei mit einem Spaehtrupp. - um diese vorerst zu uebernehmen. Ebenfalls im Loch hockend, zum Teil saure Sahne essend, traf ich folgende Offiziere an : -

Obersturmfuehrer		BUCHHEIM
Untersturmfuehrer		MUSFELD
Oberleutnant		PALM
Oberarzt	Dr.	SCHUDOK.

Den Untersturmfuehrer SCHENK traf ich spaeter.

Ich ging dann zu dem Oberarzt, mit welchem ich befreundet war. Er war sehr blass und schmutzig. Nachdem ich ihm etwas Brot besorgte, worum er mich bat, sagte er zu mir, dass ich das Schlimmste garnicht mitgemacht haette und ferner, dass ich noch so sauber und gepflegt aussaehe. Als ich fragte, was er mit dem Schlimmsten meine, sagte er aus, dass gestern bei dem Schloss, wo der Abt.Gef.Stand eingerichtet worden sei, ein Artillerieueberfall neben anderen Ausfaellen auch den Kdr. mit getroffen haette. Man nahme allgemein an, dass es Verrat gewesen sei, denn sonst haette die Artillerie nicht so genau schiessen koennen. -
Waehrend dieses Gespraechs kam der Oberleutnant PALM noch zu uns und sprach davon, dass am Vortage, - nachdem der Kommandeur neben anderen Verwundeten zum Lazarett geschafft worden war -, der Hauptsturmfuehrer von REITZENSTEIN und derzeitige Abteilungsfuehrer aus Rache den Befehl zur Erschiessung der Gefangenen gab, welche durch die Feindeinwirkung nicht zurueckgeschafft werden sind und was man auch garnicht wollte. Es lautete ja allgemein die Parole, dass der Gegner ja auch keine Gefangenen mache.
Von Russland her war es meistens so gehandhabt worden, dass bei mehreren Gefangenen nur die am wichtigsten erscheinenden abtransportiert wurden, waehrend fast immer die uebrigbleibenden ermordert wurden.
Auf meine Frage, wer denn diese Tat durchgefuehrt habe, sagte PALM mir, dass es der Oberscharfuehrer STUN und Maenner der Kradmeldestaffel gewesen seien, denn dieser STUN haette sich mit dieser Untat besonders auszeichnen wollen.
Auf Grund der Annahme, dass Zivilisten, - die noch dort gehaust haetten, - den Gefechts Stand verraten haben koennten, sollten auch erst noch von diesen ebenfalls welche erschossen werden, jedoch habe man es nicht mehr durchgefuehrt.
Ich musste dann mein Ehrenwort dafuer geben, dass ich keinem hiervon jemals etwas sagen wuerde, denn ausser den anwesend gewesenen Offizieren und dem Erschiessungskommando wusste es keiner in der Abteilung.

Anschliessend ging ich dann zur 2.Kp., um mich mit dieser zu befassen. Von dem Oberscharfuehrer KLEGLEIN-SOHN und dem Unterscharfuehrer ROHDE wurde ich dann eingewiesen und wir sprachen von angesetzten Spaehtrupps und von Ausfaellen der Kompanie.

Am naechsten Tag, dem 10.6.1944, kam gegen Mittag der Untersturmfuehrer HILDEBRAND - Zugfuehrer in der 3. Kp., welche den rechten Abteilungs-Abschnitt vor CRISTOT in Richtung AUDRIEU hielt - und ich traf ihn in einem Loch, nahe des Abt.Gef.Stds., wo ich meine Tagesmeldung abgeben wollte. Auf Grund des Artilleriefeuers unterhielten wir uns unzusammenhaengend ueber den bisherigen Kampfverlauf und dabei kamen wir auch ueber die am 8.6. erschossenen Gefangenen zu sprechen, jedoch konnte er keine genaue Auskunft ueber Einzelheiten geben, denn er selber hatte es nur gehoert, weil er mit seinem Zug in vorderster Linie eingesetzt worden war. Zu weiteren Ausfuehrungen darueber kam es nicht mehr.

...../ 3

A 092427

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282

000.5-2(25) EXHIBIT 29 B

Auf der Fahrt zur Front wurde gesagt von verschiedenen von der Front zurueckkehrenden Nachschubfahrern, dass mit den feindlichen Fallschirmjaegern kurzer Prozess gemacht wuerde. So habe das Regt 25 unter dem damaligen Regt.Kdr. Standartenfuehrer MEYER eine feindliche Fallschirmgruppe bei CAEN vollkommen aufgerieben und vernichtet. (Am 1.Tag der Invasion).

Am folgenden Tag, dem 11.6., traf der Div.Kdr., Brigadefuehrer WITT, mit dem noch nicht ausgeheilten Sturmbannfuehrer BRENER in den Vormittagsstunden bei der Abteilung ein, welche ausser einigen Fahrzeugverschiebungen, noch an demselben Platz war, als ich eintraf. Es wurden Tapferkeitsauszeichnungen vom Div.Kdr. verliehen an erfolgreiche Panzernahkaempfer.- Am Nachmittag dieses Tages fand ein schwerer feindl.Pz./Angriff statt, wo alles Verfuegbare mit Nahkampfmitteln versehen laengs der Baumreihen - auf der Skizze ersichtlich - wartete. Ich lag in einem Loch etwa 5-6 m vom Bunker des Kdrs. Im Laufe des Gefechts wurden 3 Gefangene gebracht und zwar 1 Pz Besatzung, denn sie hatten schwarze Muetzen. Ich hoerte dann, als der Oberscharfuehrer STUN den Kdr. fragte, ob er diese Gefangenen nicht abfuehren koenne, worauf der Kdr etwa sagte, indem er lachte : 'Nee, mein Lieber, kommt nicht in Frage, denn ich kenne Deine Methode'. Dieses veranlasste mich bei den Umliegenden zu der Frage, was das zu bedeuten habe, wo mir erklaert wurde, dass dieser STUN schon "mehrere" auf dem Gewissen habe.

Wann diese Gefangenen abtransportiert wurden, weiss ich nicht, denn bald nach diesem Gespraech wurde ich nach links heraus befohlen, wo eigene Panzer in Angriff waren.

Diese 3 Gefangenen waren die ersten Gegner, die ich sah.

In den spaeten Nachmittagsstunden des 9.6. war ein Stosstrupp unter der Fuehrung des Adjutanten, Obersturmfuehrer BOTHEIM, zu dem Schloss unterwegs gewesen, um noch fahrbereite Panzer, welche von gewissenlosen Fahrern stehen gelassen worden waren, herbeizuholen. Es sollen dann noch zweimal Stosstrupps zu diesem Zweck in verschiedenen Nachten unterwegs gewesen sein, aber wie es hiess, ohne Erfolg.

Becker

Untersturmfuehrer Karl-Walter BECKER
2/Aufkl.Abt., 12 SS Pz.Div. 'H.J.'

Unterschrift der Zeugen :

H.K. Keller Capt
226770
A.M. Fox, Lieut,
Can. Army.

A 092428

H3056-0288

FRANCE 1:50,000

For use by War and Navy Department Agencies only
Not for sale or distribution

CAEN

SECOND EDITION - AMS 1

SHEET 7 F/I

(French 1:80,000 sheet 29 S.W.)

Geographical Section General Staff, No 4250 (AMS M18).
Published by War Office, 1943
2nd Edition 1943

ARMY MAP SERVICE, U. S. ARMY, WASHINGTON, D. C., 1943
Lith.

REFERENCE

The road classification is not based on reconnaissance; its reliability is uncertain. (See reliability diagram)

Main Roads. (Routes Nationale, Chemin de Grande Communication)
6 Metres wide, metalled or paved
4–6
2–4
Secondary Roads.
Other Roads
Foot Paths

Railway, Double line
Single line
Under construction
Narrow Gauge line
Boundary International
Port
Power Cable, Aerial Railway

RELIABILITY DIAGRAM

Enlarged from French 1:80,000. Last revision 1910
Roads classified from 1:200,000 Michelin Tourist Map. Last revision 1938
Area revised from Survey Photographs 1943

Contours have been interpolated from spot heights and hachures on the French 1:80,000. Their probable accuracy varies with the number of heights and the nature of the ground. They should be accepted with caution

Scale 1:50,000 or 1 Inch to 0·79 Miles

Metres 1,000 500 0 1 2 3 4 5 Kms.

Yards 1,000 0 1,000 2,000 3,000 4,000 5,000 Yards

Miles ½ ¼ 0 1 2 3 Miles

Contour interval 10 metres

The Grid on this map is Lambert Zone I Origin-the intersection of the parallel 55 Grades North with the longitude of Paris Observatory

Longitude of Paris is 2°20'14" East of Greenwich

HEIGHTS IN METRES

REFERENCE

Drawn and Reproduced at the Ordnance Survey, 1942
Revised 1943

Church, Chapel
Calvary
Cemetery
Windmill, Windpump, Watermill
Tower, Chimney, Monument
Spot Height
Wireless Station
Orchards, Vineyards
Woods, Brushwood

Navigable Canal
River Canalised
Non-Navigable Canal
Ford, Pedestrian, Foot
Ferry
Well, Spring, Reservoir
Marsh
Sand
Quarries

Glossary.

Abr.	Abreuvoir	Watering Place	
Alms	Maison d'Aliénés	Asylum	
	Anse	Cove	
Arsl	Arsenal	Arsenal	
Asle	Asile	Asylum	
Aub	Auberge	Inn	
	Bac	Ferry	
	Bas	Low	
	Bascule	Weigh-bridge	
	Bois	Wood	
	Batterie	Battery	
	Barrage	Brickworks	
Briq.	Briqueterie	Brickworks	
	Brasserie	Brickwood	
	Buisson	Thicket	
Cab.	Cabaret	Small Inn	
	Canal	Canal	
Cant.	Canton	Canton	
Carr.	Carrière	Quarry	
Carref.	Carrefour	Cross roads	
Cas.	Caserne	Barracks	
Chât.	Chateau	Castle or Large Country House	
Chée	Chaussée	Road	
Chpl.	Chapelle	Chapel	
Chin.	Chemin	Road	
Cim.	Cimetière	Cemetery	
	Clocher	Belfry	
	Commune	Commune	
	Département	Department	
Dig.	Digue	Dyke	
	Ecluse	Lock	
Etg.	Etang	Pond	
	Four	Kiln	
Fme., Fs	Ferme	Farm	
Fortif., Ft	Fortification, Fort	Fortification, Fort	
Fst.	Forêt	Forest	
Gn.	Gendarmerie	Police station	
	Gué	Ford	
Hpl.	Hôpital	Hospital	
	Lac	Lake	
Mair.	Mairie	Town Hall	
Mdre	Maréchage	Marsh	
Mtne	Montagne	Mountain	
Mrie	Manoir	Manor Hall	
Mln.	Moulin	Mill	
Mt.	Mont	Hill	
	Puisseaux	Culvert	
Pge	Passage	Crossing	
Ph.	Phare	Lighthouse	
Plss.	Plaisse	Plaisse	
Pnle.	Passerelle	Footbridge	
Pnln.	Plantation	Plantation	
Prfre	Préfecture	Chief town of Department	
Psn.	Prison	Prison	
Pte.	Pontlon	Pontlon	
R.	Rivière	River	
Rau.	Ruisseau	Stream	
Roch.	Rocher	Rock	
Rte. Nle	Route Nationale	Trunk road	
Sabl.	Sablonnière	Sandpit	
Sapne.	Sapinière	Pine wood	
Scie.	Scierie	Sawmill	
Tourbre	Tourbière	Bog	
Tle.	Tuilerie	Tilework	
Usne	Usine	Factory	
Vée.	Vallée	Valley	

INCIDENCE OF GRID LETTERS AND INDEX TO ADJOINING SHEETS

	O	P
T	ISIGNY 61/6	CREULLY 72/6
	TROUVILLE 79/6	
	ST. LO 61/3	CAEN 72/3
U	TROARN 77/3	
	TORIGNI-SUR-VIRE 61/4	AUNAY-SUR-ODON 72/3
	ST. PIERRE 77/4	

EXAMPLE OF A GRID REFERENCE ON THIS SHEET

LETTER T

POINT	LA BYUDE	
	East	North
	Take West edge of square and read figure opposite 5th line on North or South margin or 5th line from	Take South edge of square and read figure opposite 5th line on East or West margin or 5th line from
	Eastern tenths westward. East 8·2	Northern tenths northwards. North 0·7
REFERENCE	T 538672	
Unit	metre Square	1,000 Reference to nearest 100

Nearest similar reference on this grid 500 Kms. distant

Convergence is given for centres of W. & E. sheet lines.

C-2° 20' W C-2° 00' W

Magnetic declination from True North for centre of sheet is 10° 05' W Jan. 1943

Annual change about 10' E.

T.N. G.N. T.N. G.N.

CAEN
N4907-W018/11x26

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H3056-0289

FRANCE 1:25,000

THAON

Edition of Jun. 1943

Sheet No. 37/16 N.E.

Vienne-en-Bessin
le Varamberg
du Château
Vaussieux
Rucqueville
MARTRAGNY
St Léger
le Parc
Ste CROIX GRAND TONNE
Lieu Maillot
Gernesey
Ducy Ste Marguerite
le Bois de Ducy
Loucelles
l'Hôtel Fortune
le Bas d'Audrieu
Audrieu
la Rue
le Haut d'Audrieu
Cr aux Cornes Chaulieu
Oristot
Coulombs
St Barbanne
Fresnay-le-Crotteur
Bronay
Ormelard
la Mottte
PUTOT-EN-BESSON
Ht de Bretteville
BRETTEVILLE-L'ORGUEILLENSE
NORREY-EN-BESSIN
les Saullets
Cairon
Beauval
Cully
le Pt Vey
le Gr Vey
Cacharas
Quesnay
le Bout Cachard
SECQUEVILLE-EN-BESSIN
la Bergerie Fe
Fe de Cardonville
le Hamel
Camet
Mauneville
Lantheuil
Perepont
Carrières d'Orival
LE FRESNE-CAMILLY
Camilly
le Landel
le Vey
Moulineaux
Bricqueville
FONTAINE-HENRY
Chaos
BASLY
THAON
Barbière
Colomby-sur-Thaon
Bouaville
le Vey
les Buissons
Vieux Cairon
LASSON
Neuf-Mer
Boutte du Rosel
ROSEL
Bray
le Ricaras
ROTS
la Hte Rue
le Bourg
Franqueville
Grigny
BURON
ARTHIE
Cussy
Ardenne Abbaye
Chor de St Louet
Scale 1:25,000 or 2·53 inches to 1 Mile
Yards 1000 500 0 1000 2000 3000 4000 Yards
Metres 1000 500 0 1000 2000 3000 4000 Metres
THE GRID on this sheet is LAMBERT ZONE I (RED)
Projection — Lambert (modified) Conical Orthomorphic
Spheroid — Clarke 1880
Origin — 55 Grades N. Meridian of Paris
False Co-ords. of Origin 600,000m.E. 200,000m.N.
Scale Factor — 8151·6 / 8152·6
Difference in Long. Paris — Greenwich 2°20' 13·95"
NOTES ① Road Classification is based on Michelin and other information. It has not been checked on the ground and its reliability is uncertain.
② Contours are at 10 m.V.I. They are interpolated from spot heights and hachures on the French 1:80,000 and amplified from Air Photo Examination. They should be accepted with caution.
③ Principal Points of photographs used in compilation are shown thus +
④ Trig Lists of this area are on a 1:50,000 sheet basis — see incidence
INDEX
INCIDENCE OF 1:50,000 SHEETS
6E/6 7E/5 DIVES 6F/2 7F/1
Convergence is given for centres of W. & E. sheet lines C=0° 14' W. C=0° 05' W
Magnetic declination for centre of sheet from True North 09° 50' W from Grid North 01° 40' W
June 1943 Annual change about 10' E.
T.N. G.N. T.N. G.N.
Compiled from Air Photographs and control provided by existing French Triangulation
Mud, Sand, Shingle, Dunes
Woods, Orchards, Brushwood
Vineyard, Cemetery, Well
Calvary, Church with Trig., Church
Windmill, Windpump, Lighthouse, Light
Tower, Chimney, Monument, Trig Point
Lins of Trees, Trees along Road
Embankment, Cutting
Cliff or Quarry, Rock
Sngl Height, Contours
Pylons unsurveyed
Pylons surveyed
Ferry
5 M/3/44/3 RGE/1000

H3056-0290

FRANCE 1:25,000

CHEUX

Edition of Jul 1943

Sheet No. 37/16 S.E.

FONTENAY-LE-PESNEL

CHEUX

CARPIQUET

VERSON

NOYERS

Scale 1:25,000 or 2·53 inches to 1 Mile

Yards 1000 500 0 1000 2000 3000 4000 Yards

Metres 1000 500 0 1000 2000 3000 4000 Metres

THE GRID on this sheet is LAMBERT ZONE I (RED)

Projection — Lambert (modified) Conical Orthomorphic

Spheroid — Clarke 1880

Origin — 55 Grades N. Meridian of Paris

False Co-ords. of Origin 600,000m.E. 200,000m.N.

Scale Factor — 8151·6 / 8152·6

Difference in Long. Paris — Greenwich 2°20′ 13·95″

NOTES ① Road Classification is based on Michelin and other information. It has not been checked on the ground and its reliability is uncertain.

② Contours are at 10m.V.I. They are interpolated from spot heights and hachures on the French 1:80,000 and amplified from Air Photo Examination. They should be accepted with caution.

③ Principal Points of photographs used in compilation are shown thus +

④ Trig. Lists of this area are on a 1:50,000 sheet basis — see incidence

INDEX

INCIDENCE OF 1:50,000 SHEETS

6 F/2 | 7F/1 | 6 F/4 | 7F/3

Convergence is given for centres of W. & E. sheet lines C=02° 16′ W. C=02° 06′ W.

Magnetic declination for centre of sheet from True North 09° 48′W from Grid North 07° 40′W June 1943 Annual change about 10′E.

T.N. G.N. T.N. G.N.

Compiled from Air Photographs on a control provided by existing French Triangulation

Mud, Sand, Shingle, Dunes

Woods, Orchards, Brushwood

Vineyard, Cemetery, Well

Calvary, Church with Trig., Church

Windmill, Windpump, Lighthouse, Light

Tower, Chimney, Monument, Trig. Point

Line of Trees, Trees along Road

Embankment, Cutting

Cliff or Quarry, Rock

Spot Height, Contours

Pylons unsurveyed

Pylons surveyed

Ferry

H3056-0291

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EXHIBIT "A 1"

ORDRES SECRETS

Dans un courrier precedent nous avons fit que suivant un soldat SS les allemands auraient recu des ordres secrets. Quelque temps apres nous avons donne le nom de ce soldat. Voici ce que ce meme soldat declare. Nous laissons sa declaration en langue flamande, celle ci etant celle qu'il parle avec le plus de facilite.

25e Regiment SS. - Hitlerjugend - Adolf Hitler

SS Troopen - 15 e Kompagnie - Opklaringsafdeeling.

Geheimbevelen.

1ste bevel : houding tegenover de burgerbevolking in de bezette gebieden: Indien de bevolking een SS. soldat verachterlijk aanziet of spuwt, mag deze persoon geslagen worden en gevangen gezet. Indien uit het verhoor blijkt dat men te doen heeft met een anti-duitschgezinde wordt de gevange in het geheim terechtgesteld.

2de bevel. - Indien door een persoon inlichtingen genomen worden naar wapens en munitie wordt deze opgeleid en ten strengste verhoord. Blijkt uit het onderzoek dat het een anti-duitschgezinde is dan wordt de gevangeneterechtgesteld wegens spionnage. Dezelfde straf wordt toegepast aan de soldaten die inlichtingen verstrekken omtrent hunne wapens.

3de bevel: De wachten mogen hunnen post niet verlaten. Tijdens de wacht niet eten, niet drinken, niet slapen, niet rooken, niet liggen. De wapens niet uit de hand geven. De verlating van den post voor de aflossing of de mededeeling van het wachtwoord aan de bevolking wordt met de terechtstelling gestraft. Het wachtwoord is het gewichtigste van de wacht.

4de bevel: houding aan het front:
Er mogen geenekrijgsgevangenen gemaakt worden door de SS troopen. Na verhoor worden de gevangenen terechtgesteld. De S.S. soldaten mogen zich niet overgeven en moeten indien er geen andere keuze is zich zelfmoorden.
Door de officieren wordt verklaard dat er geene gevangenen gemaakt worden door de Engelschen indien het S.S. soldaten betreft.

5dé bevel: De mededeelingen over troepenbewegingen van den vijand dienen snel overgebracht te worden. De mededeelingen op papier dienen eveneens in 't geheugen geprent te blijven. Is een soldaat in gevaar zoo dienen alle papieren verbrand of opgegeten. Alleen het immatriculatienummer moet medegenomen worden

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EXHIBIT "A 1"

Voor alles dient gezwegen te worden.
De verraders worden zelfs na den oorlog terechtgesteld.

6de bevel: de waarnemers welke de inlichtingen overbrengen van het front en terug met de officieren keeren nooit langs denzelfden weg terug als dezo waarlangs ze gekomen zijn.

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15 COY, 25 PZ. GREN. REGT. SECRET ORDERS IN FLEMISH.

A 092433

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288

000.5-2(25) EXHIBIT "A 2"

EnA2

12. S.S. Panzer Division (Hitlerjugend)

Geheime Befehle

1. Befehl:- Haltung gegenüber Zivilbevölkerung im besetzten Gebiete:
Falls die Bevölkerung verächtlich einen SS Soldaten ansieht oder ihn anspuckt, kann die betreffende Person geschlagen und verhaftet werden. Falls das Kreuzverhör den Eindruck hinterlässt, dass der Verhaftete deutschfeindlich ist, soll er heimlich hingerichtet werden ("terechtgesteld").

2. Befehl:- Falls jemand versucht, Auskunft über Waffen oder Munition zu erhalten, soll er verhaftet und einem scharfen Kreuzverhör unterworfen werden. Falls das Kreuzverhör den Eindruck hinterlässt, dass der Verhaftete deutschfeindlich ist, soll er wegen Spionage hingerichtet werden. Soldaten, welche Auskunft über Wachen geben sollen dieselbe Strafe bekommen.

3. Befehl:- Wachtposten dürfen weder ihren Posten verlassen, noch ist es ihnen gestattet zu essen, trinken, schlafen, rauchen, hinlegen oder ihre Waffen aus der Hand zu legen, während sie auf Wache stehen. Den Posten vor vorschriftsmässiger Ablösung zu verlassen oder das Losungswort der Bevölkerung mitzuteilen, wird mit dem Tode bestraft. Das Losungswort ist der wichtigste Punkt der Wachtpflichten.

4. Befehl:- Haltung an der Front:
SS-Truppen sollen keine Gefangenen machen. Gefangene sollen nach dem Verhör hingerichtet werden. SS-Soldaten sollen sich nicht ergeben und müssen Selbstmord begehen falls ihnen keine andere Wahl bleibt.
Offiziere haben ausgesagt, dass die Engländer keine SS-Soldaten gefangen nehmen.

5. Befehl:- Nachrichten über feindliche Truppenbewegungen sollen so schnell wie möglich durchgegeben werden. Schriftliche Nachrichten sollen zu gleicher Zeit auswendig gelernt werden. Sobald ein Soldat in Gefahr gerät, müssen alle Papiere verbrannt oder aufgegessen werden. Er darf nichts als seine Erkennungsmarke tragen.
Strengstes Schweigen in allen Dingen muss bewahrt werden. Verräter werden hingerichtet werden, selbst nach dem Kriege.

6. Befehl:- Beobachter, die mit Information von der Front zurückkehren, und begleitende Offiziere sollen nicht auf demselben Wege zurückkehren, den sie zur Front genommen haben.

EXHIBIT A1 TRANSLATED INTO GERMAN.

A 092434

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H3056-0294

000.5-2(25)

EXHIBIT "A 2"

SECRET

Ex A3

Translation of Romish part of CX 12401/IV/72650 (Opifex)
Inf.: dated July 44.

25th Regiment SS - Hitlerjugend - Adolf Hitler
SS Troops - 15th Company- Reconnaissance Bn.

Secret Orders.

1st Order:- attitude towards civilian population in occupied countries: If the population looks contemptuously at an SS soldier or spits (at him) the person concerned may be beaten and arrested. If ~~it~~ the cross-examination results in the impression that the arrested is an Anti-German he shall be secretly executed("terechtgesteld")

2d Order: If a person tries to get information about weapons and ammunition he shall be arrested and cross-examined in the most rigorous manner. If the cross-examination results in the impression that the arrested is an Anti-German he shall be executed ~~for~~ espionage. The same punishment shall be meted out to soldiers who pass on information about their weapons.

3d Order: Guards are not allowed to leave their posts, Nor are they allowed to eat, drink,sleep, smoke, lay down, let their weapons out of their hands as long as they are on guard duty. Leaving the post before being relieved or passing on of the password to the population will be punished by death. The password is the most important thing of guard duties.

4th Order: Attitude at the front:
The SS troops shall take no prisoners. Prisoners are to be executed after having been interrogated. The SS soldiers shall not give themselves up and must commit suicide if there is no other choice left.

The officers have stated that the British do not take prisoners as far as SS soldiers are concerned.

5th Order: Information about enemy's troop movements is to be communicated quickly. Communications on paper shall, at the same time, be learnt by heart. If a soldier gets into danger all papers must be burnt or eaten up. He is to carry nothing but his identification disk.

Silence must be kept about everything. The traitors will be executed,even after the war.

6th Order: The observers returning with information from the front and accompanying officers shall not take the same route as to the front.

EXHIBIT A2 TRANSLATED INTO ENGLISH.

A 92435

EXHIBIT No. C1

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Geheime Kommandosache

A b s c h r i f t

Bezug: Fuhrerbefehl Nr. 033830/42 g.Kdos. vom 18.10. 42 OKW/WAST.
Betr.: Behandlung Kommandoangehoeriger.

9 Abschriftsausfertigungen
6.Abschriftsausfertigung

OKW teilt mit:

"1) Auch nach der Landung der Anglo-Amerikaner in Frankreich bleibt der Befehl des Fuehrers ueber die Vernichtung von Terror- und Sabotagetrupps vom 18.10.42 voll aufrechterhalten. Ausgenommen bleiben feindl. Soldaten in Uniform im unmittelbaren Kampfgebiet des Landekopfes, das heisst im Bereich der in vorderer Linie kaempfenden Divisionen sowie der Reserven bis einschliesslich Gen.Kdos. gemaess Ziffer 5 des grundlegenden Befehls vom 18.10.42.

2) Alle ausserhalb des unmittelbaren Kampfgebietes angetroffenen Angehoerigen von Terror- und Sabotagetrupps, zu denen grundsaetzlich alle Fallschirmspringer rechnen, sind im Kampfe niederzumachen. In Sonderfaellen sind sie dem SD zu uebergeben.

3) Saemtliche ausserhalb des Kampfgebietes der Normandie eingesetzten Truppen sind ueber die Pflicht der Vernichtung feindl. Terror- und Sabotagetrupps kurz und buendig nach hierfuer erlassenen Bestimmungen zu unterrichten.

4) OB-West meldet ab sofort taeglich, wieviel Saboteure auf diese Weise liquidiert sind. Das gilt vor allem auch fuer die Unternehmen der Militaerbefehlshaber. Die Zahl soll taeglich im Wehrmachtsbericht bekanntgegeben werden, um damit eine abschreckende Wirkung auszuueben, wie sie schon gegenueber den frueheren Kommandounternehmen auf gleiche Weise erreicht ist."

F.d.R.d...:

/s/ illegible

Leutnant

A 092436



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291

EXHIBIT No. C1

H3056-0296

Anlage 1 zu Panzer A.O.K. 5/ Ic Nr.516/44
gKdos.v. .4.10.44.

Abschrift von Abschrift GEHEIME
KOMMANDOSACHE

Der Fuhrer
033830/42 gKdos./OKW/WFSt. F.H.Qu., den 18.10.42

23 Ausfertigungen
10.Ausfertigung
4 Abschriftsausfertigungen
1.Abschriftsausfertigung
9 Abschriftsausfertigungen
(writen)
- Abschriftsausfertigung

1) Schon seit langerer Zeit bedienen sich unsere Gegner in ihrer Kriegsfuhrung Methoden, die ausserhalb der internationalen Abmachungen von Genf stehen. Besonders brutal und hinterhaltig benehmen sich die Angehorigen der sogenannten Kommandos, die sich selbst, wie feststeht, teilweise sogar aus Kreisen von in den Feindlandern freigelassenen kriminellen Verbrechern rekrutieren. Aus erbeuteten Befehlen geht hervor, dass sie beauftragt sind, nicht nur Gefangene zu fesseln, sondern auch wehrlose Gefangene kurzerhand zu toten im Moment, in dem sie glauben, dass diese bei der weiteren Verfolgung ihrer Zwecke als Gefangene einen Ballast darstellen oder sonst ein Hindernis sein konnten. Es sind endlich Befehle gefunden worden, in denen grundsatzlich die Totung der Gefangenen verlangt worden ist.

2) Aus diesem Anlass wurde in einem Zusatz zum Wehrmachtsbericht vom 7.10.42 bereits angekundigt, dass in Zukunft Deutschland gegenuber diesen Sabotagetrupps der Briten und ihrer Helfershelfer zu gleichem Verfahren greifen wird, das heisst: dass sie durch die deutchen Truppen, wo immer sie auch auftreten, rucksichtslos im Kampfniedergemacht werden.

3) Ich befehle daher:
Von jetzt ab sind alle bei sogenannten Kommando-Unternehmungen in Europa oder in Afrika von deutschen Truppen gestellte Gegner, auch wenn es sich ausserlich um Soldaten in Uniform oder Zerstorungstrupps mit oder ohne Waffen handelt, im Kampf oder auf der Flucht bis auf den letzten Mann niederzumachen. Es ist dabei ganz gleich, ob sie zu ihren Aktionen durch Schiffe und Flugzeuge angelandet werden oder mittels Fallschirm abspringen. Selbst wenn diese Subjekte bei Auffindung Anstalten machen sollten, sich gefangen zu geben, ist ihnen grundsatzlich jeder Pardon zu verweigern. Hieruber ist in jedem Einzelfall zur Bekanntgabe im Wehrmachtsbericht eine eingehende Meldung an das OKW zu erstatten.

4) Gelangen einzelne Angehorige derartiger Kommandos, als Agenten, Saboteure auf einem anderen Weg - z. B. durch die Polizei in den von uns besetzten Landern - der Wehrmacht in die Hande, so sind sie unverzuglich dem SD zu ubergeben.- Jede Verwahrung

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EXHIBIT No. C2

ANNEX TO THE NOTE OF PANZER A.O.K. 5/Ic
Nr.516/44 Gkdos.v.4.10.44

COPY OF A COPY

GEHEIME KOMMANDOSACHE

THE FUEHRER
033830/42 gKdos/OKW/WFSt.

F.H.Qu., 18.10.42

23 copies
Copy No. 10
4 copies of the copy
Copy No. 1 of the copy
9 copies of the copy
Copy No.____of the copy.

1. For some time now our opponents have been using, inthe prosecution of the War, methods which are in contravention of the International Geneva Conventions. The attitude of the so-called Commandos is especially brutal and underhanded. These Commandos, it has been established, are for a part recruited among ordinary criminals, who are freed from imprisonment in enemy countries for this purpose. From captured documents it appears that they have received orders, not only to bind prisoners, but also to kill them, without hesitation, at the moment they believe that they might become a nuisance, or that they might constitute an obstacle to the carrying out of their mission. Moreover, we have captured orders prescribing as a matter of principle, the killing of prisoners.

2. For this reason it was already announced in an addendum to the Wehrmacht communique of the 7/10/42, that hereafter Germany would have recourse to the same methods, as regards those groups of British saboteurs or their accomplices, that is to say, that the German troops would exterminate them, mercilessly, wherever they may be found.

3. I therefore order:

Hereafter all opponents met by German troops in the course of so-called Commando operations in Europe or Africa, even if they would appear to be groups of soldiers in uniform or demolition squads with or without arms, must be exterminated to the last man in combat or pursuit. It will make no difference whatsoever whether, in the course of these actions, they be landed by boat or plane or descend by parachute. Even if these individuals acted as if they wished to surrender, no quarter must, on principle, be given them. On this point a detailed report must be submitted in each particular case to the O.K.W. for insertion in Wehrmacht communiques.

4. If members of such Commandos, acting as agents, saboteurs, etc., fall into the hands of the Wehrmacht, in a different way (for example, through the police in occupied territory) they must be handed over forthwith to the S.D. It is strictly forbidden to keep them in military custody (for example, in a P.O.W. camp), even temporarily.

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EXHIBIT No. C2

5. These regulations do not apply to hostile soldiers captured (or who have surrendered) in open combat, in the course of normal combat operations. (Offensives, large-scale landing operations by sea or air). They do not apply either to enemy military personnel fallen into our hands following naval engagements or to airmen having descended by parachute to save their own life in the course of aerial fighting.

6. I shall cause to be brought to trial by Court-Martial all these leaders and officers who will be held responsible for the non-execution of these instructions, either because they have neglected to instruct those under their command or because they have failed to carry out this order in action.

Sgd: (Signature)

Certified true copy of copy
Signature illegible
Lieutenant.

Certified a true translation of the original:
/s/F.E. HAYWOOD
Major

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unter militarischer Obhut, z.B. in Kriegsgefangenenlagern usw., ist, wenn auch nur vorubergehend gedacht, strengstens verboten.

5) Diese Anordnung gilt nicht fur die Behandlung derjenigen feindlichen Soldaten, die im Rahmen normaler Kampfhandlungen (Grossangriffe, Grosslandungsoperationen, und Grossluftlandeunternehmen) im offenen Kamp gefangen genommen werden oder sich ergeben. Ebensowenig gilt diese Anordnung gegenuber den nach Kampfen auf See in unsere Hand gefallenen oder nach Kampfen in der Luft durch Fallschirmabsprung ihr Leben zu retten versuchenden feindlichen Soldaten.

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EXHIBIT No. C3

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GEHEIME KOMMANDOSACHE

COPY

REF : Fuehrer's Order Nr. 033830/42 g.Kdos. vom 18.10.42 OKW/WEST

SUBJECT: Treatment of Members of Commandos.

9 Copies

Copy No. 6.

THE OKW REPORTS:

1. Even after Anglo-American landings in FRANCE, the Fuhrer's order, dated 18/10/42 concerning the destruction of groups of terrorists and saboteurs, remains fully valid. It does not apply to enemy soldiers in uniform within the immediate bridgehead combat zone, that is, in the sectors of the front line divisions, as well as those of the reserves back to corps, inclusively, in accordance with No. 5 of the basic order of 18/10/42.

2. All members of groups of terrorists and saboteurs including, as a matter of principle, any parachutists encountered outside the immediate combat zone, must be exterminated. In particular cases they must be handed over to the S.D. (Sicherheitsdienst).

3. All troops committed outside the Normandy battle area must be instructed briefly and explicitly on the duty of destroying enemy terrorists and sabotage troops, in accordance with the relevant orders.

4. The Supreme Commander West will report daily, as of today, on the number of saboteurs thus liquidated. This procedure applies in particular to actions taken by the Militarbefelshaber. This number must be reported in the daily Wehrmacht communique in order to produce a deterrent effect similar to that which was obtained by the same method in connection with former Commando operations.

Certified a true translation of the original:

/s/ F.E.Haywood
Major

Certified true copy

Sigd. (Illegible)

Lieutenant

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EXHIBIT No. C4

GEHEIME KOMMANDOSACHE

Gen. Kdo. XXXXVII. PZ. Korps
Nr. 6/44 g.Kdos
Subject: Treatment of Commandos

Generalkommando LXXXIX A.K.
24 Okt 1944 Abt.Ic No. 21/44 g.k.
Korps-Gef.Stand,
10.10.44

6 Copies
Copy No. 6

Distribution:
16 .Inf.Div. IIa zugl.H.Qu
21 .Pz. Div. Qu-Abt
Pz.KNa 447.

Attached hereto is the Fuehrer's order dated 18.10.42, with supplementary order:

Redistribution of this document and security of information, Pz A.O.K. 5 orders:

1. This order is to be distributed down to regiments and staffs of the same level. Information to lower formations to be communicated verbally.

2. After the information has been communicated, the copies addressed to regiments and staffs of the same level, will be destroyed. A report certifying destruction will be submitted by 19.10.

3. Attention is directed to the absolute necessity of keeping this document in a safe place. If this condition cannot be fulfilled, the order is to be destroyed from and including paragraph 3 onwards.

For Corps Headquarters

The Chief of Staff

Sgd: (Signature illegible).

2 Inclosures.

Certified a true translation
of the original:

/s/ F.E. Haywood
Major

A 092442

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H3056-0302

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EXHIBIT "D"

CAS./1/4/3

MASSEY

EXTERNAL

17,2.45.

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SECRET

Your telegram 1525 of July 28th, shootings of prisoners in Normandy.

CMHQ German Foreign Office under date December 31st wrote Swiss regarding Swiss memoranda of August 4th and September 13th. Substance of German reply begins:

1. We have been informed of result of Court of Inquiry proceedings on 18 Canadian soldiers (June 7) and 7 Canadian soldiers (June 17). Contents of declaration on oath and names of witnesses not received.

SMS Nothing said about circumstances of deaths in Court's report. All depends on arbitrary assertion based on no facts whatever. We emphatically refuse to accept this slander for which no proof exists.

2. Nevertheless there has been a thorough investigation. Regarding June 7 case, nothing accurate could be confirmed because of absence of parties concerned owing to the succeeding battle. Regarding June

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EXHIBIT "D"

17 case, that part of the SS-Panzer Pioneer Battalion 12 which took part on that day was almost totally destroyed on June 26th.

Ends.

A 092444

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

EXHIBIT "E"
(COPY)

SKETCH DRAWN BY

Rich. LEBARR

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A 492345

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EXHIBIT "F"

H3056-0305

EnF

(Enclosure En No 16)

Skizze

Kassel.—

Le-Mesnil-Patrie

Norrey

1 Sqd

1 Sqd

Stellung 3 Kp.

?

Kp. 3 Zug

St. 2 Kp.

100 m etwa

Bach

Hauptstrasse

Bt. Gef. St.

Rest 1 Kp.

10-6

11-6

SKETCH DRAWN BY USF P. KURET.

000.50 2(25)

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EXHIBIT "G".

REPROT NO. PWIS(H)/LDC/383.

LOCATION OF HQ OF AUFKLAERUNGS ABT OF 12 SS PZ DIV "HITLER JUGEND" AT 1100 HRS ON 9 Jun 44.

ENLARGEMENT OF SHEET 7 F/1 G.S.G. 4250 FRANCE 1:50,000 enlarged 1:10,000

LEGEND:
- 1st and 2nd class roads
- 3rd class roads
- Field boundaries
- Buildings

SKETCH DRAWN TO SHOW POSITION RECCE. BN. REFERRED TO IN EX. 29.

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Dienststelle der
F.P.Nr. 58 286 B

O.U., den [illegible]

APPEN- A

Bescheinigung

Das Fahrzeug [illegible] wurde von der obigen Dienststelle, bedingt durch den Alarmzustand und die dringende Transportfrage, beschlagnahmt. (Besitzer: [illegible])

[illegible]
SS-Unterstürmführer und
Kompaniefuhrer i.V.

REQUISITION D/8 JUN 44 (SEE EX. 26)

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EXHIBIT "J"

MAIRIE
DE
SAINT-SULPICE-SUR-RILLE
PAR LAIGLE (ORNE)

CANTON DE LAIGLE

ARRONDISSEMENT D'ALENÇON

Saint-Sulpice-sur-Rille, le 9 Juin 1944

APPEN-8
Enclo "J"

Der Ersäger dieses Zeugnisses, J. Coppin, ist bei mir angestellt worden um die Verbindungen mit Laigle und benachbarten Gemeinden, wo möglich zu sichern (Verenglückter, Nährmitteln, u.s.w.)

der Bürgermeister

MAIRIE DE ST-SULPICE-SUR-RILLE (ORNE)

Dienststelle Feldpostnummer 58286 B

SS-Untersturmführer und
Standartkommandant i.V.

PERMIT D/9 JUN 44 (SEE EX. 28)

H3056-0308

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EXHIBIT "K"

APPEN-D Exhibit "K"

Feldpost

SS-Mann

Werner K u n z e .

Fp.Nr. 58286 B

FIELDPOST CARD D/31-5-44 (SEE EX. 28)

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000.5-2(25)

EXHIBIT "K"

APPEN-D Exhibit "K"

Feldpost

SS-Mann

Werner K u n z e .

Fp.Nr. 58286 B

FIELDPOST CARD D/31-5-44 (SEE EX. 28)

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Filed Dec. 20, 1945

EXHIBIT U.S.A. 472 (2997-PS)

EXHIBIT U.S.A.

472

(2997-PS)

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1 Book